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Editors’ Introduction
Melanie O’Brien edited this Special Issue on Justice and the Prevention of Genocide. She was
the the head of the 2017 IAGS Conference in Brisbane and also part of the GSP Editorial Team for
more than three years. All members of the Editorial Board that have worked with her in the past are
grateful for her contribution to the journal and the excellent work she has done on this special issue.
We wanted to briefly highlight that this Special Issue has a few components that do not quite
fall within the issue’s theme. However, these other submissions are well within the rubrics and
topics we address in GSP, and therefore have been included in this publication.
We have added a full article by Emily Willard. Based on newly declassified documents, she
has reanalyzed the withdrawal of UN Peacekeepers during the Genocide in Rwanda. It has been
argued that the so-called Somalia syndrome (the catastrophic outcome of the US-intervention in
Somalia in October 1993) led to the reluctance of the U.S. Government regarding its involvement
in Rwanda. Willard, however, argues that the political actors decided on how to act in the Rwanda
case before the Somali experience. Willard disentangles the many factors and actors and creates a
better understanding of these rather complex political and organizational processes.
Field notes are about research practices and ideally discuss innovative approaches. In this sense,
the paper of James Tyner, Andrew Curtis, Sokvisal Kimsroy, and Chhunly Chhay fits perfectly, as
it constructs a geo-narrative account/analysis of the evacuation of Phnom Penh under the Khmer
Rouge regime. The method featured, Spatial Video Geonarrative, confronts witnesses with filmed
places of the event. This method “may trigger specific recollections and thereby contribute to a
deeper, more nuanced understanding of previous experiences.” We hope to initiate a discussion on
the merits and weaknesses of such an approach.
Finally, Jolene Hansell’s case note discusses how Eritrean nationals bring their claim against
a Canadian company that operates in Eritrea before a Canadian court. The plaintiffs argue, “their
treatment as laborers (…) violates customary international law prohibitions against forced labor.”
The paper sheds light on the complexities, but also on the possibilities to bring economic entities
operating internationally to justice.
Christian Gudehus
Susan Braden
Randle DeFalco
Roland Moerland
Brian Kritz
JoAnn DiGeorgio-Lutz
Lior Zylberman

Christian Gudehus, Susan Braden, Randle DeFalco, Roland Moerland, Brian Kritz, JoAnn DiGeorgio-Lutz, and Lior Zylberman.
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Guest Editorial: Justice for and Prevention of Genocide
In 2017, the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) conference was held at the
University of Queensland (UQ), Brisbane, Australia. Hosting by the UQ Law School and the AsiaPacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P Centre), the theme was Justice and Prevention
of Genocide. The conference was a resounding success, attending by almost 200 scholars from
around the world. Papers were delivered on topics ranging from the Armenian Genocide to
the Indonesian atrocities of 1965, climate change, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (ECCC), and Indigenous genocides. The latter topic was particularly relevant given the
host country, Australia, and its history as a colonised land, leading to massacres of local Aboriginal
populations, removal of Aboriginal children from their families,1 and ongoing inequalities between
Aboriginal and other populations today. One of the keynote speakers was a local Aboriginal elder,
Lilla Watson, who opened the conference at the Welcome Event. Her keynote was particularly
poignant and moving, detailing the impact of colonisation on Aboriginal people, and the personal
connection for her with these atrocities.
Three of the other keynote speeches are included in this special issue. Alex Bellamy, Director of
the R2P Centre, and foremost expert on R2P, spoke on ‘Holding Back the Tide? Human Protection
and Genocide Prevention in our More Violent World’, where atrocity prevention is key in a time of
global conflict. William Smith, the Deputy Co-Prosecutor of the ECCC, spoke about the different
types of evidence required to prove atrocities at the ECCC, with a particular focus on the importance
of the work of scholars in the field and the role they played in the trial. Robert Cribb talked about
the limits of historical guilt over atrocities, with specific reference to the case of Japan in WWII and
its post-war relations with the West.
A screening of the film ‘Denial’ at IAGS2017 was particularly relevant and timely, given that,
only two months before the conference, Holocaust denial flyers were found on the campus of
UQ, as well as other Australian universities.2 Included in this special issue are the three talks from
panellists Henry Theriault, Kirril Shields and Ted Nanicelli, who analysed different aspects of the
film and the continuing problem of genocide denial.
Drawing from the theme of IAGS2017, this special issue contains five articles focused on the
theme of justice for and prevention of genocide. Judith Rafferty’s empirical research in Rwanda
examines the needs and desires of women victims of sexual violence during the 1994 genocide,
for whom ‘justice’ takes many different perspectives. Rebecca Gidley and Matthew Turner’s piece
looks at the role of historians as expert witnesses in trials for international crimes, comparing West
Germany Holocaust trials with those of the ECCC and the Bangladesh Tribunal, and the challenges
that are presented from this very specific category of expert witness. Caroline Bennett’s interviews
with Cambodians have explored how the Cambodians view the concept of ‘karma’ within the
justice and reconciliation landscape in post-Khmer Rouge Cambodia. Katherine Southwick
touches upon one of the most current genocidal cases- the Rohingya- presenting a sociology of
law perspective as to why the international community has failed to act to prevent the genocide in
Myanmar. Finally, Bjoern Schiffbauer considers the concept of ‘naming and shaming’ as a method
of genocide prevention, and where the challenges lie in its effectiveness as a prevention option
under the Genocide Convention. Thus, there is a balance in the articles between the two main
concepts of ‘justice’ and ‘prevention’; two equally important concepts, and inherently connected
to each other: justice steps in where prevention fails, justice is rarely needed where prevention
succeeds, and justice itself is a form of prevention.
As a human rights and international criminal lawyer, a majority of my work is focused on
prosecution of perpetrators of atrocities and human rights violations. That is, it is focused on justice.
1

See “Bringing Them Home”, a report (1997) and storytelling project of the Australian Human Rights Commission,
accessed November 7, 2018, https://bth.humanrights.gov.au/.

2

Rachel Clun, “Holocaust denial flyers distributed around University of Queensland widely condemned”, Brisbane Times,
May 3, 2017, accessed November 7, 2018, https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/national/queensland/holocaust-denialflyers-distributed-around-universtity-of-queensland-widely-condemned-20170503-gvy3tz.html.
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However, I would very happily find myself without a job should prevention measures all succeed.
Sadly, this is unlikely to be the case any time in the near future. Thus, it is essential that we all
work together, in both fields, prevention and justice, to ensure that, where possible, atrocities are
prevented, or otherwise, that perpetrators of these atrocities are held accountable and impunity is
no longer routine. At domestic and international level, actions of every individual make a difference,
and we should not despair, but rather only increase our passion and purpose to create a world of
tolerance, inclusion, kindness, fairness and dignity. Such actions start at home in our everyday
activities and behaviour, and flow to the very pinnacle of government and international leadership.
Remember that to create a society where social justice is a primary underlying principle, we need
to actively support democracy and rule of law; we need to play our role, through our scholarship
and teaching, but also through participating in democratic processes such as voting, protests and
interaction with our government representatives. As genocide scholars, we are privileged to have
an education and a profession that allows to engage with current affairs and intellectual debate.
We need to ensure that we take this to our government representatives, pressuring them not only
on local issues, such as police targeting of racial minorities, but also international matters such as
imposing bi-lateral sanctions on perpetrators of atrocities or sponsoring a UN resolution advocating
action to protect a targeted civilian population. After all, the UN can act, but it is only the sum of
its member states- which are only the sum of their populations. And those populations include us.
Melanie O’Brien
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Atrocity and the Limits of Historical Guilt
Robert Cribb

Australian National University
Canberra, Australia

In the middle of the 20th century, the international community began for the first time to grapple with
the problem of reckoning with mass atrocity. A deep tension exists, however, between processes of
judicial and para-judicial reckoning, which deal with the direct perpetrators and victims of atrocity
and the instinct to attribute extended historical responsibility to whole categories of people.
Taking advantage of the unconditional surrenders of Germany and Japan that concluded the
Second World War, the victorious allies conducted tens of thousands of trials of alleged perpetrators
of atrocities both in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.1 The formal basis for these prosecutions
varied from country to country – some prosecuting powers referred to otherwise undefined “laws
and customs of war”, some used specific retrospective legislation, still others relied on existing
domestic criminal law – but collectively the trials were based on a new vision of responsibility
for wartime atrocity. Whereas wartime brutality had once been understood to be protected by
the sovereign right of the state to wage war and by the so-called “belligerent rights” of military
personnel to kill in the name of military necessity, the post-war trials asserted on a scale not seen
before or since that individual perpetrators bore individual responsibility for their acts.
In asserting the individual responsibility of perpetrators on this unprecedented scale, the
prosecuting powers had two motives. The first motive was to establish a framework for post-conflict
justice that would both reduce the customary impunity of soldiers for wartime misdeeds and avoid
the moral problem of harsh, generalized retaliation against a defeated enemy. The vast number of
cases to be heard and the problems of identifying suspects and of collecting and assessing evidence
meant that many of the post-war trials followed expedited procedures, accepting dubious evidence
and paying scant attention to the defense case. Sentencing practice was uneven: some defendants
were sentenced to death for relatively modest acts of brutality; other defendants received terms
of imprisonment for apparently egregious acts of cruelty. The prosecuting powers, however,
compared the trials with the arbitrary reckoning of previous times and regarded them as a major
advance, rather than measuring them against the standards of civil criminal trials in peacetime.
The second motive of the victorious powers in conducting individual criminal trials was to
diminish the attribution of guilt to whole nations as had happened after the First World War, when
Germany was required in the Treaty of Versailles to acknowledge guilt for launching the war. This
guilt clause, and other openly punitive articles in the Versailles Treaty, were widely perceived to
have created a legitimate sense of grievance in Germany and thereby to have contributed to the
conditions which led to the rise of Hitler. Accordingly, the Potsdam Declaration, issued by the
United States, Britain and China in July 1945 in anticipation of the final victory over Japan, made
an explicit distinction between the Japanese people as a whole and those who had committed war
crimes: “We do not intend to enslave the Japanese people but stern justice shall be meted out to all
war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners.”2
Public rhetoric by officials and members of the public on the Allied side did not always
maintain this distinction between perpetrators and the nation to which they had belonged. In the
popular press and even in the trials themselves, it is easy to find references to the alleged collective
guilt of Japan and of the Japanese people. Nonetheless, the distinction remained at the core of
most informed discussion of the trial process. In September 1947, Sir William Webb, president of

1

Sandra Wilson, Robert Cribb, Beatrice Trefalt and Dean Aszkielowicz, Japanese War Criminals: The Politics of Justice after the
Second World War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017); Norbert Frei, “Nach der Tat: Die Ahndung deutscher
Kriegs- und NS-Verbrechen in Europa - eine Bilanz,” in Norbert Frei, ed., Transnationale Vergangenheitspolitik: Der
Umgang mit deutschen Kriegsverbrechern in Europa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2006), 7-36.

2

United States Department of State, “Proclamation by the Heads of Governments, United States, China and the United
Kingdom, July 26, 1945,” Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam
Conference), 1945, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), 1476.

Robert Cribb. “Atrocity and the Limits of Historical Guilt” Genocide Studies and Prevention 12, 3 (2018): 4-9. ©2018 Genocide Studies
and Prevention.
https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.12.3.1641

Atrocity and the Limits of Historical Guilt

5

the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (also known as the Tokyo Trial), blocked the
prosecution from raising examples of good conditions and favorable treatment in camps:
We know that there are tens of thousands of kind-hearted Japanese. We would assume in the
army itself, in the navy, in the air force, many Japanese behaved very well but that is not an
answer to these charges. Meet the charges made against you and do not try to prove that in
other cases where no charges were made no faults could be found.3

This determination to separate individual perpetrators from the nation to which they belonged
was also encouraged by the United States’ hope of reshaping Japan as an ally in the emerging
Cold War.
In the period from late 1945 until 1951, seven Allied powers in the Asia-Pacific region – Australia,
the Republic of China, France, the Netherlands Indies, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and
the United States – prosecuted around 5700 men and one woman in 2362 separate trials. The
defendants faced a variety of charges, some of them arising from infringements of the 1929 Geneva
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, some of them arising from an expanded
definition of war crimes which covered abuses carried out against civilians in occupied territories.
The specific charges included murder, torture, rape, arbitrary execution, ill treatment of prisonersof-war, including beatings and the deprivation of food, medicine and shelter as well as some more
specific cases including medical experiments, cannibalism and forced prostitution. To this number
must be added some thousands who were prosecuted in makeshift Chinese local courts and more
thousands who were prosecuted by the Soviet Union. No significant research has been done on
either of these categories of trials, but it is likely that at least two thousand men were prosecuted in
each case, meaning that the total number prosecuted in Asia and the Pacific is around, but possibly
greater than, 10,000. This number is dwarfed by that in Europe, estimated by Norbert Frei to have
exceeded 96,000.4 Since that time, only the gacaca (“grassroots”) courts of Rwanda have processed
a greater number of defendants, though at the cost of highly expedited procedures.5
One might expect that the scale of the reckoning with Japanese perpetrators would have
established the post-war trials as a major landmark in the history of international humanitarian
law. Yet this is not the case. Not only have the trials received relatively little attention until
recently – notably, at the time of presentation there is no Wikipedia entry devoted to the topic
– but a widespread public discourse maintains that Japan has failed to make proper amends for
its wartime crimes. The initial insistence of the Allied powers that wartime guilt would be dealt
with in the comprehensive prosecution of individual perpetrators appears to have been derailed.
Instead, more than seventy years after the end of the Second World War, at a time when all but
a tiny handful of victims, perpetrators and eyewitnesses have died, Japanese people are widely
presumed to carry extended historical responsibility for the wartime actions of their forebears.
This derailment of the Allies’ intentions occurred for three reasons. First, the trials ended before
the full list of suspects had been exhausted. With the evidence available, Allied courts might have
tried some hundreds, possibly thousands, more suspects. Instead, these suspects were released and
the cases against them were dropped. This failure to pursue all suspects was partly a consequence
of changing political circumstances in the Asia-Pacific region – independence, civil war, communist
revolution and the economic incentives to restore good relations with Japan all played a part –
along with the general fatigue of the prosecuting authorities. The consequence, however, was that
men who had avoided trial emerged and played significant roles in post-war politics. Prominent
examples included Kishi Nobusuke (later prime minister), who had been responsible for the
recruitment of Chinese forced labor in Manchuria6 and Tsuji Masanobu (member of parliament)
who had apparently played a significant role in the 1942 massacre of Chinese associated with
3

Transcript, Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, September 3, 1947, 27474, Legal Tools
TR13-263-a_04.

4

Frei, Nach der Tat, 31-32.

5

Christopher J. Le Mon, “Rwanda’s Troubled Gacaca Courts,” Human Rights Brief 14, no. 2 (2007), 16-20.

6

Malcolm Trevor, Japan: Restless Competitor: the Pursuit of Economic Nationalism (Richmond: Japan Library, 2001), 123.
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the Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party) in Singapore. The second reason for derailment
was the growing awareness of the failure of the trial process to address the full range of Japanese
wartime misdeeds. In particular, it became apparent that the United States had worked to prevent
prosecution of Japanese personnel involved in the notorious experiments on living humans carried
out by Unit 731 in Manchuria. The U.S. protected those responsible because it wished to gain access
to the data arising from the experiments.7 Moreover, the trials did not address any Japanese crimes
against Koreans or Taiwanese. Under international law at the time, actions by a state against its
own people were not considered war crimes. Because Korea and Taiwan had been subject to Japan
at the start of the period covered by the trials, the sometimes-forced recruitment of Koreans and
Taiwanese as laborers and military prostitutes was outside the scope of the judicial process. The
absence of attention to these issues increasingly cast a shadow of inadequacy over the trial process.
The third reason for the sense of unrequited Japanese guilt was a complex set of circumstances
that cast Japanese atrocities as egregiously evil. One of these circumstances was the deep
indignation of Western captives of the Japanese military at the conditions they had experienced
during the war. For Westerners, the humiliation of subordination to Asians whom they had been
led to despise, along with the loss of their former privileges in colonial societies, in the context
of a catastrophic decline in living conditions for everyone in the Japanese occupied territories
and Japanese unpreparedness for the task of managing large communities of captives, led to a
large memoir literature that demonized the Japanese as a whole.8 Another circumstance was the
general inclination to equate German and Japanese wartime atrocities, disregarding the absence of
any program of genocide, as the term is commonly understood, on the Japanese side. Yet another
circumstance was the growing awareness of the scale of damage caused by the dropping to the
two atomic bombs on Japan near the end of the war. Especially as the invisible horror of radiation
sickness became apparent, defenders of the bombs played them up as a necessary measure against
the especial evil of Japan, particularly an alleged, but fictitious, Japanese intention to kill all
prisoners as Allied forces approached.
In many parts of the world, the failure of courts to deliver socially- expected outcomes leads to
vigilantism that is to violence against presumed perpetrators by indignant citizens. In the case of
Japan, the perception that courts failed to deliver justice has led not to lynching but to what might
be called the Great East Asia History War. For some Chinese and Korean government authorities
and people, Japan’s inadequate accounting for its past authorizes a sustained campaign to restrict
Japan’s role in regional and international affairs. For example, in 2016 a Chinese diplomat advised
the Australian government against purchasing new submarines from Japan on the grounds of
Japan’s failure to deal with its history.9
At this point, I would like to introduce an unexpected comparison. In October 1965, a small
elite group within the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) undertook a
coup against the high command of the Indonesian army in which six generals, including the army
commander, General Ahmad Yani, were killed.10 The coup took place in the context of the declining
health of Indonesia’s founding president, Sukarno, who managed an unstable, semi-authoritarian
system he called Guided Democracy, which kept the major political forces – communists, the
military and Islamists – in an uneasy stalemate. The PKI was the largest communist party in the
non-communist world and it dominated public discourse in Indonesia. If elections had been held,
it would probably have won a plurality of votes. The party, however, was vulnerable to repression
because it lacked influence in the armed forces and there were rumors that the army high command

7

Sheldon H. Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-45, and the American Cover-up (London: Routledge,
1994).

8

See for instance, Rohan Rivett, Behind Bamboo: An Inside Story of the Japanese Prison Camps (Sydney: Angus & Robertson,
1946); John Coast, Railroad of Death (London: Hyperion Press, 1946).

9

Cameron Stewart, “Don’t forget the war with Japan, China warns Australia,” The Australian, February 17, 2016, accessed
May 10, 2017, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/dont-forget-the-war-with-japanchina-warns-australia/news-story/56d9a17c5b68a946c9ce4b00a2c42b7b.

10

John Roosa, Pretext for mass murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto’s Coup d’état in Indonesia (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 2006).
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planned a coup of its own later in October 1965. In these circumstances, it appears that the party
leader, D.N. Aidit, conspired with junior army officers to kidnap the army leaders and to engineer
a decisive shift to the left in Indonesian politics which would enable the PKI to accede to power as
Sukarno’s influence declined. In the event, six of the generals were killed, a mass assassination that
shocked the Indonesian political community. The PKI coup, however, was poorly organized and
it was quickly suppressed by anti-communist forces under the then little-known General Suharto.
Like Japan’s 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, the abortive PKI coup was an act of daring and
desperation. In 1941, the United States had implemented against Japan an embargo on strategic
materials that had the potential to cripple Japan’s war effort in China. Faced with a choice between
a humiliating, damaging backdown and a bold strike with only small chance of success, Japan’s
leaders chose the bold option of a pre-emptive strike. If the military, dominated by anti-communists,
came to power in a coup against Sukarno, the PKI risked losing everything that it had worked for
in the preceding decade. Japan’s venture seemed promising for six months, but it ran aground in
a war of attrition against a much better endowed enemy. Japan’s cities were burnt to cinders in
firebombing raids and defeat was sealed by the dropping of the atomic bombs. The PKI’s venture
was defeated within 24 hours. Over the next six months, Suharto not only engineered a transfer of
political power to himself from Sukarno but also presided over a mass murder of PKI members and
associates in which approximately 500,000 people were killed. The military played a major role in
authorizing and coordinating this killing, but most of it was vigilante in the sense that it took place
outside any legal process.11 Both the Japanese people and the members of the PKI paid a terrible
price for their leaders’ adventurism.
In both cases, moreover, after the immediate brutal reckoning, both groups were encumbered
with accusations of treacherous behavior and extraordinary cruelty. In addition to false stories
of the torture of the murdered generals, Suharto’s regime, known as the New Order, summoned
up memories of the so-called Madiun rebellion 17 years earlier, when communist forces had
certainly been involved in atrocities against their enemies. The government systematically
portrayed communism as amongst the greatest threats that Indonesia continued to face and
systematically discriminated against surviving party members and associates. Former detainees
– possibly numbering hundreds of thousands – were denied civil rights. Under a later extension
of discrimination, anyone deemed not to be “environmentally clean” – which included relatives
of party members born long after 1965 – was excluded from sensitive positions, including post
government jobs. Every year, all students in the education system were required to watch a lurid,
government-sponsored propaganda film about the coup that spread falsehoods about the cruelty of
PKI members towards the murdered generals. The government regularly sponsored publications
with titles such as, The latent danger of the PKI.12
Japan and the PKI were punished for failed grabs for power accompanied by gratuitous
cruelty. Japan was punished substantially, the PKI savagely. Since the time of punishment, each
has faced accusations of historical guilt borne by generations that were not alive at the time the
atrocities were committed.
The idea of extended historical responsibility has both unsavory and respectable origins. Its
unsavory origins lie in the feud, the practice of cross-generational vengeance-seeking for ancient
wrongs. Its respectable origins lie in the 1946 essay of Karl Jaspers, Die Schuldfrage, in which he
proposed that all Germans, even those born after the Second World War, bear an enduring guilt
for the Holocaust.13 Jaspers’ assertion arguably attached unique significance to the Holocaust, but
the American philosopher Michael Sandel has expressed the principle in much broader terms: if
we take pride in the achievements of our ancestors, then we have to accept the shame that comes
from their crimes.14

11

Jess Melvin, The army and the Indonesian genocide: Mechanics of mass murder (Milton: Taylor and Francis, 2018).

12

Ariel Heryanto, State terrorism and political identity in Indonesia: Fatally belonging (London: Routledge, 2006).

13

Karl Jaspers, Die Schuldfrage (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1946).

14

Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What’s the right thing to do? (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010).
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Plausible though Sandel’s argument is, there are three reasons we should be wary of applying
it uncritically. First, it is clear that imputing historical guilt has a strong political utility. It authorizes
both general prejudice and a specific claim that particular groups are disqualified from the full
exercise of civil or human rights. Whether historical guilt leads to the exclusion of communists from
Indonesian politics or to Japan from regional and global affairs, we should be hesitant to accept
it. Second, claims of historical guilt are unusually subject to selective moral outrage. The Chinese
Communist Party rebukes Japan for the scale of Japanese atrocities during the Sino-Japanese War
of 1937-1945 but restricts discussion of the deaths that its own policies inflicted on the Chinese
people during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.15 Third, to resist the idea that
historical guilt can ever be expunged will inevitably discourage all willingness to engage with
the past on the part of the heirs of the perpetrators. Why should anyone accept an uncomfortable
reckoning when they know that it will never be enough?
This unlikely pairing of fascist militarism and Third World communism suggests grounds
on which we might limit the application of doctrines of historical guilt. First, it is important to ask
what reckoning has been done. In the cases of both Japan and the PKI, a savage historical reckoning
has been ignored in order to provide a basis for continuing political exclusion. This reckoning
reduces the grounds for continuing to demand satisfaction for past wrongs. Second, it is important
to ask whether the heirs of the perpetrators enjoy a present-day advantage as a result of crimes
of the past. This question is especially relevant to settler colonial societies that prospered on the
dispossession of indigenous peoples, but it applies to many colonial situations. Neither Japan nor
the PKI obtained any advantage from adventurism, and this absence of advantage ought to count
in regarding the ledger as closed. And third, it is important to ask whether the heirs of the victims
still suffer the consequences of those past crimes. This question, too, is relevant to reckoning with
the legacy of colonialism. Recompense and recognition for elderly victims ought to be matter of
priority, but the broad picture in the cases of China, Korea and Indonesia is that these modern
societies have outgrown whatever consequences they may have experienced in the past as a result
of the adventurism of Japan and the PKI. In all three societies, dwelling on the grievances of these
specific pasts is self-indulgent. We should reserve our indignation for the cases that matter.
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The field of genocide studies has achieved much in its relatively short lifetime. As a result, we
have a much better understanding of genocide – that problem from hell – today than we did just
a few years ago. Genocide research has helped demystify this crime of crimes. We understand its
causes, its triggers and its processes of escalation much better than we once did. We understand
how individual agency and local conditions can profoundly influence patterns of violence. Today,
there are far fewer cases of genocide and mass killing hidden from view than there once was. New
stories of victims once unknown come to light with each passing year. Their voices, once silenced,
speak to us with fresh clarity thanks to the painstaking work of the genocide researcher.
As a result of these endeavors, we have a much better understanding of how genocide
can be prevented and vulnerable populations protected. Combined with the activism of key
individuals, governments and international organizations, this knowledge helped give rise to
what I have described elsewhere as an ‘international human protection regime’ – a complex of
norms, institutions and practices focused on the minimization of suffering resulting from war,
atrocities and genocide.1 Combined with other structural forces – the spread and consolidation
of modern states, industrialization, economic growth and trade, and the social liberalization that
often accompanied them – this international regime has contributed to a significant decline in the
incidence of organized violence, including of genocide over the past few decades.
Recognizing this fact, just a few years ago, a flurry of new books declared that humanity was
‘winning the war on war’; that our ‘better angels’ were making societies ever more peaceful; that
we could hope how to eliminate genocide and mass atrocities ‘once and for all.’2 After the tumult
of the immediate post Cold War period – and the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia – the tide, it
seemed, had turned against genocide. International activism in support of peace and structural
forces unleashed modernization and globalization were having a decisive impact. If not the end of
history, then perhaps, the beginning of the end of genocide’s history.
But for all the progress that was made in building barriers against genocide – and we
should not shy away from acknowledging that significant progress was indeed made – we find
ourselves facing a major problem. History is taking its revenge. Since the start of the ‘Arab
Spring’ in early 2011, global trends in mass violence have moved consistently in the wrong
direction. The number of armed conflicts has increased. Some reports suggest a six hundredfold increase in the annual number of civilian casualties in war. Atrocity crimes are committed
with increasing regularity. Perpetrators exhibit a confidence bred of impunity. Forced
displacement – both internal and international – has reached levels not seen since the end of the
Second World War.
The basic fact of increasing mass violence is not our only problem. Wherever we look, the
forces that promoted human rights, human dignity and human protection and the sense of our
common humanity that gave rise to mutual aid are in seeming retreat. Meanwhile, the forces of
racism, xenophobia, nationalism, and what Martin Ceadal called “warism” – ideas that are the very
life blood of genocide – seem to be everywhere on the march.3
Today, we confront a global crisis in which the progress we have made in winding back the
tyranny of genocide is being unraveled. Unless urgent action is taken to address the crisis, we risk
repeating the mistakes of our more violent past. The stakes could not be higher. If we fail to mount
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a successful challenge to the march of mass violence, our world will continue to become more
unstable, more divided, and more violent. What states, international institutions, and global civil
society do next will be, quite literally, a matter of life and death for the world’s most vulnerable
populations.
In this lecture, I want to examine this global crisis and enquire into its causes and consequences.
I also want to suggest some steps that can be taken to turn the tide. I want to argue that although
the struggle against genocide and mass atrocities is today confronting an acute crisis, there are
grounds for thinking that determined action can hold back the tide of hate. This can be done
by reinvigorating global politics based on fundamental human rights, collective action and
accountability.
Winning the War on Genocide
I should start, though with a few words on the barriers erected against genocide in the decades
following the Holocaust – barriers that became a comprehensive international regime for human
protection only in the past two decades. Through Nuremberg, Tokyo, the Eichmann trial and
other legal innovations, the Holocaust left an indelible marks on world politics: the notions that
individuals and groups had ‘basic’ or ‘fundamental’ rights arising out of their very humanity that
transcended the sovereign rights of states and that state agents, even political leaders, should be
held criminally liable serious violations of those rights. In the decades that followed, significant
normative, political and institutional progress was made to actualize that ideal. An International
Human Protection regime emerged to give meaning to this ideal. It evolved from at least eight
interconnected streams of norms, rules, practices and institutional developments that emerged, in
a variegated way, in response to different aspects of civilian suffering in times of war, genocide and
mass atrocities. These were:
One: The elaboration of legal rules governing basic conduct in world affairs: principles of nonaggression and non-interference to protect weak states from predation by the strong and eliminate
armed aggression; principles of anti-imperialism and national self-determination that prevented
strong states translating military successes into legitimated territorial gains.
Two: The development and extension of international humanitarian law, principally the
articulation and prohibition of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and including
recent efforts to prohibit indiscriminate weapons (land mines, cluster munitions, nuclear weapons)
and the transfer of arms to actors who may use them to commit atrocity crimes (arms trade treaty).
These rules, now considered customary and jus cogens – in that they apply to all states and no
derogation is possible – established individuals and groups as the bearers of fundamental rights
that could not, under any circumstance, be violated.
Three: The establishment of positive legal, political and moral duties to extend protection
against these crimes across national borders. All States have an extraterritorial obligation to take all
reasonable measures to prevent genocide. They have an additional responsibility to raise the alarm
when genocide is committed or imminently apprehended by bringing the matter to international
attention.
In relation to war crimes, Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions points to an
obligation not just to abide by the law but to “ensure respect” for the Conventions around the
world. Additional Protocol I (1977) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions established a duty for state
parties to cooperate by acting, individually or jointly, to address serious violations committed in
the context of an international armed conflict in cooperation with the United Nations (Article 89).
The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees requires that states provide asylum and
ensure non-refoulement for people fleeing persecution because of their membership of a particular
race, religion, nationality or social group or because or their political opinions (Article 33). The
Arms Trade Treaty prohibits the sale of arms in situations where a State Party ‘recognizes that that
the arms or items would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians
protected as such, or other war crimes’ (Article 6.3).
This idea – that states have positive duties towards outsiders – is not new. As Luke Glanville
recently pointed out, as early as the eighteenth century, Vattel pointed out that states had “duties
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to contribute to the perfection of those beyond their borders insofar as they can without doing an
“essential injury” to themselves.”4
Four: Acknowledgement by the UN Security Council that genocide and mass atrocities
constitute a threat to international peace and security, and therefore falls under the purview of
international society’s collective security system. Starting in 2001 with Sierra Leone and accelerating
markedly after the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect principle in 2005, the protection of
civilians from genocide and mass atrocities has moved from the periphery of the Council’s agenda
to its very core. Today, more than 100,000 UN peacekeepers are deployed around the world with
Chapter VII enforcement mandates to protect civilians from atrocities. More broadly, the Security
Council’s recognition of genocide and mass atrocities as a threat to peace has had two profound
effects on its practice. On the one hand, the likelihood of Council adopting measures in response to
massacres has doubled since the end of the Cold War. On the other, the nature of these responses
has grown steadily more comprehensive and multifaceted, with protection at their core.
Five: The development of international criminal justice. The International Criminal Court and
other criminal tribunals are important for ensuring legal accountability for crimes and addressing
impunity.
Six: The codification of human rights and establishment of national, regional and international
institutions to promote and protect them. We must be mindful of where genocide begins. Genocide
and mass atrocity crimes are extreme forms of identity-based violence. Their prevention therefore
entails the elimination of the discrimination, hate speech and incitement that can give rise to identity
conflict and mass violence – precisely one of the main focuses of international human rights law
and the institutions that have been developed to promote and protect it. Legal obligations extend to
addressing some of the root causes of atrocity crimes. In this context, among the most important are
those international treaties that address entrenched patterns of discrimination, whether on grounds
of nationality, ethnicity, religion, gender or other forms of identity. Most national constitutions
and legal codes include provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of populations, such as
equality before the law. States are also required to combat advocacy of national, racial or religious
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, in line with Articles 19
and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Seven: The development of international legal and institutional regimes focused on specific
vulnerabilities, including those faced by refugees, displaced persons, people with disabilities,
women and girls, and children more broadly. This includes efforts, albeit nowhere close to fully
realized, to empower women as agents of protection.
Eight: The political commitment to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005 and its
implementation thereafter. In a sense, R2P clarifies the protection regime itself. R2P is a disarmingly
simple idea. It holds that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own populations
from four crimes that indisputably ‘shock the conscience of humankind’: genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. It requires that the international community assist
individual states to fulfill their responsibility, because some states lack the physical capacity and
resources of legitimacy needed to protect their populations from these crimes. Finally, R2P says that
when states are ‘manifestly failing’ to protect their populations from these four crimes, whether
through lack of capacity or will or as a result of deliberate intent, the international community
should respond in a ‘timely and decisive’ fashion with diplomatic, humanitarian and other
peaceful means and, failing that, with all the tools that are available to the United Nations (UN)
Security Council. R2P calls specifically for the prevention of the four crimes and – significantly –
their incitement.
These eight streams were developed separately at different times and without specific regard
for the broader whole. But it was their collective force that made a difference, beginning in earnest
only after the Cold War. Along with structural forces such as state consolidation, economic growth
and trade, and factors that Azar Gat conjoins under the rubric of ‘modernization,’ these barriers to

4

Luke Glanville, “Responsibility to Perfect: Vattel’s Conception of Duties Beyond Borders,” International Studies Quarterly
61, no. 2 (2017), 385.

©2018

Genocide Studies and Prevention 12, no. 3 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.12.3.1563

Holding Back the Tide

13

genocide and mass atrocities began to effect patterns of violence in earnest in the 1980. Genocide
and mass atrocities were forced into decline.5
RJ Rummel’s multiple surveys of ‘democide’ – the mass killing of people by their own
government – in the twentieth century show a clear pattern of decline from a peak around the time
of the Second World War.6 This general trend is also found in the data presented by the Political
Instability Task Force (PITF), which focuses on the incidence of government sponsored mass
killings and shows a sustained decline since 1993.7 The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)
and the 2013 Human Security Report presented a similar view that showed a steady decline in
the number of cases from a peak in 2001 and a decline in the number of violent deaths globally.8
There were especially marked declines in the Americas, Central and South Asia, East Asia and
Oceania, Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa. The normative developments charted earlier reshaped
our expectations about how the world ought to respond to genocide and mass atrocities.
We think we fail so much nowadays at least in part because we expect so much more than
we once did.
It bears remembering that in the wake of Nuremberg, Rafael Lemkin lamented that had Nazi
Germany exterminated only German Jews, it would have committed no international crime.9 Today,
however, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are recognized as international
crimes; states have positive legal, political and moral duties to prevent them and offer assistance
across borders; the UN Security Council understands these to be matters of international peace and
security falling within its purview; and a range of national, regional and international institutions
have been established to assist states and to hold them to account.
But the struggle against atrocities is in crisis. The barriers to genocide erected in the decades
after the Holocaust are being torn down.
The Revenge of History
Since 2011, genocide, mass atrocities, armed conflict, and global displacement have all moved in
the wrong direction, prompting expressions of concern and alarm. After declining some 72% after
1990, the number of major civil wars grew from four to eleven after 2011, with the cumulative
battle deaths reaching levels in 2014 and 2015 not seen since the end of the Cold War.10 Minor civil
wars have also increased, reaching a level not seen since the mid-1990s. From the use of chemical
weapons against civilians in Syria, to the brazen atrocities committed by violent extremists in
Syria and Iraq and the indiscriminate use of air power against civilian populated areas in Syria
and Yemen, the deliberate targeting of civilians and violation of International Humanitarian Law
has become a regular feature of many modern armed conflicts. Reported attacks on protected
buildings, such as hospitals and schools, and on protected persons such as humanitarian workers
have increased. The besieging of civilian communities, denial of humanitarian relief and use of
civilians as human shield have become commonplace features of the modern battlefields in places
such as Aleppo and Mosul.
In Syria and Yemen, the situation of civilians besieged or otherwise unable to flee conflict
zones has become so dire since 2015 that many have reportedly confronted the very real danger of
starvation and often die for want of basic medical assistance. Indeed, the eradication of starvation
– a genuine human achievement of the past few decades – is now at risk as a result of the march of
mass atrocities.
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Global trends show a sharp increase in ‘one-sided’ violence against civilians, beginning in
2013; and whilst atrocity crimes declined in 2015 from their peak a year earlier, they remained at
levels not seen since 2001.11
To understand precisely what is going on, we need to understand that violence is driven by
different concerns in different contexts. Foremost amongst the drivers of our more violent world
is the lethality of new armed conflicts in the Middle East, in particular in Syria but also in Iraq
and Yemen. The underlying causes of the armed conflicts that today plague the Middle East lay in
crises of governance caused by the failure of authoritarian rulers to legitimize their rule or improve
the lives of their populations and by the repeated self-interested interference of outside powers.
They were triggered by forces unleashed by the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and 2011 Arab Spring.
Confronted by internal demands for reform, governments turned their guns on their own
populations. Rebellions in Syria, Iraq and Yemen were all caused and then escalated by systematic
discrimination against and violent abuse of individuals and groups not aligned to the government.
They were further fuelled by external actors looking to exploit instability for their own advantage. In
all of these conflicts, the deliberate targeting of civilians has been justified through the articulation
of violent extremist ideologies that make no distinction between soldiers and civilians, ideologies
that have gained in strength as the cycle of violence has escalated.
The second cluster of violence relates specifically to the rise of violent extremism in the Middle
East, parts of sub-Saharan Africa (parts of Nigeria, Somalia, Mali), parts of central Asia (Afghanistan
and parts of Pakistan), Europe, and parts of Southeast Asia (Myanmar and The Philippines). Violent
extremist violence unleashed by Islamist non-state armed groups such as ‘Islamic State,’ al-Qaeda
and its affiliates, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab overtly challenge established international norms
and openly advocate atrocity crimes. Responses to violent extremism have also sometimes been
quite bloody themselves. For example, since 2011, Boko Haram has been responsible for more
than 11,000 deaths, more than 6,000 of which resulted from one-sided massacres of civilians. The
Nigerian government’s response has been no less brutal. Some 7,000 Boko Haram suspects have
died in custody during that time.12
Many of these conflicts have their roots in specific localities. For example, it was a combination
of local political intrigues and heavy handed policing that transformed Boko Haram from a small
extremist sect into an armed militia capable of withstanding the attentions of the Nigerian army. In
these contexts, political entrepreneurs exploit ethnic and religious divisions for their own ends and
have developed extremist anti-civilian ideologies that reject fundamental principles of common
humanity.
The third cluster of crises predates 2011 but remain unresolved. Conflicts in South Sudan,
Sudan, Somalia, the DRC, Nigeria, CAR, Mali and Myanmar may have experienced peaks of
violence in the past few years but their origins and much of their violence predate 2011. Colonial
orders have yet to be fully replaced by legitimate state institutions capable of imposing the rule of
law across their entire territory. Here, the rule of law is weak, and factions struggling for power have
committed atrocity crimes and have sought to advance the interests of one part of the community
at the expense of others.
The scale of these crises has been exacerbated by two further factors. First, declining
international resolve to stop them. States of all stripes are seemingly less willing to uphold their
legal obligations and shared responsibilities by acting collectively to prevent genocide and mass
atrocities or respond to them by protecting populations in a timely and decisive fashion. There is
evidence of declining compliance with fundamental tenets of International Humanitarian, Human
Rights and Refugee Law, not just by the violent extremists and authoritarian states that perpetrate
atrocity crimes but also by states of good standing and even some champions of human protection.
In the face of the crisis of human protection described earlier, some states have wound back their
commitment to crucial norms and principles. The Trump Administration, for example, has eased
targeting restrictions aimed at protecting civilians from indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks.
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Several others, including Hungary and Australia, have adopted refugee policies, which, the UNHCR
believes, contradicts their legal obligations under the Refugee Convention and associated protocol.
Burundi has withdrawn from the International Criminal Court, and South Africa and The Gambia
threatened to do likewise, placing this new institution under immense political pressure. Others,
such as The Philippines, could follow suit largely because the Court has become an inconvenience.
Foreign actors have also played significant roles in stoking some of the violence. Whilst, for
example, the principal blame from the carnage in Syria must reside with the Syrian government
we must also recognize that a number of states and other actors actively fuelled the conflict and
encouraged its escalation. This includes Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Iran, Hezbollah, Russia, and
increasingly the US, but also – though to a lesser extent – the UK and France. There has been a
significant increase in the involvement of outside states in civil wars. In 1990, only 4% of civil wars
were “internationalized” through the direct involvement of other states. By 2015, that figure had
increased to 40%.13 Many of these civil wars were characterised by mass atrocities and experienced
interventions by multiple external states. Some of these external actors – such as Russia in Syria
and Saudi Arabia in Yemen – have used force in support of actors responsible for widespread
and systematic atrocity crimes, have supported such uses of force, and have themselves directed
attacks that have resulted in large-scale civilian casualties. Some of these attacks, such as the
Russian bombing of a UN aid convoy in Syria in September 2016 and repeated Saudi bombing of
schools and hospitals in Yemen, may in themselves constitute war crimes. These and other states
have supplied the arms and ammunition used to commit atrocity crimes or have turned a blind eye
to their transportation to the perpetrators of atrocities – in contravention of the spirit and letter of
the Arms Trade Treaty. What is more, in Syria and Yemen, the scale of mass atrocities crimes is at
least in part due to the sense of impunity granted to perpetrators by their Great Power allies: Russia
in the case of the Syrian government, and the US in terms of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and
Iraq. These states have inhibited accountability for atrocity crimes in the Middle East.
Causes
Why has the world taken this turn towards the more violent? One of the most popular theories
is Pankaj Mishra’s thesis that what we are seeing is merely the latest phase of a backlash against
modernization and globalization.14 Mishra maintains that Western style modernization uprooted
traditional cultures and societies but failed to replace them with new locally grounded and
legitimated ideas about how we should live. That was not much of a problem for those who benefitted
materially from the global transformation but it created a reservoir of resentment amongst those
who did not benefit, those on the receiving end of the ever-widening inequalities between rich and
poor. Extremist ideologues – entrepreneurs of disenchantment – exploited this resentment to their
own advantage. Romantics responded to modernity with nationalism and mythology; anarchists,
communists and fascists with wildly utopian visions of a world reordered; Islamists with dreams
of the caliphate and the restoration of their own – extremist – accounts of sha’ria. In Mishra’s vision,
today’s jihadists and white extremists are simply contemporary manifestations of the same forces
that brought anarchist terrorism, socialism and fascism to the streets of Europe in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.
This account is illuminating inasmuch as it points to the inevitability of violent resistance to
transformational change and shows that far from being unique and novel, the extremism of today
draws from the same reservoirs of human resentment that drove extremism a century ago. But it
is a one-sided accounting that pays little attention to the goods wrought by modernization, not
least among them sharp declines in poverty, and increases both the quality and length of life. It
is also too general in its explanation. It struggles to explain why this type of violence emerged in
some times and places and not others undergoing similar transformations. Here, I suspect that the
ideologues play a more significant role than this account suggests.
So too do local conditions. The rise of Boko Haram, for example, had next to nothing to do with
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industrialization and modernization and everything to do with local politics and the authorities’
mistreatment of opposition activists. Likewise, it was not ‘modernization’ that sparked the Sunni
rebellion in Iraq that eventually gave rise to Islamic State. After all, many of Iraq’s Sunnis had
profited under Saddam’s modernization schemas. Rather, it was the collapse of Saddam’s regime,
their loss of privilege, wealth and security, and the sometimes brutal discrimination against them
by the Shi’ite controlled government in Baghdad that drove their resentment: products of the US
decision to invade in 2003.
An alternative account suggests that the problem lay not in the fact of violence, but rather
in our interpretation of it. That is, the elevated normative expectations I mentioned earlier were
not, as it was claimed, products of a universally understood conception of humanity and human
rights but rather of a liberal moment in world politics made possible by Western hegemony after
the Second World War and its triumph after the Cold War. As EH Carr explained in 1939, perhaps
the ‘common morality’ that underpinned the struggle against genocide after the Holocaust was
actually nothing more than the interests and preferences of the powerful masquerading as universal
moral truth.15 If Carr was right, then important elements of the struggle against genocide – human
rights and humanitarian law, human rights institutions, R2P, international criminal justice – might
be better understood as products of a Western liberal governed international system rather than
normative standards genuinely shared by the society of states. And, if that is correct, the relative
decline of the West should result in the relative decline of Western liberal values measured in terms
of declining compliance and the declining will and capacity of states and institutions to ensure
compliance. From this perspective, we are witnessing end times of human rights, as Stephen
Hopgood eloquently explained.16
I have always baulked at the association of the West with liberalism and fundamental ideas
about human rights, not least because it exaggerates the extent to which Western states actually
championed these rights and also because it simultaneously neglects the ideas, struggles and
advocacy of non-Western leaders, activists and communities. The campaign against colonialism
was prefaced on the idea all humans enjoyed certain fundamental rights, not least to life and liberty.
Western states were among those most implacably opposed to these notions. It was African and
other post-colonial states, that argued – in the context of apartheid South Africa – that governments
were not entitled to discriminate on the grounds of race or to treat their populations however
they saw fit; arguments which at the time often met opposition in the West, not least the US and
UK. More recently, R2P was devised by a commission co-chaired by an Algerian (Mohammed
Sahnoun), placed on the UN’s agenda by a Ghanian (Kofi Annan), and negotiated by a General
Assembly led by a diplomat from Gabon. Rwanda, South Africa and Pakistan played pivotal roles
in those negotiations. It was Guatemala that proposed the UN General Assembly’s first resolution
affirming the principal, over the objections of many European states. In all this, it bears remembering
that John Bolton – the US Ambassador to the UN at the time – remained implacably opposed to
the concept and that by the time that the UN got around to adopting R2P, the African Union
had already adopted more forceful language on atrocity responses into its own constitution. The
same is true of other institutions. There was little diplomatic pressure, and certainly no coercive
inducement, placed on states to agree, sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC. The US, recall,
is not a state party.
Treaties, resolutions and positions have to persuade a majority of states to be adopted by the
United Nations. It is a long time since the West had the numbers to control a majority in the UN.
But that is precisely why Carr’s diagnosis of ‘moral universalism’ as simply the preferences of
the powerful is not an accurate description of our context today. Only those ideas that command
a majority drawn from every part of the world can advance. Most, if not all, of the legal and
institutional barriers against genocide have commanded a sustained majority. They are, I think,
signifiers of an ‘overlapping moral consensus’ against genocide and mass atrocities, not a thinly
veiled Western moral hegemony.
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Setting these two explanations alongside one another does highlight one critical point: our
explanation of the present must address two distinct problems: why is violence increasing and
why is international society seemingly less able to control it? In relation to the first question,
Mishra’s account exposes how radical social and economic transformations can give rise to
violent backlashes though it was not always modernization that lay at the heart of the problem:
local politics and foreign invasions have proven equally significant in recent rimes. Nonetheless,
fragmentation, inequality, instability and ideology provide us with a useful way of understanding
violent extremism.
But violent extremism is only one of the things making our world more violent. Another, is
the incomplete globalization of international society. By this, I mean the project of establishing a
global order comprised of sovereign states capable of maintaining order within their boundaries
without having to resort to mass violence. Many of the conflicts that give rise to genocide and mass
atrocities today might be characterized as wars of state formation and consolidation – wars about
what the boundaries of the state should be, what ideological and constitutional form it should take,
and who should control it and on what basis. Of these many occur in countries where the states
have barely – if ever – exercised legitimate control over the whole of their territory. In Sudan, South
Sudan, Somalia, DRC, CAR, Mali, and Myanmar there have been many more years of war than of
peace since independence and atrocity crimes have been longstanding features of these wars in
part because of their practical utility and in part because the association of peoples and territories
lay at their core. But in addition to these residual conflicts, the ‘Arab Spring’ gave rise to a new set
of conflicts, caused in part by the failure of the Middle East’s authoritarian governments to build
internal legitimacy and improve the lives of their peoples and in part by external intervention.
This is happening in an era of declining internationalism, in which, as Peter Hayes put it,
‘onlookers [are too] preoccupied with their own, to them more pressing concerns’ to do what is
necessary to protect shared international norms.17 This is a trend driven in part by stagnating and
declining economies in the post Global Financial Crisis world, which has prompted governments
to look inwards rather than outwards. These sentiments have encouraged states to retreat from the
active promotion of global anti-atrocity norms abroad, with two principal effects. First, by reducing
expectations of foreign intervention, sanctions or censure, retreating internationalism has altered
the balance of costs and payoffs associated with mass atrocities in favour of the payoffs. On the
costs side, the chances of prosecution, intervention, sanctions and embargoes have declined. On the
payoff side, the chances of foreign support for perpetrators have increased in some cases. Second,
the decline of internationalism has elevated suffering by limiting the aid granted to vulnerable
populations and the survivors of mass violence. Such heightened suffering will only add to the
reservoir of resentment from where the ideologues of extremism draw their support.
Response
What then is to be done? Our response to these challenges should be built on rights, collective
action and accountability. The fundamental human right to be protected from genocide and other
mass atrocity crimes must be at the heart of what we do. The reaffirmation of rights is central both
to delineating the bounds of acceptable and unacceptable behavior and in reframing the language
we use to describe situations and the peoples affected by them. Genocide and mass atrocities are
crimes and need to be explained as such. The victims of these crimes are not only just that – victims
of crimes – but also rights-bearing individuals deserving of protection. This needs to be our starting
point – the satisfaction of fundamental, universal and very basic human rights.
With that in mind, we need to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights. We need nothing
short of a global campaign to ensure that people know of their rights, understand why they have
them and how they arose, and to ensure that government fulfills its most basic of duties: the
provision of order and protection from the violation of fundamental rights. As a start, we need to
persuade states to sign, ratify and implement the key international treaties and protocols associated
with the prohibition and prevention of atrocity crimes and provision of assistance to their victims.
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Member States should also ensure that atrocity crimes and their incitement are criminalized by
domestic law. To encourage them to do so, we need a global campaign to reaffirm the world’s
commitment to the core obligations of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law.
The second step is to translate abstract agreements, principles and articles of faith into
collective action. Global thought on the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities remains too
abstract and generic, which consequently limits its capacity to shape behavior and impel collective
action. States are typically risk averse, meaning that it is easier to persuade them to act after the
fact, when costs and consequences can be calculated and causation attributed than it is to persuade
them to act prospectively. We need then to think more carefully about the politics and practices of
collective action. To think in more tangible terms about how to prevent this specific genocide rather
than genocide in practice; to identify which capabilities are needed for what job, and which need
strengthening, and how. We need to better at figuring out what political claims and maneuvers
are required to protect people and what is realistically achievable, and about what capacities are
required and how, precisely, they can be built. For example, the UN Secretary-General could utilize
his annual report to member states on R2P to articulate a clear strategy for atrocity prevention.
National governments could take steps to mainstream atrocity prevention concerns into their
foreign and development policies. There is also a need for stronger research on atrocity prevention.
We need to better understand the precise preventive strategies, policies and levers of influence that
can be used, and by who, to address specific threats and risks.
Political leadership is also imperative. We need political leaders willing to support global efforts
against genocide and mass atrocities and prepared to take risks to advance them. New leadership
will have to come from outside the West. For example, rather than resisting Chinese pretensions to
leadership through the UN, the West should embrace it and explore ways of transferring greater
responsibility for international peace and security to it. My main point here is that the traditional
friends of human protection will need to do more to encourage others to take the lead and should
be prepared to transfer responsibility to others.
Finally, accountability is needed to close the gap between normative commitments, legal
obligations and actual lived reality. International organizations, governments, individual leaders,
and state agents have specific – individual – responsibilities and obligations related to the protection
of populations from genocide and mass atrocities. We must work to make them more accountable.
Accountability helps close the gap between commitment and lived reality by ensuring the rigorous
and open scrutiny of practice in light of agreed principles.
Individual states must be held accountable to their own societies and their peers to ensure
that they fill their core protection obligations. We need research and activism to ensure that
states establish domestic mechanisms to ensure that national authorities are accountable for their
commitment to the Responsibility to Protect. This could be achieved through regular parliamentary
debates, permanent parliamentary working groups, annual reports by National Human Rights
Institutions or Human Rights Ombudspersons, or other mechanisms such as national committees
for atrocity prevention. We need nothing short of a new domestic politics in each country, one that
demands action to fulfill the solemn commitments and legal obligation of states.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that the struggle against genocide and mass atrocities confronts a major crisis.
Part of this is simply a function of the increase in global violence. But there are also powerful
global trends pushing against human protection, forces of racism, nationalism, xenophobia, and
extremism. But the greatest strength of the barrier erected against genocide after the Holocaust
is the sustained global consensus on which it rests. Different cultural traditions have their own
expressions of human protection. To borrow a label from John Rawls, on this we have a point
of “overlapping consensus” between the world’s many different conceptions of justice.18 With
so much normative and political progress made, the challenge now is to make atrocity crimes
prevention a lived reality and to turn back the tide of violence sweeping the world. We can all play
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a role whether by defending internationalism, filling the knowledge gaps that will help drive better
informed practice, or by providing the fresh ideas that are sorely needed.
There remains too much of a gap between the solemn commitments and legal obligations
of States and the actual lived experience of vulnerable populations. As the new UN SecretaryGeneral, Antonio Guterres told the Security Council in early 2017, “Our failure to deliver on what
we have promised by protecting populations from atrocity crimes shames us all. We must do
better.”19 Indeed, we must.
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Justice for Genocide in Cambodia - The Case for the Prosecution
William Smith

Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia
Phnom Penh, Cambodia
The Importance of Contemporaneous Documents and Academic Activism*

Figure 1. ECCC Case 002-01 trial in session.
Achieving justice for the genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes alleged to have
occurred in Cambodia during the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) period has not been simple. In
2006, more than 25 years after the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK or Khmer Rouge) was
ousted from power in Cambodia, ending its barbaric rule, the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) began its investigations. Its mandate was to investigate the senior
leaders and those most responsible for the crimes that occurred under the CPK. Critically, prior to
the ECCC investigations, significant investigative, archival and analytical work had been carried
out on the Khmer Rouge crimes by independent academics, researchers, journalists, investigators
and analysts working with and independently from non-government organizations (NGOs) tasked
with the same goal. Combined, these individuals and organizations have ensured that thousands of
highly probative documents produced by the CPK were preserved, early interviews with victims,
witnesses and suspects were recorded and painstaking analysis of the evidence discovered was
undertaken. This pre-ECCC work has proved invaluable, assisting the investigators and parties in
their investigation and presentation of cases, and the Chambers in their final judgments.
Today, I will highlight examples of some of this evidence that was collected prior to the
operation of the ECCC, to illustrate the importance of this substantial research and analysis on the
CPK documentation and the conduct of early interviews with suspects, witnesses and victims in
assisting in proving the prosecution cases at the ECCC.
First, I would like to put the prosecution cases in the broader factual context on which the
specific allegations against the accused at the ECCC have been made. Between 1975 and 1979, some
of the worst crimes in history were committed in DK against millions of Cambodians, when the CPK
took power after winning a five-year bloody war against the Khmer Republic government forces.
Well before coming to power, and on gaining power, the CPK leadership sought to radically and
rapidly transform Cambodian society from a capitalist feudal economy to an extreme communist
agrarian society. In the three years, eight months and twenty days that the CPK was in power, it
is estimated that at least 1.7 million people were killed through execution, overwork, starvation,
malnutrition, disease, sickness and lack of medical care. Half of these deaths are estimated to
* William Smith is the International Deputy Co-Prosecutor in the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia.
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have occurred as a result of executions, with the other half as a result of the inhumane conditions
imposed upon Cambodians.
This radical vision was implemented through a number of CPK policies, beginning with the
forcible transfer of the population of Phnom Penh and other towns to the countryside where people
were forced to work under inhumane conditions on agricultural and infrastructure projects. These
projects were aimed at rapidly increasing Cambodia’s production and create self-reliance. As part
of this policy the CPK aimed to increase the size of the labor and defense force by forcing young
men and women to marry and have sexual relations in order to produce offspring. At the same
time, the CPK implemented a policy to persecute and kill individuals and groups they believed
opposed, or would by their inherent nature, oppose or be antithetical to their form of communist
ideology. Those targeted for persecution and killing were deemed enemies of the CPK. These
groups included those belonging to the former government or their forces, CPK members and
rank-and-file soldiers and workers that they believed were traitors, the Vietnamese (who they
viewed as lifelong enemies), the Cham Muslims (who they believed were unable to stop practicing
religion), or any other individuals that they believed possessed traits which contradicted their
socialist revolution. These included those possessing capitalist tendencies or those they believed
were connected to foreign powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union.
A consequence of the implementation of these CPK policies was the removal of almost
every fundamental human right recognized under international law. Rights such as the right to
life, physical protection, expression, speech, association, movement, family, work, leisure and
religion, among many others, were stripped from nearly every resident in Cambodia. As a result,
Cambodians effectively became slaves of the CPK for more than three-and-a-half years. Alongside
the crimes committed by the Nazis against the Jews and other minority groups in Europe during
the Second World War, the nature and duration of the crimes of the Khmer Rouge, and the number
of victims killed, raped and treated inhumanely make these crimes some of the worst in recent
history.
With such a cruel, pervasive and complete attack on the humanity of a country it is difficult
to understand why it took decades for any substantive national or international governmentsponsored judicial process to commence. There are three fundamental reasons why no such
interventions were made. First, prior to the early 1990s there was a general lack of international
co-operation and consensus on international issues, resulting from the politics of the Cold War.
Second, it was only after a unique convergence of events– the large scale systematic serious human
rights abuses being committed during the breakdown and conflict of the former Yugoslavia; the
end of the Cold War; and the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993– that the development of international criminal courts and tribunals as
a response to mass atrocities became a reality. Third, the unstable political and military situation
existing in Cambodia between the former Khmer Rouge forces and the newly formed Cambodian
government continued until the late 1990s (when the Khmer Rouge leadership finally surrendered
in full), which made it difficult to establish, investigate and bring to trial DK perpetrators.
Yet, after years of discussion between the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) and the
UN over the power sharing of the judicial process and the guarantee of fair trial standards for
any accused, to the surprise of many the ECCC finally became operational in July 2006. Everyone
recognized that, with key suspects at an advanced age, and the crimes now having occurred
decades earlier, the window for justice for these atrocities was closing fast. But importantly for
many, that window was still open.
Fortunately, in the absence of a judicial process in the preceding 25 years to bring individuals to
account for these crimes, the work of independent researchers, academics, journalists, investigators
and analysts working within or outside key NGOs filled an important void, and ensured justice
would be served for these crimes. Working independently or with organizations such as the
Cambodian Genocide Project led by Gregory Stanton, the Cambodian Documentation Program
led by David Hawk or the Documentation Centre of Cambodia (DC-Cam) led by Youk Chhang,
these individuals in many capacities undertook thousands of witness and suspect interviews,
and collected, collated, preserved, archived, copied and analyzed tens of thousands of Khmer
Rouge documents and other materials produced contemporaneously to the crimes. A number of
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these individuals wrote heavily sourced articles and books on the DK period and the lead up
to it. They were diverse individuals with a similar aim: to discover the truth of the events of the
period. Combined, they wrote in-depth analyses of the crimes that were committed, the policies
that promoted those crimes, the structure of the CPK party and the DK government, their systems
of communication, the background and activities of those most responsible for the crimes, and the
general and specific causes and motivations that led to those crimes.
The comprehensive archives and expert works produced as a result of this work have been
invaluable in arriving at the truth of the criminal allegations in the ECCC cases. Indeed, the value of
the archives was recognized by the UN Group of Experts Report which found that, based principally
on an examination of DC-Cam files, a prima facie case against select DK leaders for international
crimes could be made. In their 2004 report the Experts stated, “It is expected that the Chambers
will rely heavily on documentary evidence. Some 200,000 pages of documentary evidence are
expected to be examined. The bulk of that documentation is held by the Documentation Centre
of Cambodia, an NGO dedicated to the research and preservation of documentation on crimes
perpetrated during the period of Democratic Kampuchea.”1
The expert articles and books produced on the DK period before the ECCC investigations
started have also provided critical fast track insights into the DK period from nearly every
perspective. This would otherwise have taken years to develop. Authors such as David Chandler,
Ben Kiernan, Elizabeth Becker, Philip Short, Steve Heder and Nayan Chanda, among many others,
have provided highly informative books that have guided the parties to relevant facts in the case,
original documentation and witnesses.2 Various offices at the ECCC wisely hired some of these
experts who had researched and written extensively on this period. Experts such as Craig Etcheson,
Steve Heder, Ysa Osman, Meng-Try Ea, and a number of analytical staff from DC-Cam were
employed when the court began. These staff significantly bridged the knowledge gap between
the independent investigations and analysis done before the ECCC and the new investigation and
legal teams who did not have that specialist knowledge prior to their arrival.
Before we review some examples of key evidence that was collected by individuals working
on the DK period crimes pre-ECCC, I will outline the current status of the work of the ECCC,
particularly in terms of the trials it has conducted over the last 11 years. These trials, as a result of
the ECCC’s personal jurisdiction as described in its founding Statute, could only be of individuals
who were considered to be senior leaders and those most responsible for the crimes committed. So
the number of prosecutions was inevitably aimed to be relatively small. Consequently, since 2006,
there have been 10 individuals under judicial investigation and prosecution. Of these 10, three have
been convicted of crimes in two separate trials and some of these convictions have been confirmed
on appeal. The third trial at the ECCC, which is the second one against the accused Nuon Chea and
Khieu Samphan, has been completed, with the judgment expected in November 2018.
The first of the three trials heard was against Kaing Guek Eav, otherwise known as ‘Duch.’ He
was the officer in charge of S-21, a converted high school that became a torture and killing centre
of the CPK for most of the DK period. Here, over 12,000, and it is now alleged that over 18,000
people were imprisoned in inhumane conditions, interrogated, tortured and executed over a threeyear period. For these crimes against humanity and war crimes, Duch received a 35-year custodial
sentence with a reduction of 5 years as a result of his illegal detention prior to the establishment of
the ECCC,3 which was increased to a life sentence on appeal.4
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Figure 2. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch providing training to his guards at S-21 during the DK period and then
testifying at the ECCC approximately 30 years later.

Figure 3. Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea attending a CPK rally during the DK period.
The second trial was initially against four accused, Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan
and Ieng Thirith. However shortly before the trial began, Ieng Thirith was found mentally unfit to
stand trial due to the onset of a severe case of Alzheimer’s disease. Then, over a year into the trial
Ieng Sary, the husband of Ieng Thirith, died from a number of conditions relating to his advanced
age of 87. After a long trial, convictions were recorded against Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan
for crimes against humanity, of murder, persecution and other inhumane acts arising out of the
forcible evacuation of between two million and three million people from Phnom Penh, and others
across the countryside, in order to implement the CPK’s socialist agrarian program. Both of the
accused were sentenced to life, and despite revision of some convictions, the life sentences were
upheld on appeal.5
The third trial was against Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, addressing their responsibility for
the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes occurring throughout the whole
5
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DK period. This trial has concerned itself with the allegations of enslavement and deaths through
inhumane treatment at worksites, forced marriages and rape within those marriages, and the mass
killing of individuals across the country inside and outside CPK security centres. The charges of
genocide relate to Vietnamese and Cham Muslims living in Cambodia. The hearings of the third
trial have finished and a verdict is expected in November 2018. It was originally planned to have
one trial against the four senior leaders, however the Trial Chamber decided to sever the charges,
resulting in two trials.6 Each trial dealt with two sets of representative charges in the closing order,
ensuring that the combined impact of both trials properly represented the core types of crimes
committed in the DK period.7
The two trials of Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan have been particularly large, when
measured against the time they have taken, the allegations they have covered and the evidence
admitted in support. Combined, the two trials have taken 499 days, required the questioning
of 278 individuals, 172 witnesses, 95 civil parties and 11 experts. Some 16,591 documents have
been admitted, which include contemporaneous DK materials, analytical works, audio and video
recordings, and interviews by the Co-Investigating Judges and DC-Cam. These documents range
in size from single-page DK telegrams or photographs to books of several hundred pages.
The significant length of the two trials and the sizeable amount of evidence used to support
the charges has been necessary for a few reasons. Proving crimes that occurred countrywide on
a widespread and systematic basis some three decades earlier requires a detailed and thorough
approach to the evidence both in terms of the content and volume of material collected. This
comprehensive approach is also required to prove the causal link between the most responsible for
the crimes and the perpetrators who physically committed them. To prove the link, proof is usually
required of the organizational authority structure and communication systems through which the
crimes were committed; proof of the policies that led to the commission of the crimes; and the role
and activities of those leading the organizations to which the perpetrators belong. This evidence is
often complex and difficult to obtain.
Finally, these mass atrocity cases are large due to the responsibility of the court to put the
charges in a historical context, to determine the broader causes and motivations behind the
commission of these crimes. It is essential that a society learn from its experience in order that
history does not repeat itself. Although these issues may not be specifically necessary to prove the
charges in the indictment, court findings on the broader causes and motivations behind the crimes
have the potential to educate law makers, politicians and society on what societal conditions should
be avoided in future to reduce the likelihood of similar crimes occurring again. Understanding
these factors provides a more satisfactory outcome for the victims, and gives a more complete
picture of why the crimes occurred.
I will now turn to the nature of the prosecution evidence that was used to prove the allegations
at trial. In all three trials the prosecution used evidence from multiple sources, including witnesses,
civil parties, expert and accused testimony, and statements made out of court produced by the
ECCC investigators or other individuals or agencies; CPK documentary evidence produced
contemporaneously with the crimes during the DK period, in print, photo and video form; other
contemporaneous documents produced by other governments and NGOs; forensic reports of
exhumations; books and articles. At the ECCC the Trial and Appeal Chamber has made clear,
rightly, that out-of-court statements carry less weight than in-court testimony.8
Notably, CPK contemporaneous documents and admissions by the accused in video and
print form have been extremely valuable for the prosecution in proving its case. As for the
contemporaneous documents, they do not suffer from memory loss, which can occur with a witness,
civil party, suspect or accused, particularly with the events occurring around three decades earlier.
These documents have the ability to capture accurately the precise nature of the crime, the policies
6
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that led to those crimes, the specific structure of the DK organization and systems of communication,
and the true intent of the accused and other individuals with which he or she may share the same
goals. Often in mass atrocity cases there is limited concern for self-incrimination by an individual
to hide their criminal intent, due to an often-held belief that they will never be brought to justice.
Consequently, statements written and made at the time of the crimes by perpetrators are often less
guarded than statements made when a judicial process against an individual is likely.
Fortunately for the Prosecution, large numbers of CPK internal documents were left behind in
Phnom Penh, at S-21 and a few other places, when the Khmer Rouge was forced to rapidly exit the
city due to the accelerated Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in early January 1979. Nuon Chea was
well aware of the evidentiary value of the documents left behind at S-21 when he scolded Duch, his
subordinate, in 1983 for not destroying the documents before Duch fled S-21. This comprehensive
set of documents left at S-21 became vital evidence for the prosecution more than 25 years later in
proving some of the charges against all three accused.
The types of documents left behind by the Khmer Rouge in Phnom Penh included the CPK
Party Statute, Standing Committee Meeting Minutes, Central Committee Decisions, monthly or
bi-monthly CPK policy magazines (also known as Revolutionary Flags or Youths), directives,
guidelines, orders, letters, telegrams, photographs, videos, prisoner lists and execution lists,
among others. The Revolutionary Flag and Youth magazines provided a continuous flow of the
policies and propaganda that the CPK wanted to educate all CPK members to implement in their
respective areas of responsibility. Speeches and articles pronouncing and detailing CPK policies,
some criminal, were written, authorized or agreed to by the accused and other senior leadership of
the CPK. Being able to attribute this information to the accused was important for the Prosecution.
Admissions made by the accused in recorded speeches both before, during or after the DK
regime, and admissions made in video documentaries and memoir style books produced by them
or for them, have been highly probative in proving the allegations charged. Many of these speeches
were statements transmitted over DK radio and recorded in other countries. Many were recorded
by international journalists, and many were part of documentaries made after the DK regime,
where both accused, particularly Nuon Chea, were extremely candid about their roles in and
agreement with many of the criminal policies charged, particularly the policy to kill individuals
they believed were traitors, without trial.
Expert testimony and expert books and articles written by academic scholars and journalists
have also been invaluable for the prosecution. Testimonies of authors of specialized or weighty and
extensive research works, such as David Chandler, Phillip Short, Steve Heder, Elizabeth Becker,
Kasumi Nakagawa, Peg Levine, Stephen Morris, Nayan Chanda, Ysa Osman, Alex Hinton, Craig
Etcheson and Henri Locard, among others, have assisted the Trial Chamber and the parties to better
understand the relevant evidentiary areas required to be proved or defended, and the relationship
of original documents to these areas. These writings or testimonies also provide an opportunity for
the parties to test alternative opinions both before and during trial. Experts have testified on topics
such as the operation of S-21, CPK policies, authority structure and communication systems of the
CPK, the armed conflict with Vietnam, forced marriage and the commission of genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes.
The prosecution at the ECCC has always acted with determination to ensure the maximum
amount of evidence was made available to the parties and the Trial Chamber to determine the
truth of the allegations. Where possible, the prosecution had the goal of requesting the admission,
both during the investigations and trials, of as much contemporaneous documentary evidence and
accused and other senior leader confessional evidence, along with expert opinions, as it could, in
order to support and corroborate the essential witness and civil party evidence at trial. This was to
ensure the prosecution met its responsibility to prove its cases beyond reasonable doubt. I would
like to highlight some examples of this type of contemporaneous or confessional evidence that was
used at trial to prove the charges alleged.
The first key allegation I will look at is the issue of the nature of the ideology, goals, authority
structure and communication systems of the CPK– the CPK being the one-party government
of Democratic Kampuchea. Proving these core functioning aspects of the Party enabled the
Prosecution to argue more persuasively the nature and purpose of the CPK’s criminal policies,
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Figure 4. The front page of the Statute of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.
how they were implemented and who was criminally responsible for them. The high level of
consistency of concepts and language on these issues between the CPK Statute and all of the other
evidence at trial combined, as well as CPK documents, witness, civil party, accused and expert
testimony, enabled the prosecution to argue with confidence the specific nature of the ideology,
goals, policies, authority structure and communication systems of the CPK.
The clearest and most authoritative CPK document that assists in proving the ideology, visions,
objectives, goals, duties and obligations of Party members, and the authority and communication
structure of the CPK, is the Statute of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.9 Testifying at trial,
Duch stated that the CPK Statute tendered in court was an amended version of a similar one that
he had knowledge of prior to the DK period. Although the Statute does not explicitly outline the
specific criminal policies with which the accused are charged, the Prosecution argued that by such
membership to the Party, the accused agreed to its goals, objectives, structure and obligations on
members, as outlined in the Statute.
In terms of the Party’s objectives, the Statute outlines the following, “…to continue to make
and to achieve socialist revolution in Kampuchea and to move forward toward Communism in
Kampuchea in the future [and the Party] must defend the results of the revolution and defend
and construct the country well.”10 More specifically, regarding the nature of their ideology, the
Statute indicates groups and characteristics of individuals that are likely to be in opposition to and

9

The Statute of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK Statute), 1976, ECCC Case 002 Doc. No. E3/130.
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CPK Statute, Fundamental principles and political stances of the Party (Fundamental principles), 3.
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become enemies of the Party. It states “…[the Party] arms itself with…strong proletarian world
views and life views, absolutely struggles against non-proletarian world views and life views and
opposes the revolutions of the petty bourgeoisie, the capitalists, the feudalists, the imperialists and
all reactionaries.”11 Dealing with the concept of enemies further, the Statute places obligations on
members to actively seek out enemies as a part of the social revolution, “...[the] Party must have
high-level revolutionary vigilance towards all enemy activities and trickery, direct or indirect, overt
or secret, which have the intent to destroy the Party by every means.”12 This requirement highlights
the pre-occupation, animosity, suspicion and readiness to take action against any individual with
a different view, or aligned or perceived to be aligned, to a group that is not acceptable to the
CPK ideology. Such a requirement of Party leaders and members underpins the motivation for the
persecution and killing of suspected Cambodians and minority groups during this period.
The Statute further highlights the inflexible zealousness and speed within which CPK members
were required to implement the social revolution. It states, “[E]very member of our Party, must […]
always be on the offensive, forging himself in the heat constantly, always agitating, attacking, and
pushing constantly, inside the great, hot and deep revolutionary movement of the popular masses
and the worker peasants…making socialist revolution and constructing socialism successfully as
quickly as possible, keeping on moving forward toward Communism.”13 This rigid and absolutist
approach required to implement the CPK goals of “building” and “defending” the country
supported the arguments that the crimes which arose out of CPK central policies were committed
as a result of a system that allowed little leeway to oppose the policies imposed.
In terms of decision making, the Statute identified that the CPK leadership and members
at all levels of hierarchy made decisions in a collective manner, stating “…the Party leadership
organizations must implement collective leadership and have specific persons holding
responsibility” requiring that “various decisions of the Party must be made collectively.”14 This
principle provided an insight to the prosecution as to how decisions were made and consequently
how often decisions required agreement with more than one person. This was a relevant factor for
the Prosecution in arguing the liability of Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan for criminal decisions
arising out of meetings in which they participated as part of a Committee. Based on this principle
we argued that decisions emanating from those meetings could be imputed to all who were on that
committee.
In terms of the authority and reporting structure, the Statute demonstrated that the CPK had
a strict structure and reporting system that created onerous responsibilities on each member at all
levels to fully inform their subordinates and superiors of their activities, criminal or otherwise.
Regarding the authority structure, it requires that “… [t]he minority respects the majority. Lower
echelon respects upper echelon. The individual respects the collective. The private respects the
organization. The various echelon organizations respect the central organization.”15
Regarding reporting obligations, the Statute requires “…[a]t the designated times, lower
echelon must report to upper echelon on the situation and on work done. Also at each designated
time, upper echelon must report to lower echelons regarding the general situation and regarding
instructions which they must carry out.”16 The prosecution argued that this reporting and
communication structure provided strong evidence of ordering, agreement and knowledge of the
commission of the various crimes across the country due to this inflexible top-down authority
structure and the continuous top-to-bottom and bottom-to-top communication system that was to
be enforced.
I would now like to turn to some illustrations of contemporaneous evidence and statements by
the accused that were used to prove crimes arising out of CPK policies or the accused’s participation
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in them. First, turning to the forced evacuations of the residents of Phnom Penh to the countryside
in the first few days of the Khmer Rouge takeover on 17 April 1975, admitted photos provided
highly probative evidence of the evacuation itself and the forced nature of it.
The photos clearly demonstrated from the air and ground the arrival of the Khmer Rouge into
Phnom Penh and the hope for a better future, then the immediate mass evacuation of the city in
the first two days of the takeover, and following this, the complete emptiness and desolation of the
city only a few days later. These photographs and videos depicted columns of people, young, old
and sick, leaving on foot or being carried under armed guard with few or no possessions, leaving
in a sea of humanity down the main roads exiting the city. The photos taken shortly after depicted
barren, wide, main streets where not a car or person could be seen. These before photos, and
the after shots of completely empty streets where not a person or car could be seen corroborated
the forced and inhumane conditions under which the population was evacuated testified to be
witnesses and civil parties. At the same time, these photos provided clear evidence of the power
and discipline the CPK leadership had over its rank-and-file soldiers to perform such an operation.

Figure 5. The evacuation of the residents of Phnon Penh when the Khmer Rouge took control of the city
in April 1975.

Figure 6. A photo taken shortly after the residents of Phnom Penh were forcibly transferred to work camps
in the countryside in April 1975.
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Contemporaneous DK documents such as the February-March 1976 edition of the CPK
Revolutionary Flag magazine confirmed the forcible nature and purpose of the evacuation,
stating, “After the liberation of the entire country, nearly 3 million people had to exit the various
cities empty-handed, without food supplies, without any means and tools at all to increase
production.”17 One of the accused, Ieng Sary, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and CPK Standing
Committee Member admitted that, “The first months of the liberation were quite tough; 2000 to
3000 people died through the evacuation of Phnom Penh and several thousand died at the paddy
fields.” Khieu Samphan also admitted that he “clearly realized that the population might have
fallen along the way.”18 Other contemporaneous material such as communications from embassies
at the time and notes taken by foreign journalists present in Phnom Penh, particularly those of
Sydney Schanberg,19 all provided valuable corroboration to the victim and witness testimony of the
forced and inhumane nature of the evacuation.
Second, turning to the enslavement of Cambodians in worksites and communes across the
country, which led to the death and serious physical and psychological injury of the workers,
the video and photographic evidence brought into the courtroom the reality of the witness and
civil party testimony. The video clips showed thousands of Cambodians, including children and
the elderly working in large-scale agriculture projects under deplorable conditions. The video of
the work done on these building and irrigation projects shows the speed, discipline and arduous
nature of the work. When witnesses described suffering inhumane conditions in a number of cases
leading to the death of workers, their conclusions that they were being “treated like animals” rang
true.
The pressure under which the CPK put the workers to produce can be seen in the CPK
meeting minutes of 30 September 1976, where it is recorded that the CPK must “whip up the
mass movement, vigorously, and strictly directly on the human and material forces, in order to
accomplish the 3 tonnes per 1 acre plan and to achieve the plan to build 30% of irrigation system
countrywide.” In a speech on 15 April 1977, Khieu Samphan admitted to the size of the worksites
and the standard of living, stating that each construction site of a reservoir, canal or dam “is manned
by as many as 10,000, 20,000 or even 30,000 workers…we have no machines. We do everything by
mainly relying on the strength of our people… Though barehanded, they can do everything.”20
Later, shortly before his detention at the ECCC he admitted to the forcible nature of the work, “In
the co-operatives, the people were not free” corroborating witness testimony that they were in a
“prison without walls” in DK. 21
Third, turning to the forced marriage and rapes arising out of those marriages, photos of one
ceremony provided an insight into the circumstances under which witnesses and civil parties
described these forced marriage ceremonies. Two photos showing over 40 men and women being
married, lined up, with no emotion, in the same uniform, same haircuts for men and women, in a
bare hall with the only decoration being a large flag containing the communist symbol of a hammer
and sickle, strongly supported testimony that marriages were forced. A CPK contemporaneous
document, a Revolutionary Flag magazine dated 2 June 1975, made clear that marrying and
procreating was under the control of the CPK: “In the matter of building a family, no matter
the outcome of the Organization’s and the collective’s assessments and decisions, they must be
absolutely respected.” The forced aspect of the marriages was further confirmed by Nuon Chea
to Thet Sambath, a Cambodian journalist, when he told him: “The man always wants to choose a
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Figure 7. An excerpt from the CPK February to March 1976 Revolutionary Flag magazine where the forced
transfers of the population a year earlier are discussed.

Figure 8. A photo of Cambodians detained at work sites where they were forced to labor under inhumane
conditions.

beautiful girl, so that’s why we forced them to get married and Angkar chose he wife.”22 In the DK
period the word “Angkar” took on a number of meanings, but it was generally used to mean the
leadership of the CPK. This type of document and admission by the accused strongly corroborated
the many witnesses and civil parties from across the country who stated they were forced to marry
and have sexual relations against their will. These forcible sexual relations were charged as rape.
22

Gina Chon & Thet Sambath, Behind the Killing Fields (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 41.
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Figure 9. A photo of two young Cambodians being forcibly married.

Figure 10. A photo of a forced wedding ceremony under the Khmer Rouge.
The driving force behind the forced marriage policy can be seen in statements of the accused
made both during and after the DK regime. On 15 April 1978, Khieu Samphan stated it was a clear
goal of the CPK at that time to “grasp firmly and implement well the plan to increase the size of the
population to its maximum, so as to have 15-20,000,000 people in the next 10-15 years.”23 Similarly,
Nuon Chea in 1981 stated that DK “has pursued a policy of increasing its population... Since 1975
Democratic Kampuchea has always required a rapid increase in its population. Thus, the four-year
23
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©2018

Genocide Studies and Prevention 12, no. 3 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.12.3.1658

Smith

32

plan of 1977-1980 aimed at increasing our population to at least 15,000,000 within 5 to 10 years.”24
Consequently, when the prosecution argued that civil party and witness testimony of forced
marriages and forced sexual relations occurring around the country were not ad hoc, but part of a
systematic central policy, these contemporaneous documents were invaluable in supporting that
argument.
Fourth, turning to the CPK policy to kill Cambodians and other groups under the façade
that the CPK was “defending the country” the Prosecution relied upon on photos, videos, CPK
documents and the accused’s own statements. Although there were many debates at trial as to
the number of killings and the purpose of the killings, ultimately the fundamental issue of the
large-scale killings of civilians and protected persons from all national, racial, ethnic, religious
and political groups boiled down to whether or not it was a legitimate exercise to kill people the
CPK suspected or believed were enemies or traitors. Nuon Chea argued that such killings were
legal and the Prosecution argued that such an argument was abhorrent, having no legal base in
international criminal law.25
One of the key documents that demonstrated the intent of the leadership to authorize the
killing of enemies without due process was a decision made on 30 March 1976 to different CPK
committees across the country. The decision delegated “[t] the right to smash [kill]…in absolute
implementation of our revolution, [and to] strengthen our socialist democracy” to the Standing,
Central, Zone and General Staff Committees located in Phnom Penh and around the country. The
clarity and absolute authority provided in this document and other similar documents promoting
the killing of enemies without trial was the reason why so many people were killed in Democratic
Kampuchea. The absolute power to kill by this decision was now distributed to delegated
authorities across the country.
One of the locations where the prosecution proved the murders occurred as a result of this
killing policy was at S-21, the torture and killing centre in Phnom Penh where at least 18,000 people
were detained and executed.
The thousands of documents left behind have been powerful not only to show that mass
killings occurred, but that they occurred as a result of policies, and those policies were created
and agreed to by the senior leadership. A full range of CPK documents were discovered at S-21.
These documents allowed the Prosecution to prove areas in the cases that not only related to S-21,
but to crimes committed elsewhere across the country. The documents assisted in proving that the
killings at S-21 were authorized by individuals at the highest level of responsibility, the nature of
the killing policies that existed, and the identity, number and type of victims killed.
For example, one of the many thousands of prisoner and execution lists found at S-21, dated
17 February 1977, recorded an instruction from Duch to his subordinate. The annotation on the list
stated; “(1) Smash: 115 (2) Keep: 23 + 21 = persons. Comrade Duch proposed to Angkar. Angkar
agreed.” This singular document, we argued, assisted in proving the death of 115 prisoners and
that a member or members of the Standing Committee ordered the killings, or were at least aware
of them.
Allegations of torture were also corroborated through the use of S-21 documents. On one
confession from S-21 the annotation stated, “Brother Duch, Here are the responses of Phoas,
given when we whipped him 4-5 times to break his stances before taking him for waterboarding.
Respectfully, Pon, 14 April 1977.” Other annotations on “confessions” of prisoners assist in
demonstrating that Nuon Chea and other senior leaders were aware of the existence of S-21 and
the interrogations, tortures and killings occurring there. One annotation on a confession stated,
“One copy sent to Brother Nuon [Nuon Chea] on 10 September 1977.” One explicit annotation by
Duch to his subordinate that appeared on a prisoner list provided highly probative evidence of the
criminal nature of S-21, where it stated, “Uncle Peng, Kill them all, Duch 30/5/1978.”
24
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Figure 11. The Central Committee Decision of 30 March 1976 delegating the authority to kill to Zone
Committees and other specialist Committees.

Figure 12. A photo of the outside of S-21 taken shortly after the Khmer Rouge were ousted from power
in 1979.
Of the approximately 189 prisons or security centres that were known to have existed during
the DK period, the prosecution in the second trial of Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan concentrated
on proving the inner workings of four of them, including S-21. One of those other security centres
was a place called Kraing Ta Chan in the Tram Kak District, where many thousands of prisoners
were killed. Assisting in demonstrating the number of prisoners killed there was a document
from the prison chief that stated, “We have so far smashed 15,000 enemies. Please be informed
accordingly. District Re-education Office 105, An.”26
In any criminal case, a confession from an accused taken in unequivocally voluntary
circumstances is powerful evidence. Thet Sambath interviewed Nuon Chea for many years on
video prior to Nuon Chea arriving in ECCC custody. Thet Sambath then produced a publicly
available documentary called Enemies of the People, in which Nuon Chea makes some of the most
candid admissions as to his role, knowledge and implementation of the CPK’s killing policy.27
The documentary is full of admissions as to his role in the decisions to kill people perceived to

26
27
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Figure 13. A copy of an S-21 prisoner list where Duch provided instructions to kill or keep the detainees
for further interrogation.

Figure 14. A copy of an S-21 prisoner list where Duch instructs his subordinate, “Uncle Peng” to kill them all.
be enemies of the CPK, for example he stated, “The Party decided to kill them because they were
betraying the party and the nation. I was not scared or sad when they were killed. They had done
wrong and betrayed us, so they received the kind of treatment they deserved.” As to the lengths
Nuon Chea would take to preserve his own life and other senior leaders, Nuon Chea stated in July
1978 to the Communist Workers’ Party in Denmark, “[t]he leadership apparatus must be defended
at any price … There can be no comparison between losing two or three leading cadres and 200-300
members. Rather the latter than the former.”
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I would now like to turn to some further illustrations of contemporaneous documentary
evidence and admissions by the accused tendered to show Nuon Chea’s and Khieu Samphan’s
participation in the crimes charged. Regarding Nuon Chea, the prosecution argued that as a result
of Nuon Chea’s second most senior position in the CPK and DK, and his role and activities in
the CPK, including the creation and promotion of its criminal policies, Nuon Chea was a central
participant in a joint criminal enterprise to commit the crimes charged.

Figure 15. Nuon Chea giving a speech during the DK period and then being interviewed approximately
25 years later before he was arrested and detained at the ECCC.

Nuon Chea was the Deputy Secretary of the CPK and a leading Standing Committee member,
with this committee having the highest decision-making powers in the CPK and DK. In the Thet
Sambath documentary Enemies of the People, Nuon Chea, not denying power but in fact taking
pride in it, stated he and Pol Pot, the Secretary of the CPK, were at the same level. He said “[t] hey
just called him and me Brother Number One and Two… I was not the right arm or the left arm of
Pol Pot… We were equal. Pol Pot did not serve me and I did not serve him. We both served the
way of the Party.” As to being central to creating CPK policies and agreeing to them, Thet Sambath
wrote of the relationship between the two, “During their years in power, the two were nearly
inseparable, spending much more time with each other than they did with their families or other
leaders. Before any new initiatives were presented, Pol Pot and Nuon Chea always discussed them
together to hammer out the ideas and make sure they agreed on every point.”28 This evidence,
taken from Nuon Chea’s interviews with Thet Sambath was powerful in proving the joint criminal
enterprise between Pol Pot and Nuon Chea, the two individuals holding the highest positions in
the CPK at the time.
In terms of Khieu Samphan’s role in the crimes charged, the prosecution argued that Khieu
Samphan also worked closely with Pol Pot and Nuon Chea in his role as the DK Head of State,
his central role in Office 870 (the political and administrative committee that implemented the
decisions of the Standing Committee) and his role in the Commerce Committee. As a result of
his position, roles and activities, in these positions and the CPK more generally, the Prosecution
argued that Khieu Samphan significantly contributed to the joint criminal enterprise with Pol Pot,
Nuon Chea and others to commit the alleged crimes.
Khieu Samphan’s own admissions in his book about his relationship with Pol Pot corroborated
the other evidence at trial. Khieu Samphan wrote, “As for daily life, Pol Pot and Nuon Chea had
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Figure 16. Khieu Samphan on official duties in the DK period and then sitting in a trial session at the ECCC
approximately 35 years later.

meals with me, and we had meals together. We did nothing separately.”29 When interviewed in
a television documentary, Khieu Samphan stated that he respected Pol Pot and viewed him as
a “great leader” and said he “followed him all the time, like a shadow.”30 Becoming teary on the
video footage, he said, “I can still see him in the Cardamon Mountains, here and there. I always
keep a clear image of him in my head.”31 When asked by the interviewer if he missed Pol Pot, Khieu
Samphan answered, “Yes, because he had such an exceptional mind.”32 It was quite clear from
these videos that Khieu Samphan was in awe of Pol Pot. Such emotion and candidness is often
very difficult to obtain during the trial due to the official nature of the atmosphere and the more
circumspect approach that the accused is likely to adopt.
Khieu Samphan’s agreement with the killing policies and active participation in promoting
them can be seen in many speeches during the DK period to high-level CPK cadre from around
the country. One of those speeches at the 1978 anniversary records Khieu Samphan demanding
that cadres pledge “[t]o exterminate resolutely, all agents of the expansionist, annexationist
Vietnamese aggressors from our units and from Cambodian territory forever … To exterminate
resolutely all CIA agents… to exterminate the enemies of all stripes.”33 These contemporaneous
documents, recording statements of the accused at the time the alleged crimes occurred, provide a
valuable insight into whether or not the accused had the requisite criminal intent to commit crimes.
Similarly, Khieu Samphan’s presence at the CPK Standing Committee meetings demonstrated his
active involvement in the making and promoting of CPK policy.34
I would like to come back to the importance of the role of independent academics, journalists,
analysts and other individuals in the investigation of the crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge
in the judicial process at the ECCC. These early inquirers devoted significant parts of their lives to
ensure those most responsible were brought to justice at a time when the international community
and the Cambodian government were unable to do so. One such person was Alex Hinton who
came to the Prosecution’s attention in 2006 as a result of a book he published entitled Why Did
29
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Figure 17. Minutes of CPK Standing Committee meeting on 8 March 1976, indicating that both Nuon
Chea and Khieu Samphan attended.
They Kill?35 The theme and research of this book addressed the question of why mass killings
occurred during the Khmer Rouge period. The book was based on comparative genocide research
and a specific study of the alleged genocide and crimes against humanity occurring in Cambodia.
In any criminal case, national and international, it is not required for the prosecution to prove
the motivation behind a perpetrator’s crime, as opposed to the necessity of proving the intent
to commit the crime. Often these two concepts are closely connected but nonetheless they are
distinct. However, despite the fact that Alex Hinton’s book had highly probative evidence of crimes
being committed from first-hand interviews with victims and perpetrators and valuable opinion
evidence on how CPK language was used to incite killings constituting genocide and crimes against
humanity, among other matters, his book came under close attention for another important reason.
In his book, Alex Hinton sought to identify and understand why individuals at the highest
and lowest levels of the CPK and DK structures would persecute and kill Cambodians, and other
groups such as the Cham Muslims and Vietnamese. Such information would be valuable for the
legacy of the court, so Cambodian society and the international community could learn from this
experience.
Consequently, in the second trial against Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, in which the
genocide and crimes against humanity charges based on mass killings around the country would
be heard, the Prosecution requested that Dr. Hinton be called. We wanted the judges and the public
to hear an objective analysis of how the mechanics of genocide worked so that the facts in the case
could be better understood.
As Alex Hinton testified he demonstrated that his extensive academic career, voluminous
publications, and leadership positions held in the area of genocide studies amply enabled him to
be classified as an expert on issues such as the cause of the genocide and persecution in Cambodia.
As he did in his book, Dr. Hinton gave an articulate and comprehensive account of the societal
factors that created conditions for killings on a massive scale and other acts of persecution to occur
in Cambodia. He explained to the judges the universal and uniquely Cambodian societal factors
that existed both before and during the DK period, which caused the genocide and crimes against

35

Alex Laban Hinton, Why Did They Kill? Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of
California Press, 2005).
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humanity to occur.36 It was clear in the courtroom that the judges concentrated on every word of
his testimony, as he approached the evidence from a macro and micro perspective to explain how
these killings took place so systematically.
Dr. Hinton also testified on the information he received first-hand from hundreds of witnesses,
who included former Khmer Rouge cadre and survivors who provided evidence of the existence
and implementation of the CPK policies to kill specifically Cham Muslims, Vietnamese and other
groups. These interviews were conducted in Kampong Cham province in the mid-1990s as part of
Alex Hinton’s research for his PhD.
A significant part of Dr. Hinton’s testimony concerned one aspect of the CPK documents
that was being argued as evidence of intent to commit genocide of the Vietnamese. This evidence
was identified in the language used by the CPK in their leaders’ speeches, publications, and other
documentation. For example, in the April 1978 Revolutionary Flag magazine, the CPK acknowledges
their “success” in eradicating the Vietnamese from Cambodia, stating “[a]nd now, how about the
Yuon? There are no Yuon in Kampuchean territory. Formerly there were nearly 1,000,000 of them.
Now there is not one seed of them to be found.”37 Alex Hinton testified that language used in this
way in CPK documents was done intentionally to incite subordinates to commit genocide against
the Vietnamese.38
On the last day of Dr. Hinton’s questioning, his testimony on this issue caught the close
attention of Nuon Chea to such an extent that he requested to be brought up to the courtroom in
order to make a statement in response to the expert’s opinion. It was very rare that Nuon Chea
came into the courtroom, preferring to watch the proceedings in an adjacent room on video due
to his health conditions. After a statement by Nuon Chea, in which he said he believed the word
‘Youn’ was not derogatory towards Vietnamese, Dr. Hinton responded respectfully, “I think that’s
a valuable pedagogical exercise in general, but in the end I stand strongly by my stance that the
word ‘Yuon’ can be a very incendiary word. It’s a word that can incite hatred and violence and in
the context of DK it was an incitement to genocide.”39
Sitting at the prosecution bench as this exchange was unfolding, I watched Dr. Hinton ably
and respectfully respond to Nuon Chea’s view. I thought to myself, would Alex Hinton ever have
thought that, when he was that 31-year-old PhD research student sitting in a village in Kampong
Cham province in the middle of Cambodia collecting evidence on the genocide of the Khmer Rouge,
that 25 years later he would be discussing his findings with Nuon Chea in a trial where Nuon Chea
was charged with genocide on the very facts he was investigating? Being in this position clearly did
not intimidate Dr. Hinton. To the contrary, in court he held his resolve to keep his mind trained on
the topic and bring to the fore all of the facts to support his opinions under heavy questioning and
the opinion of Nuon Chea himself. All Dr. Hinton’s prior hard work had paid off, and he was able
to make his contribution to the accountability and reconciliation process in Cambodia in one of the
most salient ways possible.
The title of this address was Justice for Genocide in Cambodia – The Case for the Prosecution.
However, I aimed to steer my remarks to acknowledging the importance of independent
academics, journalists, researchers, investigators, analysts and NGOs that take the difficult,
dangerous and often thankless course of investigating and analyzing mass human rights abuses
when the international community is unable to do so. Without these efforts, important evidence
is easily lost, documents are destroyed, opportunities for incisive interviews are gone, witness
leads are buried, and the chance to deliver justice decreases by the year. If not for the work of these
individuals, independently or together, prior to the establishment of the ECCC, seeking justice for
the Khmer Rouge crimes would have been extremely difficult. This activity by these individuals
and organizations provides a good lesson to all of us to keep seeking justice for others, even when
it feels like nothing will ever be done.
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ECCC Case 002/02, Trial Transcript, Doc. No. E1/401.1, 14 March 2016, 24, 44-68.
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Introduction
For some decades now, historian David Irving has been at the center of scandal, including arrest
and incarceration in Austria in 2005-2006 for Holocaust denial. His published histories on persons
such as Adolf Hitler and Erwin Rommel have received mixed reception, especially among scholars,
and his self-promotional YouTube videos show him to be a racist and a misogynist. Yet perhaps
Irving’s most controversial moment was the trial he brought against Holocaust scholar Deborah
Lipstadt, known today as Irving versus Penguin Books Limited, Deborah E. Lipstadt.1 Irving accused
Lipstadt (and her book’s publisher) of libelous representation in her book Denying the Holocaust,
and it is this trial that is at the heart of Mick Jackson’s 2016 film Denial.
The film stars Rachel Weisz as Deborah Lipstadt and Timothy Spall as David Irving, and it
premiered at the Toronto Film Festival in 2016. The film was subsequently nominated for a British
Academy Film Award for Best Film, and it has been positively reviewed in the press, the Guardian
calling the film an “overwhelmingly relevant assertion of the truth.”2
Denial was selected by the committee of the 2017 International Association of Genocide
Scholars conference for a number of reasons. First, the film was relatively fresh and had only
just premiered in Australia. Second, the debate over Holocaust denial had recently reignited on
Australian university campuses after pamphlets and posters were distributed nation-wide that
questioned the legitimacy and historical veracity of the Holocaust. Third, the film intended to
introduce mainstream viewers to the world of the Holocaust and Holocaust denial, and the choice
of the filmmaker was to fictionalize rather than employ a genre such as documentary. These were
social and filmic influences that the panel took into consideration when discussing Denial.
The Risk of Hypocrisy by Kirril Shields
Let me start with something of an anecdote. I lived for three and a half years in Bermondsey,
London, a borough that boasts the highest density of council housing in South London. In my
experience, cafes in the area cook fry-ups, of which there are a good number (those places where
you go to eat fried eggs, sausages, fried bread and so on). These cafes do not serve bagels. So why is
it that the character of Deborah Lipstadt in Mick Jackson’s 2016 film Denial, asks for a bagel in one
of these eateries? Why not a cup of tea, or a fried egg on toast? Why not nothing? Why a bagel in a
cafe not traditionally known for bagels?
My point here being representation and how filmmakers wish to emphasize a particular trait
or typology. The bagel is an important insert within the film because this is what Jews eat. The
bagel is a marker, a somewhat clichéd symbol among the many other symbols inserted in the film
as a means of denotation. Watch for the row of expensive cars, the metal thorn in the foot, the
tattoo on the arm, the t-shirts the character of Lipstadt wears, sandwiches in the cupboard, plastic
cups intended for red wine; all are markers concerned with building a particular representation.
1
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Admittedly, this is typical of film and theatre, and something Bertolt Brecht would have referred to
as gestus, which, by loose definition, are single or repeated actions that, either on stage or onscreen,
are socially coded.3 They tell us something about a character and where they might be positioned,
socially or culturally. The plastic cups of red wine preferred by the character Richard Rampton
QC (played by Tom Wilkinson) tells us that he is a simple man of simple taste, who thinks glass
or crystal an indulgent frivolity. Alternatively, that time is too precious to waste with the washing
up. Denial is (as are most films), littered with socially coded signs akin to the cups and the bagel.
These codes, however, extend beyond quite obvious and rudimentary social and cultural
identifiers, and include the more nuanced and/or less obvious, such as facial expression, body
language, filmic angle, soundtrack, and so forth. Actors, in the very process of becoming another
being, adopt various identifiers to show class and social habit, cultural customs, and these adaptors
inform backstory, even tell us something about the character’s opinions on matters. Think what a
hand on a hip suggests, or the way a cigarette is held. Rachel Weisz’s portrayal of Lipstadt is reliant
on various codifiers, including the habit of a hurried walker and fast talker, suggesting a strong
female character, self-determined, who can think on her feet. There is also a lack of partner, with
the exception of a dog, suggesting Lipstadt a woman with little need of a human relationship.
Here I want to move past this character of Lipstadt and all that is emblematically embedded
in her character, to discuss the performance by Timothy Spall, and his rendering of the Holocaust
denier, David Irving. Spall is also reliant on symbolic gestures as a means of fleshing out the
character of Irving. The actor bends a certain way to possibly symbolize a lack of integrity; he
holds spectacles to enhance a sense of learnedness, and so on. Irving, in real life, is a 79-year-old
author of World War Two histories (mostly), who sides politically with the Right, and for some
while has denied (denies?) the Holocaust. In Spalding’s characterization, any number of socially
coded actions become apparent, intended to signal the author’s social status, and his like or dislike
of certain peoples. This is no better epitomized than in the scene where Irving peers out from his
lounge room window unblinking, somewhat akin to Anthony Hopkin’s portrayal of serial killer
Hannibal Lecter. He stares after two young lawyers working for Lipstadt’s publisher (who Irving
is attempting to sue), as they walk from his house. Why is it the character Irving refrains from
blinking? Because arseholes do not blink, or so seemingly suggests Hollywood.
Until viewing Denial, all I knew of David Irving was that he was British and that he was a
Holocaust denier. I had never read his books, did not know what he looked like, and was never
interested in his account of the Holocaust. Following the screening, having watched hours of Irving
as he performs “himself” on his self-produced YouTube clips, having read snippets of his books,
here is my very brief opinion of the man. Is he racist? Yes. Is he anti-Semitic? Yes. Is he a misogynist?
Yes. Is he a Holocaust denier? Actually, I am not sure given recent revisions of his own ideas. In
some YouTube clips Irving does not deny the numbers of Jews who perished in the Reinhardt
camps, only contests the numbers that were gassed at Auschwitz. So he seemingly agrees with
the figure of 6 or 6.5 million Jews dead, but differs on certain specificities, reminding me of a man
who is aging and remains stubborn for no reason than stubbornness alone. In some respects, after
watching Irving’s self-indulgent YouTube performances, I feel as if in the last year or so he has
picked up a copy of Timothy Snyder’s Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin and this has
had some effect.4 But does David Irving advocate for political and social right-wing movements?
Yes. So, in summary, regardless of where he sits in relation to the Holocaust nowadays, Irving is
definitely a non-blinker.
While Irving may not be the most ethical of individuals, is he the man we see on the screen
in Jackson’s Denial? In my opinion, he is not the man we see on screen. I admit that I have never
personally met the man, and all my knowledge of him is derived from online or published mediums.
I therefore base this opinion on certain types of textual evidence. I am also aware that what we
see on screen is artistic license, an actor’s prerogative. After outlining my own inadequacies and
3

George Brandt, “Brecht, Bertolt,” in The Continuum Companion to Twentieth Century Theatre, ed. Colin Chambers (London:
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acknowledging the fact that film molds and manipulates purposefully, it is important to draw
on the core motivation behind the film; that of a libel case, a false statement damaging a person’s
reputation. And it is here where there’s the risk of hypocrisy. Is this film, therefore, a somewhat
well intended and morally tenacious case of libel, based on another not so well intended and
immoral case of libel? Because if Irving’s depiction by Spall, under direction of Jackson, is false,
then the film seemingly falls prey to its own accusation. Or, could it be that there is such a thing
as well-intended and moral defamation? Here I am not suggesting that actors or directors dismiss
hyperbole or over-the-top portrayals of real-life “baddies”. And yet, even when taking this into
account, given the message at the heart of Denial, is the filmmaker and the production team being
somewhat hypocritical?
As a means of attempting to answer this question, I turn to David Irving’s histories, his
published work, which is a long list of writing that, over the years, has led to time in prison,
and bankruptcy. What Irving stands accused of—aside from this seemingly forever-changing
interpretation of the Holocaust—is the picking and choosing of history, hence his somewhat
positive analysis of Adolf Hitler, and, according to Sir Ian Kershaw, Irving’s attempts to exculpate
Hitler’s role in the Final Solution.5 Irving is criticized for selectively choosing aspects of the past that
seem to him interesting historical artefact, and relying upon his interpretation to usurp popular
and well-regarded scholarship. So he picks and chooses subjectively, constructing characters such
as Erwin Rommel, Josef Goebbels, or Hitler in ways sometimes antithetical to tried, tested, known,
and well-regarded historical methods. And in opposition to what could be called ethical and moral
accounts of a past that attempt to recognize decent scholarship rather than hearsay or speculation
(I refer to Irving’s reliance on a book written by Fred Leuchter titled The Leuchter Report: The End of a
Myth).6 As a result, Irving has seen himself in all manner of trouble, hence this particular court case,
hence the supposed bankruptcies, hence his time in prison in Austria, and hence being banned
from entering Australia.
However, a problem arises when you begin to ponder the film Denial, and the filmmaker’s
decisions. Has director Mick Jackson done something similar in his direction and choice of character
depiction to what Irving is accused of doing in his histories? At the heart of what I am proposing is
the responsibility to build a story ethically, something unbiased; a history that provides as accurate
a representation as possible. For this is exactly what this film, Denial, is concerned with. It is about
defending a person’s reputation from ill repute or slanderous motives. Yes, there is that element to
the film that proves Irving’s history inaccurate in relation to Auschwitz, but the film is also about
a writer thinking he has been wrongly portrayed in a book. Then, somewhat ironically, this same
person now finds himself being wrongly portrayed in a film about being him wrongly portrayed in
a book. I feel like the filmmaker never really understood the complexities of representation, or the
social and political nuances at work, or decided representing Irving accurately was not an important
consideration given Irving’s background. In the director choosing the film’s representations,
Jackson undermines the film’s message and offers opportunities for Irving (and with some right to
do so) to accuse the filmmaker of an inaccurate and slanderous representation.
Some accusations are easily defended in relation to Irving’s politics and his past deeds, or
even when considering some of his published work, in that it would be easy to accuse Irving of
being an anti-Semite and then prove this, or to show historical inaccuracy in some of his history.
In the case of artistic representation, however, as seen in the film, David Irving would have a
legitimate gripe. I feel it is one thing to show a person to be Jewish by having them order a bagel in
a London café, but it is quite precarious to insert characteristics that allow Irving, his followers and
his beliefs, a moment of exculpation. And this is what this film might enable. It gives opportunity
for Irving to show that he has been wronged in representation, and while this does not lessen
other racist or misogynistic examples of Irving’s self, it does offer him the opportunity to revel in
misrepresentation, building on the “hard done by” rhetoric he employs that until now had little
substance.

5

Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation (London: Edward Arnold, 1985).
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One broad question that I believe arises in relation to this last point: is such a concern relevant?
Irving is an old man with aging views, who appears very much a narcissist, very much a selfseeking publicity monger. Should we care if this film offers Irving a small reprieve given the overabundance of accusatory evidence that questions his morals and his historiography? Unfortunately,
this topic does remain relevant and applicable to generations younger than Irving, because in
2017, some of Irving’s younger followers decided to distribute leaflets at Australian university
campuses, denying the Holocaust and publicizing the same uneducated rhetoric that Irving
himself propagates. While they were quickly gathered up and destroyed by campus security, their
presence shows that Irving’s ideas remain potent and followed. So I do insist that there is some risk
in taking this particular character representation too far from the real, and in doing so providing
those who distribute denial leaflets, alongside Irving himself, a legitimate means of debasing or
undercutting (or usurping or delegitimizing) those who demand historical and historiographical
accuracy. It provides Irving the impetus to question ideas of fairness and accuracy, when his own
career has been reliant on the distortion of both.
The Rhetoric of Denial by Ted Nannicelli
When I arrived at Emory University in 1998, it was with the intention of majoring in English and
History. Had I stuck to that plan, I may well have taken a course with Professor Deborah Lipstadt
and had a much more interesting perspective on Denial, based on her memoir, History on Trial: My
Day in Court with a Holocaust Denier (2005). However, I ended up taking only one history course
before my interests permanently shifted to cinema studies and now, not quite twenty years later, I
teach in a film and television studies program.
I do not know if my training gives me a much different perspective on this film than any of
you probably have—I was often transfixed by the acting performances much like I imagine most
viewers are—but it is probably fair to say that in my job I tend to think about the construction of
films more than non-specialists. So, that is what I would like to talk about—the construction and,
more specifically, the cinematic rhetoric, of Denial.
Considering the film as a rhetorical construction occurred to me as potentially fruitful because
the film takes rhetoric as a theme. That is, Denial juxtaposes David Irving’s baseless, empty rhetoric
against the truth—historical fact as it is presented by Lipstadt and her legal team. What I want to
suggest is that there is a tension in the way the film stages this opposition. The tension arises from
the fact that rhetoric and truth are not necessarily opposed, a fact that the film’s construction itself
makes clear enough. For Denial is a largely accurate account of historical events, but one that makes
copious use of rhetoric to help its arguments and to elicit sympathy for those arguments and for
the film’s protagonists.
At this point, one might immediately wonder what could be wrong with a film eliciting our
sympathy for Lipstadt and what she represents in this film: the triumph of history, fact, truth, and
civility. Of course, the answer is “absolutely nothing”. Lipstadt and the principles or ideals with
which she is aligned certainly do warrant our sympathies, while Irving and the principles or ideals
(such as they are) with which he is aligned warrant our rebuke. But it is precisely because this is so
glaringly obvious that Denial’s liberal use of rhetoric is so curious and, to my mind, a bit unsettling.
It is very unlikely that many people come to a screening of the film with no knowledge of
its content. I would like to think, however, that most people who come to a screening of the film
have a clear moral view on the Holocaust, and on those people who have tried to deny that the
Holocaust occurred. If I am mistaken about this, then I suppose much of the worry I am about to
express about the film’s rhetorical structure is misguided. Perhaps, in other words, many viewers
come to Denial with enough of an open mind that the film’s rhetoric—especially those moments
that make it unambiguously clear who we should side with—is indeed warranted. If I am right that
most viewers come to the film with the sense that Holocaust denial is a moral wrong and are thus
unlikely to have any sympathy for Irving whatsoever, then it remains puzzling to me why the film
goes to the rhetorical lengths that it does.
At this point I wish to be a little bit more specific about my claims regarding Denial’s rhetoric.
What sorts of rhetorical devices do I have in mind? Some are common to many—perhaps most—
mainstream Hollywood style movies. One of the most important conventions in such movies is

©2018

Genocide Studies and Prevention 12, no. 3 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.12.3.1573

Shields et al.

44

that the films are, in Noël Carroll’s words “emotively prefocused” for us.7 That is to say, we do
not view the events movies represent impartially. Rather, we experience the represented events
from a particular perspective that the film’s narration affords us, and this perspective emotionally
colors our apprehension of those events. I use the term “narration” broadly here to refer to the
way in which the film distributes the fictional (or, in the case of non-fiction movies like this one,
representational) content. Narration includes things like camera angle, camera distance, sound
perspective, and even non-diegetic sound—that is, the musical score accompanying the image
track, which of course affectively prefocuses and gives a particular perspective on the represented
events in the image track. Consider, for example, the ominous strings playing over the scene at the
end of the trial, in which a single question from the judge seems to indicate that Lipstadt’s entire
defensive strategy might be upended. Or, consider the shift to a major key that emotively focuses
the delivery of the verdict.
Of course, most of the most affective prefocusing work in Denial involves engendering our
sympathy (or pro-attitudes more broadly) towards Lipstadt. According to a widely-accepted view
developed by Murray Smith, there are two main, often interconnected processes by which movies
elicit our pro-attitudes towards characters in this way: alignment and allegiance.8 Alignment is a
formal process by which the narration “aligns” our perspective on the represented events with
that of a particular character, usually the protagonist. This happens in two ways: through spatiotemporal attachment, which is a matter of being with or following a character, and through subjective
access, which is, as it sounds, a matter of granting us access to a character’s subjectivity, including
her feelings, beliefs, desires, and so forth. According to Smith, spatio-temporal attachment shows
us what characters do, and subjective access reveals what they are thinking or feeling.
One of the more contested elements of Smith’s account is the claim that, everything else
being equal, increased alignment with a character tends to increase allegiance with the character.9
Allegiance, for Smith, involves an evaluative dimension; it can be thought of as a matter of rooting
for a particular character. According to Smith, the central way in which allegiance is developed
is through the solicitation of moral judgment of characters by viewers. We can think here of the
screenwriter’s old adage, “if you want the audience to instantly hate a character, have him kick a
dog in the first scene”.
Smith’s theory of character engagement offers an interesting perspective from which to think
about Denial, in part because it helps clarify this sense, that the film is doing more rhetorical work
than it really needed. As suggested earlier, it seems plausible to think that most viewers come to
the film allied with Lipstadt and against Irving. If this is the case, one wonders if it is necessary to
frame the Irving character from occluded angles and in shadows to make him appear even more
sinister and unknowable. Perhaps the more forceful way of representing Irving’s evil character
would been to have given us more banal scenes in which he is simply openly racist. I should
acknowledge, though, that apparently the scriptwriters went to great lengths to ensure that Irving’s
dialogue in the film is constituted by things he is on the record as saying.
The filmmakers did not hold themselves to this rule for their portrayal of Lipstadt, however. I
also wonder about what I would regard as the “forced” spatio-temporal attachment to the Lipstadt
character in her many jogging scenes. Work of attachment here feels particularly forced because the
jogging adds nothing to the story, but is such a banal character feature that it gives us no sense of
Lipstadt as a person. One possibility is that the jogging scenes afford the opportunity for otherwise
unmotivated close-ups of the Lipstadt character, so even if we are not getting true subjective access
to her mental states through the narration, we are able to exercise our mind-reading capacities to
glean her emotional states and, perhaps, share them, moving us from alignment to allegiance.
It is also possible, of course, that Lipstadt really was or is an avid runner, and this explains
why she has this hobby in the film. But given the film’s comfort with other rhetorical moves, one
wonders why such a bland hobby is not spiced up a bit. It cannot be, logically speaking, because
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the film is committed to complete factual accuracy to Lipstadt’s actual life. Interestingly, the film
does erroneously suggest, very explicitly, that Lipstadt is from Queens when in fact she hails from
the Upper Westside. It is hard to imagine why the filmmakers would fictionalize this detail unless
it is a conscious effort to head off the worn anti-Semitic association between Jewish Americans and
wealth. As is well known, the New York’s Upper West Side is reputed as one of Manhattan’s most
affluent neighborhoods, while Queens has a reputation as a rough-around-the-edges working
class neighborhood. And numerically speaking, there are many more Jews in Manhattan (and even
more in Brooklyn) than there are in Queens.10
Why mention such a minor detail—a throwaway line at the end of the film? Because it seems
to me indicative of the film’s uneasiness around its central assertion: that the truth may not speak
for itself, as Lipstadt seems to believe at the film’s start. But that the right and the good are the right
and the good in part because they do not need to manipulate truth to win their case; they simply
need to adduce evidence. In other words, that throwaway line, in which the Lipstadt character
claims to be from Queens, seems to me symptomatic of a disturbing anxiety tacit throughout Denial:
that the film does not really buy its own putative claims about the sufficiency of simply adducing
evidence and presenting facts, since its own construction makes clear that the filmmakers have
made deliberate use of film’s rhetorical potential in an attempt to solidify viewers’ allegiance with
the Lipstadt character, and guarantee the right emotional response to the represented events.
To be clear, my claim is not that there is anything intrinsically wrong with movies—even
those that are non-fiction, or based on a true story—that make use of cinema’s rhetorical potential
in the sorts of ways I have outlined. Neither is it that such movies are intrinsically “untruthful” or
somehow on par with Irving’s manipulation of historical fact. Far from it. Non-fiction films and
films based on actual events necessarily represent historical events from a particular perspective
and often set out to make arguments. This in no way vitiates their ability or potential to accurately
represent historical events and be truthful in that sense.
Rather, my point is that Denial might be socially and politically relevant in a way popular
commentators have not recognized. The common claim regarding the film’s current relevance is
neatly expressed by Peter Bradshaw in his Guardian review: “I find this film and its clear-headed
premise rewarding. This reasserts the primacy of truth.”11 But perhaps the real relevance of the
film is that, in the post-truth age, simply marshaling facts and evidence is not enough to sway
people towards the morally right view. Denial tacitly suggests, through its own use of rhetoric, that
we, who are on the right side of history and have the facts on our side must also—like the posttruthers—appeal to people’s emotions.
Denial, Rhetoric and Reality by Henry Theriault
The lawsuit by David Irving against Deborah Lipstadt is certainly a fit subject for a serious film. It
has all the features, in fact, of a classic Hollywood movie, even a showdown Western: the peaceful
protagonist tormented by a nasty bully heading a gang of socially-deviant thugs and who relies
on manipulation, intimidation, and violence—though, in the 21st century, this action plays out in
a courtroom rather than on Main Street with six guns. To the extent that it tells a much worthier
story than most other films, it is certainly laudable.
Given the artistic, ethical, and intellectual vacuity of the vast majority of contemporary films,
this is, unfortunately, faint praise. Because its creators chose to take on a major issue of human
existence—genocide—as well as one of the most prevalent and complex phenomena—denial
(which applies not just to genocide, but also to the health effects of tobacco, global warming,
evolutionary theory, political corruption, and more)—its makers have given tacit approval that
the film be judged against a higher standard. This standard is the various intellectual and artistic
approaches against denial developed over the past half century. We might consider the film on the
Armenian Genocide, Ararat, and the genocide’s multilayered and multifaceted legacy, including
10

Simone Weichselbaum, “Nearly One in Four Brooklyn Residents are Jews, New Study Finds,” New York Daily News June
26, 2012, accessed May 24, 2017, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/brooklyn/brooklyn-residents-jews-newstudy-finds-article-1.1100080.

11

Peter Bradshaw, “Denial Review: Overwhelming Relevant Assertion of Truth.”

©2018

Genocide Studies and Prevention 12, no. 3 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.12.3.1573

Shields et al.

46

denial.12 Without doing justice to its complexities, this masterpiece pushes the question of denial
in all its dimensions. What is a “fact,” and how do we relate to facts—as individual or group/
cultural memories, as the motivation for violent and non-violent political action, as objects of art
mediated through a complexly layered traumatic history—should we relate to past facts, and
more? How do we communicate facts dear to us or that are traumatic for us to others who have a
different relationship to them, or no relationship at all? Ararat takes its name from a mountain, a
material object, while Denial takes name from an abstraction; and yet, the former engages denial in
a sophisticated, shifting, dynamic manner, and the latter in a mechanical, reductive, simplistic one.
Irving is a “type” and those he appeals to are as well; perhaps that is what is true about the
real David Irving, but, then, is he really the story? We have a simple conflict between good and
evil, between true and false; in director Atom Egoyan’s hands, the topic is probed in ways that the
Irving case provides little obvious material for. For a film to have engaged on the topic of Irving in
a sophisticated way would have required artistic innovation that is lacking in the literal-minded
presentation of the case. Indeed, for the film to reveal much about denial, it would have had to
have had a sad, not a “happy,” ending—for instance, showing Irving becoming a hero again of
neo-Nazis worldwide. For the norm is that our world is pervaded and even molded by denial.
Deborah Lipstadt’s History on Trial: My Day in Court with a Holocaust Denier was written
before denial was firmly recognized as a phenomenon across genocides, science, and politics. It
represented Lipstadt’s particular experience of the trial and her approach to the Holocaust, which
had generally not been open to being situated in a broader history of genocide and human rights
abuses and mass violence. So it might be understandable that the book did not make connections
that are rather obvious to anyone who considers denial, and it remained somewhat limited even
in regard to Holocaust denial because it did not take account of the complexities of denial wellexposed and analyzed in considerations of other cases, whether denial of genocides of Native
North and South Americans; Aborigines in Australia; Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians in the
Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic; Bosnians in the former Yugoslavia; Rwandans, principally
Tutsi, in Rwanda; and many more; or denial of the harms of tobacco, global warming, and so on. To
choose to call the film Denial in this context, therefore, was to make a claim for it that was simply
untrue and misleading. “Denial” as a general phenomenon, even in reference only to genocide, is
not reducible to Holocaust denial. The choice obligated the filmmakers to find some creative means
of expanding the focus.
I am not suggesting that those who study the Holocaust or Holocaust denial specifically share
such limitations; quite the contrary, some of the most innovative and committed thinkers and
activists on denial of other genocides have been Holocaust scholars who are able to balance, in a
productive and respectful way, the Holocaust as the referent case of genocide and the importance
of recognizing it as part of an overarching history of genocide and its denial.13 I am also not
suggesting that those who focus on other genocides and/or their denials are any more open to
making connections. Ararat is about the Armenian Genocide and its denial. Yet, in Egoyan’s hands,
the Armenian Genocide becomes the occasion to reflect on and analyze truly universal concerns.
In the same way Hamlet is not about some Danish folks, but about all of us, Ararat is not just about
Armenian folks but all of us. It explicitly critically engages other issues, such as homophobia. And it
recognizes as a legitimate question why the Armenian Genocide should matter to non-Armenians.
Given all that has been written and discussed regarding denial, Denial’s creators clearly missed
12
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an excellent opportunity to extend Lipstadt’s range; after all, there was nothing that bound them to
a literal rendering of her book and exclusive focus on Holocaust denial. Even as a representation of
the Irving trial, the standards of serious historical research and a commitment to accuracy would
have required reliance on more than Lipstadt’s own representation of events. The same is true of
an adequate conceptual analysis of denial; there is no reason that Lipstadt’s foundation could not
have been expanded to strengthen the film. This is an aesthetic as much as a moral claim.
The Unacknowledged Unseen Context
Rather than focus on the shortcomings of Denial, it is better to use it as an occasion for positive
consideration of what “denial” is and has become by the early 21st century. Western philosophy
has always been obsessed with distinguishing “appearance”—how things are perceived—from
“reality”—the actual metaphysical truth of what is. Other traditions also have recognized this
distinction and sometimes shared the response of rejection of “appearance” in favor of some sense
of “reality,” typically spiritual/transcendent. In the Western cultural tradition and these others, the
uncertainty has sometimes been embraced, for instance in the use of unreliable literary narrators,
meditation practice that starts with unsolvable conceptual tensions or puzzles.
This basic binary has been modified in many ways. The standard narrative of Western
philosophy has certain “turns” that have recast the opposition in new terms. The “Epistemological
Turn” took us from what might be termed the “Metaphysical Era,” in which the question of
perception was limited to a challenge that could be overcome with proper devotion and practice,
to one in which epistemic boundaries could never be escaped. For Plato, for instance, the question
of perception was relevant only to the world of appearances, which could be transcended by the
philosopher who entered the world of things as they actually are.14 Once a person was trained
to see the world as it is, the issues of perception dropped out and the thinker had direct access
to reality. With the “Epistemological Turn” of the early modern period, philosophers recognized
that even our concepts of true reality are bound within epistemic horizons or speculative.15 All we
can know is what we perceive, not what is. Perception became objective reality, whether with a
Berkeleyan, Kantian, or other twist. We became trapped in questions of perception.
The “Linguistic Turn” of the 19th and 20th centuries pushed people back further into
themselves, as perception became viewed as bounded by linguistic frameworks. Whether Noam
Chomsky’s rationalist approach to a natural language forming the bedrock of all thought, the
ordinary language logicians for whom linguistic statements became all that philosophical analysis
could apply to, or poststructuralists who gave up a notion of a consistent, authored or intentionally
created/developed language, but still saw thought and perception as embedded within a given
linguistic framework.
This philosophical retreat paralleled and perhaps derived from concrete historical developments.
It posed the challenges that opened the door to both creative and repressive innovations in what
we might call the age of denial. It allowed the following political moves a space.
The 1600s saw the rise of critical philosophy and co-requisite natural sciences, politics, and
culture. Democracy, individual human rights, complex social unifications (for instance, in the
nation or class) all became mechanisms of advancement. The rhetoric of expanded rights, political
participation, and more, however, contradicted the obvious reality of newly universal colonialism,
slavery, genocide, exploitation, and elite-driven internal repression. If human history had always
had war and genocide, conquest and capitulation, in the modern era these became the foundations
of a global system. What is more, they were driven forward in a period in which the rhetoric
seemed to call for the opposite, yet they thrived. A Marxist might see this as the natural progress
of social/political/economic contradictions driving change; while a liberal as the mere resilience

14
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of outmoded ideas that required patience for the new progressive ideals to take hold.16 Yet, the
contradictions were not, generally, resolved by revolutionary overthrow of the regressive regime
or reform of laws toward greater fairness and universality. Contrary to the expectation of historical
materialism or even a looser Hegelian notion of dialectical progress, the resolution not only left
the contradiction intact, but transformed it into the foundation of a novel form of mental-material
order.17
The result has been a new kind of system in which two opposing forces—appearance and
reality, however updated—are connected together toward an overarching oppression. It is not
denial alone that is the problem, but denial in its relationship with reality. It is not the case that
there are no objective facts in the world; quite the contrary, many are easily accessible and doubting
them is the function of denial, though denial is often misrepresented as legitimate Cartesian
doubt. It is no longer a question of the opposition of falsity and truth, illusory and actuality, but
of control of the variable distance between rhetoric and reality. Here the error of Jean Baudrillard
is evident.18 He was right to reject old notions of the relationship of appearance to reality; they
capture only a certain one of the many relationships possible. But his postmodern move to hyperreality in which all rhetoric and reality become equally rhetorical, is a grand cover up of what is
actually the case. He fails to account for the continued difference between rhetoric and reality and
embraces pure rhetoric as the real. Indeed, despite the pretentions of postmodernists obsessed with
differentiating the postmodern from the modern, the two supposed eras are part of one Rhetorical
Age. Postmodernism is simply the latest misunderstanding of and covering up of denial.
To say “system” is too much. What we have is a chaotic ordering and an ordered chaos, or
fluidity between system and anti-system, opposing tension and complementarity, and what is
on the continua between these pairings. At times, rhetorical devices support approaches to the
truth—here again Ararat comes to mind, though any good work of cinema, drama, literature, static
visual art, or music would serve just as well, as this film and other works use aesthetic methods
to draw audiences to understandings of challenging political and ethical issues they would not
have achieved were they given merely didactic treatments. There is a profound difference between
seriously studying the statistics of Auschwitz’s functioning and genuinely reading Wiesel’s Night;
the latter does what the former never can; however important statistics are in their own right, they
remain incomplete without an imaging step that recognizes or invests them with their truly human
meaning—the suffering, perseverance, luck good and bad, tragedy, indescribability, and more of
what this part and the entirety of the Holocaust comprised.
The distance between rhetoric and reality can be understood through examples. At times, in the
present US Trump Administration, bald-faced lies are presented as truths in direct contradiction
to evidence. These are embraced by many as “alternate facts.” In this case, the distance between
truth and falsity (denial) is maximized. At other times, the distance is condensed, in order to give
credibility to what is not quite true. The concept of “plausible deniability” is an illustration: through
it, a leader avoids any evidence of intent to produce bad consequences for a victim group. Indeed,
there are times when distance is erased in order to demonstrate the reliability of an authority (a
leader, for example), so that he/she/they will later be able to open the gap up again on an issue of
more importance. Good genocide deniers, for example, deny the minimum necessary to justify
their false conclusions; sloppy ones overreach and are easier to refute.
The more that politically and ethically progressive ideas and practices have taken hold and
become expected, the more that the distance between rhetoric and reality has been manipulated.
Again, it is not that this gap becomes wider and wider, which might be called the Orwellian model;
people are not so stupid as to fall for grand falsifications, at least not all or most people. If all
16
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pockets of a society seem to acquiesce, it is because some who are well aware of the falsity in play
choose to pretend to confirm as true what is false out of political savvy, self-preservation, or the
embrace of advantages the right approach to acquiescence guarantees. Rather than being widened
perpetually, the gap is controlled, so that its oscillations become the primary means of political
power-over domination.
Rhetoric-Reality
It is beyond the scope of these brief remarks to give a full accounting of the various ways that the
relationship between rhetoric and reality is manipulated, of the two terms and their variations, or
of the mechanisms acting on their relationship. But a partial treatment should be instructive.
It might have been that in the 17th Century, with the rise of notions of popular political
participation, evidence-based science, et cetera, there was the potential for a new kind of human
society. But the Rhetorical Turn that began at that point closed off the possibilities of genuine
liberation. Recalling Michel Foucault’s notion of the transition from a politics of the “Right of Death”
to “Power over Life,”19 through this turn, we went from a period in which power did not need the
cover of rhetorical adherence to ideals to one in which power, oppression, and domination have
been represented successfully as their opposites. The point of no-return was perhaps the French
and Haitian Revolutions, the full complexities of which emerge only when they are treated together
(though some might contend that pre-modern Christianity operated as a cover for oppression and
exploitation; in this sense, we might see this aspect as a precursor to modern power, as it conflicted
with the raw power of kings).
If Friedrich Nietzsche was right to recognize the disconnect between the pre-modern Christian
concept of good and its relationship to power and desire, or the desire for power-over, he failed
to appreciate the brilliance of the modern/contemporary resolution of that disconnect through the
manipulation of rhetoric. For Nietzsche, greater power inhered in a nakedly explicit display of
dominance for its own sake, than through the more subtle application of power that is hidden
through a reversing denialist dissimulation that renders the action of power and oppression itself
invisible and thus all the more impactful, resilient, and far-reaching.20 Ayn Rand’s literary crudities
are mirrored in her intellectual ones (even beyond her vulgar, reductive, simple-minded reading
of Nietzsche), where she fails to appreciate Ellsworth Toohey as the rightfully dominant figure in
The Fountainhead and far more worthy (not morally, of course, because there are no morally worthy
characters in anything written by Rand) and interesting than Howard Roark, who is more a dog
than a person, with childish-macho desires hardly worth bothering about.21
If I have argued that we inhabit a rhetorical age in which the relationship between rhetoric and
reality is the focus of and guarantor of power-over, readers might see this as even more pessimistic
than previous attempts to engage this split. Many postmodernists, in fact, embrace as liberatory the
purely rhetorical as the entire universe of human existence. But my position is no less favorable,
due to a simple reversal. With only a few noteworthy exceptions such as Nietzsche, the core quest
of Western philosophy has been understood to be the attainment of truth by overcoming obstacles
and barriers erected on the path to it. For Plato, this was a 40-year process, for Hegel it required
two millennia and more of public progress. What the age of denial has taught is that, at least by
the modern era, the truth is pretty straightforward to grasp and record. Denial is about moving us
away from a hold on the truth, and the illusion that the truth is somehow elusive and difficult to
reach is a key foundation that allows denial the full range it has in the modern/postmodern world.
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Examples abound. It was after the 1997 Bringing Them Home22 report offered compelling
evidence of what Australians had done to the indigenous inhabitants of the continent they colonized
that a backlash ensued that eroded much of the progress made on the issue that far.23 In 1992,
as decades of slow progress culminated in a widespread discussion of the legacy of Columbus’
genocidal conquest of the “New World,” an aggressive backlash characterized by violent rhetoric
and explicit, unabashed celebrations of the destruction of Native Americans reasserted genocidal
racism into the heart of US political discourse (where denial had covered it for some time). The
White Man’s burden, captured so well in John Stuart Mill’s paternalistic views of the colonized,
recast oppression of indigenous peoples across the globe as if a service was being done for them,
not to the great benefit of, but to the detriment of colonizers.24 The Armenian Genocide was widely
known and unquestioned across the world and even in Turkey in 1919, but by the 1920s denial had
begun its erosion of the obvious truth. We see the same trajectory regarding Rwanda and many
other cases. Denial is always there, as the air we breathe, but continually basic “brute” facts of
human society and politics insert themselves into the field of denial. In the moment of assertion,
yes, the truth is evident, but then the action of denial erodes certainty as water rushing over granite
gradually scrapes it away.
So we come back to the film Denial. All these features of denial and, more to the point, the fact
that we live in an age of denial and that denial is the key concept of the modern/postmodern era
and the mechanism of its most devastating harm (if the global destruction of climate change, which
is now authorized through denial, is any measure), have no presence in the film. Denial becomes
an aberrative act of a bullying, pathological, morally corrupt antagonist, not the foundation of
contemporary social and political life. In this way, the film does a tremendous disservice and
actually reinforces the broader and more potent denial invisible in it: by pretending that the worst
of denial is David Irving, like the fox who, with stick in mouth, backs into a pond to force its
fleas off it onto the stick, the film allows us to conceptually push all of the denial that pervades
our lives onto the Irving figure. I do not mean to suggest that typical people are anything like
David Irving—taken discretely, Holocaust denial is incontrovertibly one of the worst forms of
denial in moral terms—but by presenting him as emblem or epitome of denial and in essence
the entirety of denial, the implication is that his defeat was a great defeat for denial, instead of an
opportunity through which we might push the battle against denial, against the manipulation of
the distance between rhetoric and reality. The film could have represented Irving as the tip of the
denial iceberg, so to speak, alerting us to its pervasive presence and the danger it poses, before our
ship goes down. Instead, the film retreats from this major political potential, into a nice Hollywood
happy ending.
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Introduction
In his 2002 book The Haunting Past, prominent French historian Henry Rousso claimed that
“historians are no longer in their proper element once they don courtroom robes.”1 The statement
was made in the context of explaining why Rousso defiantly opted not to act as an expert witness
in Holocaust perpetrator and collaborator trials held in France in the 1990s. Recognized as a
leading specialist in the history of Vichy France, Rousso, in seeking to justify the reasons for his
refusal to testify, took the opportunity to eschew the very act of historians stepping into court to
provide expertise in criminal trials. The problem was especially acute, argued Rousso, when the
proceeding was itself motivated by a desire to remedy a past wrong, a missed opportunity for
justice against Holocaust perpetrators decades after the fact, and was highly politicized. Such trials
were, according to Rousso, actually “stagings of the past,” viewed by the society in question as a
means to achieve national redemption for previously unaddressed sins, and utilized by leaders to
build political capital.2 Yet, Rousso is not content simply to rationalize his own decision to avoid
the courtroom, but openly condemned what he termed the “judicialization of the past” and the
instrumentalization of historians in the pursuit of justice (whether in service of the prosecution, or
the defense).3
In Rousso’s mind, the courtroom – and he neglected to acknowledge differences between
various legal systems, state courts and international tribunals – is no place for historians. This is
particularly the case in criminal trials, where the historians’ testimony invariably has some impact
on the verdict reached against an individual. Questions from the court – judge, prosecution or
defense – to the expert witness historian are all geared towards achieving an outcome of guilt or
innocence. As a result, “consciously or unconsciously,” Rousso contended, “all argumentation…
hinges on what would allow us [historians] to come up with an answer, in one direction or the
other.”4 Historians in court were, thus, not free to merely supply the court with the necessary
context and historical framework needed to inform a full and fair assessment of the charges and
arguments, but were “hostage” to the court and its “line of questioning,” even without realizing
it.5 Most pressingly, it is not the historian’s job to sit in judgment, whether from the witness box
or in constructing historical interpretations generally. Their task is to convey an understanding
of the past on the basis of available (and often fragmented) evidence – not to absolve or condemn
historical actors.
By no means is Rousso alone in his warning that history and law are incompatible exercises,
and that historians should be less willing to enter court as expert witnesses. Other historians have
likewise highlighted a tendency for courts to misjudge the practice of history, and overestimate
the historian’s capabilities.6 Graeme Davison suggests that once in court, historians can be treated
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as a “walking repository of facts” rather than an expert whose main function is to reach his or her
own conclusions on events.7 Peter Mandler, too, identifies a similar judicial prerogative in which
the establishment of incontrovertible “facts” conflicts with an historian’s instincts to question
and interpret their significance. The question of “why” – a vital one in historical discourse and
disagreement – Mandler argues, is far less prevailing in court, since it would “paralyse any
functioning judicial system,” and be “rightly repugnant to society which looks to the judicial system
to decide, not to explain.”8 According to Hal Rothman, historians in court must present a neutral
but “usable past,” one that is both devoid of historical theory and methodology while representing
more than “a mere recitation of facts.”9 Michael Marrus posits a view consistent with Rousso’s
criticism that historians can be held “hostage” to a court’s questions, which can differ markedly
from the parameter-setting historians typically engage in at the beginning of their research, and
which shapes the subsequent narrative.10 And, in the same unambiguous vein as Rousso, David
Rothman contends that “[t]o enter the courtroom is to do many things, but it is not to do history.”11
This article tests the claims made by Rousso and others that historians should avoid the
courtroom witness box or, at least, be wary of the dangers. Through an examination of three case
studies – the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial in West Germany, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia, and the International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh – this article contends that the
role of historians as expert witnesses in mass atrocity proceedings cannot be easily generalized, nor
should it be. Analysis of these three case studies provides a more nuanced and complex approach
to what are traditionally presented as uncomplicated, universally-applied criticisms of historians.
It argues that, on one hand, the objections made by Rousso misrepresent the Nazi crimes trial
sui generis that was the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial, while failing to account for the engagement of
historical expertise in mass atrocity trials beyond Europe in the recent past (and present). This
article suggests that, paradoxically, Rousso’s criticisms are less suited to the European context that
represents his purview, and apply more readily to the highly-politicized crimes tribunals outside
the continent. Finally, it recognizes that the potential and ultimate importance of the proceedings
themselves – in advancing citizens’ knowledge, offering victims justice, and politically legitimizing
a government – should be measured in full against the hypothetically corrupting effects of
historians’ engagement as experts in court.
The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, 1963-1965
Beginning in December 1963, the trial of 22 men – former personnel of the Auschwitz death camp
– in Frankfurt am Main, was a major event in West German history. A media sensation until its
conclusion in August 1965, the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial was attended by over 20,000 people, and
for many West Germans was the first time they discovered the extent of National Socialist crimes
– and the word “Auschwitz.”12 For contemporary West German historians, too, the trial proved
to be a boon for the advancement of their profession. Engaged by the Hessian State AttorneyGeneral Fritz Bauer, four professional historians – Martin Broszat, Hans Buchheim, Hans-Adolf
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Jacobsen, and Helmut Krausnick – provided detailed written expert reports to the Frankfurt court,
and appeared in the witness box to give testimony and to respond to the court’s questions. Indeed,
it is widely known that the historians’ reports for the trial formed the acclaimed and influential
book Anatomy of the SS State, published in the immediate aftermath of the trial, and which stood as
a pioneering text for many decades.13 For Rousso, the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial stands as an odd
exception to his generalized rule that history and law were a corruptive mix. In defending his own
decision not to act as an expert witness, Rousso contends that the judicial and political situation in
West Germany in the 1960s created an altogether different situation to 1990s France. Contemporary
history in West Germany, Rousso maintains, was “still in the midst of substantial evolution,” which
at the time “had not reached a degree of maturity sufficient for this history to be able to provide
magistrates with tried and true interpretative grids.”14 Historians, Rousso claims, were involved at
a “very early” stage of the trial in a “collaboration” with jurists, and both “were seeking a truth that
they helped elaborate together, each with their respective methods and objectives.”15 The following
examination will show that these assertions – and a number of observations Rousso makes about
historians as expert witnesses in court generally – are largely inaccurate.
This central argument notwithstanding, Rousso is correct that contemporary history was in its
infancy in West Germany during the period leading up to the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial. Where it
was attempted, historians put to one side the problematic subject matter of Jewish persecution, the
research on which was severely restricted by the dearth of vital archival documents that remained in
external control.16 Similar problems struck the few West German prosecutors attempting to pursue
justice against Holocaust perpetrators – distance from the crime scene, Cold War geographical
realities, a spread of eyewitnesses throughout Europe, and populace unwilling to face its past in
court.17 Still, by the late 1950s, West Germans’ memories of the postwar, allied-imposed and run
Nuremberg proceedings against major war criminals, and subsequent cries of “victor’s justice”,
had begun to fade. In 1958, the founding of the Central Office of the State Justice Administration
for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes unveiled a renewed governmental and judicial
willingness to resume prosecution of alleged Nazi criminals. In the same year, the Ulm trial of
Einsatzkommando (members of a mass shooting squad charged with the murder of Jewish civilians
in Lithuania in 1941) acted to directly link the goals of prosecutors and historians in what became
a watershed event.18 For the West German public, this trial heightened awareness of Nazi crimes,
and, given their horrific extent, graphically illustrated the pressing need for further, domesticallyrun trials of Nazi criminals.
The social, political and legal context of West Germany in the late 1950s, thus, had consequences
for the practices of contemporary historians. The Ulm trial required prosecutors to understand and
convey to the court the unfathomable scale of killing, and the seemingly impenetrable historical
background within which the crimes were perpetrated. While the scene of the crime itself was
remote, and inaccessible, the institutional context could be reconstructed through documentary
evidence.19 Prosecutors faced an extraordinary task as a result. Establishing an individual’s
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culpability within an intertwining, dynamic, frequently incomprehensible institutional and
command structure proved to be exceptionally challenging.20 Yet, such a delineation would be
essential in order to counter defendants’ inevitable pleas that they acted under “superior orders”
(Befehlsnotstand) that they were compelled to obey. For these reasons there was a pressing need
to utilize historical knowledge and expertise to inform the court and to assist the prosecution in
proving their case. The nature of West German law, however, only added to the complexities. There
was no provision to convict individuals of crimes against humanity in West Germany – as there
had been to charge those on trial at the post-war International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg –
and it seems, no resolve on the part of the West German judiciary to contemplate the drafting of a
new penal code that encompassed such a charge.21
As a consequence, the sole option for prosecutors seeking to convict Holocaust perpetrators
was a charge of murder, or “accomplices to murder” (Beihilfe zum Mord). This limitation brought
with it a number of unique impediments. Under section 211 of the West German Criminal Code,
a murderer is defined as “anyone who kills a human being out of blood lust, in order to satisfy
their sexual desire, out of greed or other base motives, maliciously or treacherously or by means
dangerous to the public at large or in order to enable or conceal another crime.”22 Proving that the
accused had followed orders to kill, irrespective of the horrific scale of the killing, would not suffice
to demonstrate that murder had been committed as defined under the code. The prosecution
would have to show that alleged perpetrators had killed in contravention of orders, or shown
excessive brutality in carrying out their allotted tasks – even in the case of mass killings. It created
a seemingly perverse situation whereby those who committed murder without demonstrating
particular malice fell outside its strict legal definition. To help overcome these difficulties, the Ulm
prosecutors engaged the services of two historians as expert witnesses in the trial: Hans-Günther
Seraphim and Helmut Krausnick. The trial both represented the first instance in which the expertise
of West German historians was utilized in Nazi crimes trials, and highlighted some of the ways in
which these historians might continue to serve judicial ends. Importantly, the Ulm trial increased
West Germans’ reception to further trials, and led to a refusal to allow the mere passage of time to
stand as a reason for inaction.23 Calls to seize the immediate and diminishing opportunity of trying
perpetrators on their own soil received a boost owing to a peculiarity in West German law: a 20year statute of limitations effectively meant that after 1965, any offences committed prior to 1945
would be exempt from prosecution.24
It was within this historical context that the initial prosecutorial investigations began into
crimes committed by personnel of the Auschwitz death camp. Led by Fritz Bauer and his team of
prosecutors, over a two-year period from June 1959 a list of suspects was whittled down to the 22
men who would ultimately stand trial in Frankfurt. Krausnick, Broszat and Buchheim met with
the Frankfurt prosecutors on November 7, 1962, prior to the beginning of the Auschwitz trial just
over one year later.25 Bauer – a lawyer of peerless reputation and near-public celebrity – saw the
trial not only as a means to seek justice for mass murder, but as a didactic opportunity to teach
the West German public about Nazi atrocities. The historians were to play a critical role in this
judicial-educational process. At the November 1962 meeting, Bauer informed the three historians
present that they would be invited to attend the trial by prosecutors, and from the witness box
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would provide the court with “the necessary summary and classification of the entire scheme of
political events at that time.”26 Historians were instructed, directly, not to mention the defendants
or their crimes, but to leave these parts “missing” in the historical narrative for the prosecution to
fill in the trial itself.27 The historians were also to produce written reports, on topics specified by the
prosecution and deemed most relevant to the trial.
Though prescriptive, do the conditions under which these historians operate signify they
were somehow “hostages” of the court, or of the prosecution? While Bauer’s instructions set
the boundaries – the defendants were clearly off-limits – the topics suggested were broad and
otherwise left entirely up to the historians to research and write. According to Gerhard Wiese, the
last surviving prosecutor of the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial, it remained the prosecution’s option not
to tender an historian’s report as evidence – were it viewed to be irrelevant to the matter at hand or
detrimental to their case.28 To this extent, the historians did need to construct what Hal Rothman
terms a “usable past,” though the prosecution were no more held hostage to the historians, than
the latter were to the court. The reports were pieces of supporting evidence that provided what
the prosecution viewed as critical background for the case. The question of defendants’ guilt or
innocence – which Rousso trumpeted as the central problem of historians in court – did not fall
within the boundaries of this analysis. Indeed, Bauer deliberately excised not only this question,
but any details about the defendants from the historians’ considerations.
The meeting between historians and prosecutors in November 1962, moreover, lays waste
to Rousso’s claim that the two were in a “collaboration,” or that historians “helped to collect
evidentiary documents.” Historians met, were issued with their brief for the trial, given instructions
around boundaries, and independently conducted their research thereafter. The construction of
expert reports and the indictment, by the historians and prosecutors, respectively, was barely
a consultative exercise, let alone a collaborative one. Even the historians themselves adopted
contrasting strategies and approaches to the construction of their reports. Buchheim’s report on
the SS was, for example, cobbled together from several reports he had written over the course of
the preceding decade; while Broszat’s report on the concentration camp system was original and
necessitated archival research.29 The prosecution, for their part, drafted the indictment – a 700-page
document that contained detailed historical context, biographical particulars of the defendants, their
alleged crimes and incriminating evidence – without input from the historians. For prosecutors,
the indictment was the key piece of evidence against the defendants, while historians prepared
their reports in response to specified topics and in accordance with the methods and expectations
of their discipline. Evidently, historians and lawyers were not, as Rousso claims, “seeking a truth
that they helped elaborate together.”30
Certainly, greater care needs to be taken not to cast the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial as a joint
historical and legal endeavor. It is true, however, that the reports historians produced for the trial
reflected the legal requirements Bauer faced in proving murder, surveying the overall historical
context, as well as specific details that the prosecution could relate to the alleged crimes of those
on trial. Where Bauer ensured that historical and legal lines of demarcation were clear, the trial
process and importance of the indictment in framing the charges reinforced the trial’s historical
strictures. Despite these conditions, once in court the historians were by no means at the mercy
of its “line of questioning.” Indeed, a reconstruction of the historians’ time in the stand, through
contemporaneous newspaper reports and other evidence, reveals that, with few exceptions, defense
lawyers did not quiz the experts on the content of their reports in great detail.31 Furthermore, if
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the historians felt pressured to respond definitively and quickly to defense lawyers’ or judges’
questions, and bore the weight of influencing a defendant’s guilt or innocence – one of Rousso’s
fundamental misgivings – it was revealed neither in their responses given to the court, nor reflected
in the day’s press coverage.
To the extent that Rousso’s cautionary approach to history and the courtroom should be applied,
it is to prosecutors in the course of the trial, not historians as experts. Prosecutors in the Frankfurt
Auschwitz trial, via the comprehensive written indictment, suggested that Nazi crimes were best
understood through a “top down” framework. Within this model of explanation, Hitler was the
architect of Nazi crimes, and Himmler, Heydrich and Eichmann (amongst others) their organizers,
and subordinates – typified by the Auschwitz trial defendants – their perpetrators. This form of
explanation is held by Irmtrud Wojak and Dieter Pohl as the “standard” for West German courts
in the early 1960s, the subjects of which were the crimes of middle and lower ranking officials.32
Legal imperatives, such as understanding where individuals fitted within Nazi power structures,
overrode historiographical ones – understanding how those structures operated in practice.
Ultimately and effectively, in his written judgment Presiding Judge Hans Hofmeyer determined
that the genesis of the Final Solution was immaterial to the considerations of a murder trial, even
one in which the killings took place within the most murderous Nazi death camp. Establishing
the contribution of individuals other than those on trial was, according to the judgment, “not
the task of a jury court,” which was satisfied with the explanation that the “main perpetrators”
(Haupttäter) planned, generated the conditions for, and directed the course of the Final Solution.33
Still, Hofmeyer saw much to praise about the historians’ role in the trial, describing their reports
as “well-founded and convincing explanations” with which the court “fully concurs.”34 Although
the ultimate findings of guilt hinged not on the historians’ reports, but primarily on eyewitness
testimony, Hofmeyer saw much to praise about the historians’ role in the trial. He described their
reports as offering “well-founded and convincing explanations.”35
Perhaps even more important than the singular example of the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial, the
grouping and prosecution of former personnel of particular centers of extermination – or “murder
complex” – resulted in the collation of evidence and testimony that provided, and continues to
provide, historians with considerable insight into other sites of atrocity such as Treblinka, Sobibor
and Belzec death camps.36 The historical understanding would undoubtedly have been severely
limited were these trials restricted to single defendants without extrapolation of context. The
post-trial book derived from historians’ reports, Anatomy of the SS-State, proved to be one of the
most influential works by German historians in the post-war era. It would be wrong, however, to
expect that the authors of this work viewed the influence and imposition of the law on its structure
and content in a negative light. In his introduction to Anatomy, Buchheim praised what he called
“[t]he strict rules of the judicial proceeding” that his work and that of his fellow expert witnesses
were subjected to in the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial. These rules, according to Buchheim, imposed
a “standard of rationalism” on the practice of history that resulted in Anatomy, of which he claims
historians “are in dire need.”37 Needless to say, such an opportunity would have been lost had
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the historians involved chosen to heed the admonishments issued by contemporaries, the tone of
which was not dissimilar to Rousso’s view expressed 30 years later.
The four historians contributed their expertise to the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial within its
opening weeks, offered scholarly authority to the legal charges, legitimacy to the government’s
political prerogatives, and corroboration of victims claims. While much of what Rousso has to
say about the trial is inaccurate, the example more broadly suggests that historians can play a role
beyond the four walls of academia, one that may advance causes greater than the mere defense of
history’s disciplinary boundaries: informing a nation’s judicial confrontation of the past; achieving
justice for victims and survivors; and raising the public’s awareness of hitherto obscured mass
atrocities committed in its name. Moreover, this argument is not limited or even most relevant
to a single murder trial of Holocaust perpetrators within a domestic setting in the 1960s – but
applicable to the many and varied tribunals and proceedings that take place around the world in
response to mass atrocities committed in the twentieth century.
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
A hybrid domestic/international court, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
(ECCC) was established via an agreement between the Cambodian government and the United
Nations.38 It began operating on the outskirts of Phnom Penh in 2006. Its ongoing task is to try
“senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes
and serious violations” of Cambodian and international law during the Khmer Rouge’s regime
from April 17, 1975 to January 6, 1979.39 So far it has convicted three people (Kaing Geuk Eav,
Nuon Chea, and Khieu Samphan) of crimes against humanity, and sentenced each to life in prison.
Although his focus was on Nazi crimes and Europe, Rousso warned that it was these types of
trials that could be used to build the political stature of national leaders, and could be viewed
as a means to restore a nation. While he intended that they apply to France, Germany, and other
central and western European countries, Rousso’s concerns are especially relevant to Cambodia.
Where it was the prosecutorial endeavor of Bauer and others who overcame the initial public and
political opposition to the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial, the ECCC was established by a government
decision after negotiations with the United Nations Secretariat. Undoubtedly, the ECCC has made
important strides for victims, notably through its civil party system. Yet, the establishment of the
ECCC was fundamentally motivated by the Cambodian government’s desire to benefit from a
tribunal. This government has built much of its political legitimacy on its opposition to, and role in
overthrowing, the Khmer Rouge. This point notwithstanding, many of its leaders are themselves
former members of the regime. Strict limits are imposed on who can be prosecuted at the ECCC –
to protect both specific individuals and the overarching narrative that only the very senior leaders
of the Khmer Rouge were responsible for the crimes of the regime.
This level of politicization, however, has not dissuaded academics, including historians,
from becoming involved in what amounts to a project of Khmer Rouge accountability.40 Scholars
had campaigned for a tribunal to try the Khmer Rouge leaders, have assisted judges during its
establishment, been employed by both the prosecutors’ and investigating judges’ offices, and
testified before the court. Indeed, some academics have fulfilled a number of these roles at different
times. Prior to the ECCC, historians acted to oppose the Khmer Rouge though rarely made judgments
of individual culpability. One report, Seven Candidates for Prosecution, was authored in 2004, before
the ECCC came into being. As its title suggests, the report examined the possible evidence against
seven suspects, although it did not make an explicit pronouncement of guilt.41 Since the Khmer
38
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Rouge were afforded Cambodia’s seat at the UN throughout the 1980s, an academic interest
in Cambodia also took on an advocacy dimension at this time for many scholars. Some of this
activism evolved into seeking justice for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge years before the creation
of the ECCC. Still, it was not clear precisely what role historians would play in the proceedings
themselves. Certainly, the ECCC was not preceded by an equivalent of Bauer’s explicit instructions
issued to historians prior to the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial. No particular report or document set
out and limited the role that historians’ might play in the ECCC proceedings. Although the role of
individual historians remained uncertain, the existing historical scholarship on the Khmer Rouge
was placed on the case file before the court.
Primarily structured along the lines of a civil law system, under the ECCC expert witnesses
are called by the Trial Chamber rather than by the prosecution or defense teams. While the parties
may recommend individual experts, the judges decide whom to call, and they themselves conduct
the initial questioning. The role of historians has often been to give the broader picture, to discuss
nationwide policies, and (in direct contrast to their role in the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial) to elaborate
on the role of the accused. With expertise in Khmer Rouge prison networks and political slogans,
historian Henri Locard appeared before the Trial Chamber.42 Specifically, Locard was questioned
on the different categories of prisons around the country, their similarities and differences, the
few archives that remain from some prisons, and the role and importance of political slogans in
Khmer Rouge ideology. Since the Khmer Rouge was a secretive and paranoid regime, historians
have played an important role in establishing the specific responsibility of the leaders on trial.
David Chandler, in particular, testified during a phase of the Case 002 trial – one that focused on
the nationwide political, military and communication structures that existed during the Khmer
Rouge period.43 As well as addressing the subject of his expertise – security centers – his testimony
revealed the code names of various individuals, helped to determine the authorship of key Khmer
Rouge documents, and examined how the regime’s Central and Standing Committees functioned.
It was especially important to set out the role of Khmer Rouge leaders for the court, since the death
of Pol Pot in 1998 had provided an opportunity for surviving leaders to claim that responsibility for
killings lay solely with the former Communist dictator. As a case in point, one of the defendants,
Khieu Samphan, asserted that his role as head of state was largely symbolic. To this end, historians
such as Chandler helped enable the court to establish defendants’ leadership roles within complex
structures.
Not only has historians’ knowledge been used to build a case against defendants in
a highly politicized trial of national redemption – surely Rousso’s worst historico-judicial
nightmare – the ECCC has also served as a forum to play out longstanding disputes within
Cambodian historiography. For instance, historian Michael Vickery was known for his vocal
criticism of what he termed the “Standard Total View” of the Khmer Rouge period: presenting
the Khmer Rouge as a homogenous monolith within a national story of victimhood that ignored
regional variations. Vickery was hired as a consultant by the defense team for Ieng Sary, the
Khmer Rouge’s foreign minister.44 The impact of Vickery’s advice was felt keenly and came
to be reflected in defense questioning of academics such as Chandler and anthropologist Alex
Hinton. In so doing, the ECCC became an opportunity to add a legal framework to these existing
historiographical debates.45 Although the court made no explicit judgment on these arguments, it
did largely endorse current – and predominant – historical interpretations. Additionally, despite
the ECCC being a court located in Cambodia, with a majority of Cambodian judges, there has
been only limited involvement from Cambodian historians. Partly, this stems from the ongoing
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political sensitivity of the Khmer Rouge era, one that is potentially dangerous for local academics
to explore. One exception is the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), a local NGO that
has conducted research into the Khmer Rouge era and supplied many documents to the ECCC.
The DC-Cam director Youk Chhang and deputy director Dara Peou Vanthan have testified before
the court in January and February 2012, primarily on questions surrounding chains of custody
and authenticity of documents. This testimony did include a contentious discussion of whether
it was possible that Vietnamese officials had destroyed documentary evidence during the 1980s,
a period in which they had a strong tutelary relationship with the Cambodian government.46
Similar questions arose during the testimony of other experts, including Locard, but the court has
shown little interest in unravelling the complex issues, and, at times, has acted to shut down such
exchanges.47 Nonetheless, while the ECCC’s work has political undertones and implications, and
these elements have impacted the contribution of historians to the proceedings, the engagement of
such experts has brought some benefits.
Indeed, and in a rather stark contrast to the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial’s written judgment, at
least two cases tried at the ECCC reveal the extent to which historians’ expertise contributed to
the judicial outcome. The judgments for Case 001 and Case 002/01, respectively contain 72 and 117
references to Chandler’s testimony.48 The latter trial’s judgment, moreover, contains 149 references
to Stephen Heder’s scholarship, and 142 references to the testimony and work of historian-cumjournalist Philip Short and his book Pol Pot: Anatomy of a Nightmare.49 These references occur most
frequently in parts of the judgment that address national-level policies and structures. The role of
historians, additionally, cannot be neatly separated from that of the ECCC itself as a mechanism
for justice and contributor to a national narrative. For decades, no one was held to account for
the crimes of the 1970s, and there was no real attempt to gain a greater understanding. One
consequence is that many younger Cambodians know very little about the Khmer Rouge regime.
Even amongst those who lived through it, one question persists: “why did Khmer kill Khmer?”
It reflects a fundamental lack of historical understanding as to how more than a quarter of the
country’s population could have been killed by their own leaders. This was quantified through a
2008 survey, which found that 82% of participants stated they wanted to know more about what
happened during the Khmer Rouge regime, with a similar number agreeing that there cannot
be reconciliation without knowing the truth.50 Within this context, then, the role of history and
historians at the ECCC takes on a significance beyond the trial of mass murder.
The ECCC appears to embody many of the concerns voiced by Rousso and other historians.
The Cambodian government is actively working to mold the history of the Khmer Rouge period for
its own ends, and the ECCC has formed one critical element of this process. It is also the case that
the judicial setting shapes and, at times, restricts, what historians can and cannot say, including
deeper examination of profound historiographical questions. Most concerning for Rousso, perhaps,
would be the extent to which historians have directly commented on the role and culpability of
those individuals on trial – well and truly exceeding what Rousso has set out to be the historian’s
mandate. Many of the most prominent historians of the Khmer Rouge period have testified as
expert witnesses, yet there has been no signs that these engagements have led to any corruption of
historical scholarship on the subject. Perhaps far more significantly, the ECCC has opened up space
for conversations at individual and societal levels about the past. The change is tangible. In the
early 1990s, Khmer Rouge history disappeared from the school curriculum as a result of political
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considerations. Just a year after the ECCC began its operations, in 2007, DC-Cam published its
own textbook about the Khmer Rouge period. This work has since been progressively integrated
into the Cambodian high school curriculum.51 Importantly, the presence of the ECCC in Cambodia
– within which historical experts play a substantial role – has created space for history itself, and
historical education, to be part of the justice process.
International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh
There are both remarkable similarities and striking differences between the ECCC in Cambodia and
the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) established in Bangladesh. Both began operating around
the same time – the year 2009 in the case of the ICT – with the aim of trying crimes committed in
the 1970s. Specifically, the ICT was created to investigate atrocities committed during the 1971
Liberation War, during which Bangladesh became independent from Pakistan. The Bangladeshi
government claims that three million people were killed by the Pakistani army and the local militia
groups they recruited.52 As a result of domestic and international factors, it was only the ascension
of the Awami League-led coalition into power in 2008 that proved to be the catalyst for the ultimate
formation of the ICT.53 As well as undertaking as part of its electoral platform the establishment
of a war crimes tribunal, to a large extent the Awami League draws its political legitimacy from
its role as a leading force in the liberation movement. How the Liberation War is and should be
remembered in Bangladesh remains a dominant issue in the country’s politics. For its part, the ICT
is thoroughly enmeshed in this political environment. The politicization of trials – or the allegation
of it – has continued to shadow the Tribunal. Notably, accusations of political opportunism have
been leveled because members of the opposition political parties – the Bangladesh Nationalist
Party and Jamaat-e-Islami – have been the Tribunal’s primary defendants.
To date, the ICT has convicted and executed six people, with more than 50 others convicted
and sentenced to terms of imprisonment, or to death.54 Despite its name, the ICT is a domestic
court trying international crimes, and only has jurisdiction over perpetrators in Bangladesh.55 It has
largely been maligned internationally owing to its application of the death penalty, and to what is
viewed as a low standard of procedural justice.56 Witnesses have been intimidated, laws have been
changed retroactively, and people outside the court have contributed to its verdicts.57 Domestically,
however, the ICT has been the subject of impassioned, divisive and bloody confrontation. Mass
protests against what were viewed as overly lenient or excessively severe sentences have brought
tens of thousands of people into the streets, and led to 78 deaths.58 Since these verdicts are in some
way influenced by historical experts, for those who argue that historians should excuse themselves
from court the ICT may well be seen as the singular expression of their every argument.
Nonetheless, it would be an error – one committed all too readily by Rousso and others –
to generalize about the impropriety of historians acting as expert witnesses in trials of national
51
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importance without scrutiny of individual examples. In part, and in relative terms compared to
the previous two examples, the history of the Liberation War and the roles of the accused have
been largely known. Though infrequent, historical experts have testified before the tribunal.
Muntassir Mamoon, professor of history at Dhaka University, gave expert testimony from July 1,
2012 in the case against former Jamaat-e-Islami leader Ghulam Azam. He particularly discussed
the relationship between the accused, local paramilitary groups, and the Pakistani army, including
the power of political speeches in encouraging violent acts.59 War crimes researcher Shahriar Kabir
testified in August and September 2012 in the case against Jamaat-e-Islami Secretary General
Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mojaheed. Kabir’s testimony examined how the identity cards carried
by members of paramilitary groups, and signed by Jamaat-e-Islami leaders, linked the two
organizations. Moreover, Kabir set out historical evidence that, in his view, demonstrated that the
accused attended rallies and urged people to join paramilitary groups.60 Thus, historians at the
ICT have not restrained themselves from pronouncements about defendants’ guilt or innocence,
the organizations to which they belonged, and the role of the tribunal itself. During his testimony,
for example, Kabir characterized Jamaat-e-Islami as “an organisation of war criminals, mass
murderers and people who committed crimes against humanity.”61 He urged the tribunal to put
the organization itself on trial.62 In media commentary after the verdict was read in a different case,
historian Muntassir Mamoon thanked the protestors who had mobilized in support of the death
penalty at the tribunal.63 Such a gesture indicates that Mamoon was not concerned with keeping a
neutral public stance on what he thought should be the role of the tribunal. These types of comments
have drawn defense counsel scorn, with both Kabir and Mamoon accused of a political bias against
Jamaat-e-Islami that was reflected in their testimony and post-verdict pronouncements. While both
scholars – prominent historians of the Liberation War – deny any accusation of political bias, they
also clearly reject the type of concerns voiced by Rousso and others that historians should avoid, at
all costs, involvement in highly politicized trials. On the contrary, they have embraced the ongoing
judicialization of the past through the ICT, and sought in the most vocal ways available to highlight
its political and social necessity.
Not all public figures have had such a positive relationship with the ICT, however. In 2014,
British journalist David Bergman, who writes for a Bangladeshi English-language newspaper, was
found to be in contempt of court for blog posts he wrote about one of the tribunal’s judgments. The
point of discontent was, namely, that Bergman had questioned the government-approved death
toll of the Liberation War. He was fined and briefly detained. In response, 52 Bangladeshi scholars
and activists from backgrounds including history, political science, and law, penned a statement
opposing this ruling and its impact on freedom of expression.64 The ICT, in turn, demanded an
explanation from those who signed the letter for this action they claimed “belittled the authority
and institutional dignity of the Tribunal.”65 Some signatories chose to withdraw their support and
apologize, but others – including academics who had authored expert reports for the tribunal –
had contempt proceedings brought against them. All were ultimately acquitted and issued with
a caution.66 The severity of the ICT’s response to this criticism is indicative of the central place
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the Liberation War, and concurrent Bangladeshi suffering, occupy in the nation’s recent history.
Judgments have referred to the “undisputed” or “settled” history, asserted that local collaborators
“acted as traitors,” and maintained that this claim needed “no further document to prove.”67 The
emotional value attached to these events is also reflected in the language of the written judgments,
one of which refers to the Liberation War as the “blood-soaked history of the birth of our dear
motherland.”68 These snippets reveal the degree to which the ICT is willing to openly acknowledge
history’s role in its functions.
The witness box in such a courtroom, it might be assumed, would be avoided at any cost
by historians. The example of the ICT in Bangladesh, arguably, embodies all that Rousso and
others counseled against. It is a series of highly politicized and publicized trials, which act to
appropriate, legitimize, and endorse particular national histories. Professional historians willing
to offer expertise to this body may – and, for the most part, are expected to – comment on guilt or
innocence of defendants, even at the risk of inciting widespread and deadly violence. Moreover, the
historians themselves face the possibility of criminal charges, even imprisonment, should they be
seen to undermine the “authority” and “dignity” of the Tribunal. Yet, some of the most prominent
historians of the Liberation War have not merely and openly expressed fervent support for the
Tribunal, but called for its mandate to be extended beyond individual defendants, to encompass the
prosecution of entire political organizations.69 Though clearly emotionally-laden, even politically
motivated, the historians’ comments and pronouncements by members of the Tribunal do not
necessarily diminish its overall value – neither as a means to reckon with the violent past from
which the Bangladeshi state was created, nor that of the ostensibly blinkered historical narratives
that emerge from its expert witnesses or written verdicts. Some of the Tribunal’s methods – and
particularly the use of legal force to inhibit external discussion of its role and accuracy of its
historical conclusions – must be roundly condemned. Tellingly, although there could scarcely be
a more hostile environment for the practice of history than the ICT witness box, their commentary
after the fact suggests none of the historians who entered it would likely describe their experiences
as akin to having been “held hostage” to the court’s questioning, as Rousso graphically portended
might be the case. For the historians who did appear at the ICT, admittedly, their job has been
made easier by the reality that their historical views largely squared with those advocated by the
Tribunal itself. Nonetheless, as was the case in West Germany and Cambodia, the ICT’s dispensing
of (albeit procedurally flawed) justice, its further raising of public awareness of the events in
question, judicial redemption on a national level, and promotion of further academic enquiry into
the events, represent potentially beneficial outcomes that may be aided through the injection of
historians’ expertise.
Conclusion
Rousso’s decision not to testify in trials for French Vichy-era crimes and his public writings setting
out a rationale for this stance are well-known. In fundamental ways, Rousso’s position has shaped
the ensuing debate around the involvement of historians in mass atrocity trials, one that played
out mostly in a European context. Through an examination of three case studies, this article tested
Rousso’s thesis that such proceedings are anathema to the practice of history and that, consequently,
historians should avoid the witness box and the role of courtroom expert.
This article contends that the situation is more complex than that presented by Rousso,
who overlooks a number of considerations. Not all tribunals and trials of mass atrocities are the
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same. There are considerable differences between legal systems, rules of evidence, definitions of
criminal offenses, overarching political and social goals, and the use of expert witnesses – historian
or otherwise. Moreover, Rousso’s argument that an historian’s duty is to enhance historical
knowledge, rather than to judge individuals on trial, neglects the understandings of the past
that have been developed from proceedings to which historians have – to various extents and in
different ways – contributed their expertise.70 Mass atrocity trials and tribunals have opened up
discussions about national histories within public and private spheres, as well as at international
and domestic levels. Such proceedings have led to the unearthing of evidence and reinvigoration
of scholarship. Through their testimony, historians have revealed much about where individuals
and organizations fit within complex structures of power. Historians can offer a judge or jury
insight into such matters – as they have in all three case studies presented – and such outcomes
can also immensely benefit historical scholarship. Where evidence has failed to emerge it is that
which might be used to support a view that history has been corrupted, or that historians have
been “held hostage” by the court. That this has proven not to be the case even in highly politicized
trials of contemporary relevance, in which deliberate attempts are made to cultivate a particular
narrative, adds further doubt to the claim by Rousso and others that history stands to lose from the
engagement of its practitioners in court.
Certainly, the situation is more complicated than many of the warnings issued by Rousso and
others might indicate. The three case studies examined in this article suggest that it is unhelpful
to generalize about the social, political and historiographical value of mass atrocity trials in which
historians’ expertise is sought and utilized. Neither a blanket condemnation nor an unqualified
endorsement can be issued. Trials that are designed to engender national catharsis – the very
kind that Rousso advocated historians avoid – will inherently judicialize the past, and may
instrumentalize historians’ expertise and testimony. It is too simplistic, however, to denounce
such instrumentalization outright: even where a proceeding is intentionally designed to endorse a
narrative that serves the political legitimacy of an authoritarian party, as in the case of Cambodia.
Plainly, this is not the only use to which history has been put in these nations. The tribunals
also provide a means to deepen general and scholarly understanding of mass crimes, including
genocide, to recognize past wrongs, acknowledge forgotten victims, and to mete out long-awaited
justice. Clearly, and if nothing else, a robust and instinctive defense of what may be seen as the
limits of historians’ public and professional responsibilities, and boundaries of their craft – such as
that undertaken by Rousso – must simultaneously take into account these potentially constructive
outcomes.
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Karma after Democratic Kampuchea:
Justice Outside the Khmer Rouge Tribunal
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The Khmer Rouge regime, a Maoist communist regime that ruled Cambodia between 1975 and
1979, claimed the lives of up to one third of the Cambodian population, and devastated the country
by dismantling government, education, religion, healthcare and law.1 Since its deposal in 1979, the
question of how to determine justice for victims of the Khmer Rouge regime has held national and
international interest. The regime, and its subsequent rendering in public record and memory, has
been highly politicized, both in Cambodia and abroad, from a politics of demonization in the 1980s,2
through the shadows and mirrors of the early 1990s (“the practices and policies of the past”),3
to a past that, according to the Prime Minister, Hun Sen, should be “buried,” and what David
Chandler calls the “collective amnesia” of the 1990s).4 In recent years there has been a turn towards
considering the treatment of the Khmer Rouge within an international model of criminal justice
and reconciliation, played out in the hybrid courts of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia (ECCC). As a highly visible institution, the ECCC stands as a symbol of government
and international responsibility – supposedly for Cambodian people, but also aimed towards
the global sphere and an international rhetoric of justice framed within transitional processes of
democratization and liberalization.
This article steps outside the Extraordinary Chambers to consider how people in rural
Cambodia, who have not been involved in the court, create their own understandings and lived
experiences of the Khmer Rouge regime. I do this by examining how people use ‘karma’ to
account for the genocide and its consequences.5 By stepping outside the court, I consider ways of
dealing with genocide that exist beyond the international framework of transitional justice and the
narratives it produces, and by doing so, ask wider questions of what justice is and does. This allows
a consideration of the many different ways justice is understood, framed, narrated, and enacted,
in Cambodia, particularly in lives that are far distant (metaphorically, physically, and temporally)
from the court.
After introducing the ECCC, I will explain karma as explained to my by my research
participants (including lay people and Buddhist monks), before introducing case studies from my
research. This paper is a study of the everyday enactment of Buddhism, rather than being a paper
in Buddhist studies that considers the lexicon or formal teachings of the religion. The voices of my
informants are presented, and my understanding and analysis of their use of the term karma in
narrating these circumstances, follows.6 The discussion I develop asks for an appreciation of the
* This article went to press before the verdict of case 002/02 on 16 November 2018, when in a landmark verdict, Nuon Chea
and Khieu Samphan were the first people to be convicted of genocide by the ECCC.
1
For a comprehensive description of the Khmer Rouge, read Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in
Cambodia Under the Khmer Rouge, 1975 – 1979, 3rd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
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David Chandler, “Cambodia Deals with its Past: Collective Memory, Demonisation and Induced Amnesia,” Totalitarian
Movements and Political Religions 9, no. 2-3 (2008), 355–369.
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Tom Fawthrop and Helen Jarvis, Getting Away with Genocide? Elusive Justice and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (London: Pluto
Press, 2004).
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Although some scholars debate the validity of the term genocide for Cambodia (see Ben Kiernan, “The Cambodian
Genocide: Issue and Responses,” in Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions, ed. George Andreopoulos
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 191–228; and William Schabas, “Problems of International
Codification - Were the Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo Genocide?” New England Law Review 35 (2000), 287-302,
I follow Ben Kiernan’s conviction that the term is appropriate, due to the nature of the Khmer Rouge regime’s rule,
which was based on an ideology of purity that led to the disproportionate targetting of ethnic minorities among
those killed (see Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Dafur (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2007), 540-554.
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Michael Jackson (The Politics of Storytelling: Variations on a Theme by Hannah Arendt (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum
Press, 2013, 17)) argues that stories are a form of sociality - creating belonging to family, friends, even nations - but
they are also transformative, particularly when told in relation to suffering, when stories are also told to recount
and rework events that befell us, enabling us to recover “a sense of ourselves as actors and agents in the face of
experiences that make us feel insignificant, unrecognized, or powerless” (ibid.). Because of this, stories are always
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way people in Cambodia draw on existing frameworks of knowledge and understanding to make
sense of their history. By exploring how people make sense of violence and national tragedy on the
everyday level I also provide a space to hear stories and voices from beyond the court – the voices
of all people: those who killed people; those whose people were killed; those who do not fit into the
neat categories of victim and perpetrator that a court requires.
By allowing for modes of dealing with the past outside the court, I provide a way of thinking
that does not confine justice to one cosmological or conceptual configuration. Justice is a dynamic
and ongoing process, and I suggest that the many overlapping domains in which it is enacted, even
when conceptually at odds, exist simultaneously. Considering the local case-study of Cambodia
allows me to posit then, that rather than a dichotomy between (inter)national and local forms of
understanding and providing “justice,” the different frameworks are co-exisiting forms of global
interaction; sometimes at odds with each other; sometimes complementary; often times unrelated
but important companions.
The Research
This article results from an ongoing exploration into the Khmer Rouge regime in contemporary
Cambodia. Most of the research was conducted during ethnographic fieldwork between June 2012
and December 2013, with a return trip of one month in 2017. The main focus of this research was
an examination of mass graves from the Khmer Rouge regime and the politics of the dead within
them. The fieldwork was multi-sited, focussing on two primary locations (Choeung Ek Genocidal
Center, Phnom Penh, and an island in the Bassac river I have named Koh Sap), with visits to fifteen
other locations across Cambodia, at which I spent varying amounts of time, ranging from a few
hours to a few weeks. The research consisited of a mixture of participant-observation, formal and
informal interviews, and the collection of archival data. Informants ranged from rural farmers, to
ministerial advisors, Buddhist monks at all levels of the sangha,7 professors at universities in Phnom
Penh, other religious personnel including Buddhist âchaa,8 Islamic teachers, and a range of other
people. Both men and women were participants in the research. Some interviews were conducted
in semi-formal environments, many happened conversationally as we went about everyday life.
A research assistant accompanied me throughout my research and was an active participant in all
data collected.9 Interviews were primarily conducted in Khmer and then transcribed into English.
The names of all informants have been changed.
Transitional Justice and the ECCC
The rhetoric of transitional justice originally considered justice to be situated within democratization
and liberalization processes, particularly in post-authoritarian states. Accountability for past
crimes and human rights abuses was considered central to this. This rhetoric has become so
embedded in the international imaginary that as Dustin Sharp points out, “for many, the question
is no longer whether transitional justice is needed in the wake of dictatorship or mass atrocity, but
how it should be implemented.”10 This has led to a certain institutionalisation of processes across
the globe. However, as Sharp also argues, recent models have widened the scope, positioning
transitional justice within wider peace-building contexts outside liberalization.11 These narratives
consider the restorative potential of justice systems, and the need to disembed the narrow confines
partial, selective, and agentive, excluding the complex inter-relational spheres in which events happen and are
understood. They are also socio-culturally mediated and use specific frameworks and narratalogical devices to make
them shareable and relatable. Thus I use the term narrative to refer to the stories that people tell that exist within
cultural spheres of communication and are agents of sociality and transformation in the post-conflict environment.
7

The Buddhist monastic order (Khmer words are transcribed using the Huffman system of transliteration except for
words that have attained a common written form, such as Pchum Benh, preta, and neak ta).
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Lay ritual specialists.
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Thanks in particular to Um Sompoah and Res Phasy for their help and support in collecting this data.
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Transitional Justice 9, no. 1 (2015), 153.

11

Ibid.

©2018

Genocide Studies and Prevention 12, no. 3 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.12.3.1567

Bennett

70

of the liberalizing framework that may not fit with local cosmologies and justice systems. It is in
this sphere that the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia sits.
Established in 2005, the ECCC is one of only a handful of hybrid courts in the world, where
international and national personnel work in partnership to try perpetrators of mass violence.
Situated in Cambodia, but established through agreement between the UN and the Cambodian
government, the ECCC aims to unite national and international perspectives on justice, and by
doing so, create political change as well as judicial influence and oversight.12 Although primarily
following a retributive model, aimed at punishing the leaders of the Khmer Rouge regime for crimes
directly associated with their actions, its wider aims are restorative, and include widespread civil
party engagement, a reparation plan, and an outreach programme stretching across Cambodia.13
The effects of these efforts, particularly the civil party engagement, has been the creation of a court
which is a unique hybridisation between local modes of being in the world and internationalised
systems of transitional justice. To date the court has concluded two cases: in 2010 former
commandant of S-21, Kaing Guek Eav (Duch) was found guilty of crimes against humanity and
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions (case 001), and in 2014 Nuon Chea (Brother Number
Two) and Khieu Samphan (President of Democratic Kampuchea) were found guilty of crimes
against humanity (case 002/01). Cases 003 and 004 are in progress.
Much of the literature (academic and public) on justice in Cambodia concentrates on the ECCC
as the central forum of transitional justice. Those who argue against the court pay attention to its many
compromises and asserted failures – for example, the temporal restrictions of only investigating
crimes conducted between 1975 – 1979 (which obscures the geopolitical circumstances that aided
the regime both before and after its rule);14 the endemic corruption and ongoing interference of
the Cambodian government;15 and the personal jurisdiction which limits its cases to only the top
cadre deemed “most responsible” for the crimes of the regime (thereby obscuring others who
committed atrocious crimes, as well as further compounding the political impunity that runs rife
in Cambodia).16 These, as well as many other issues, are examined in minute detail by scholars and
the media, and deemed to affect the court’s ability to administer justice in, and for, Cambodia.17
These discussions primarily position the perceived failure of the courts with the Cambodians,
rather than considering the incommensurability of the transitional justice system within the Khmer
sphere;18 the “friction” as Alexandra Kent calls it of the “co-performance [of] justice” between the
international system and the Khmer reality of patronage-based social encounters.19 By positioning
Cambodia as a failing state, as well as considering the international framework of justice as the
only relevant one, these critiques fail to engage with the ways the ECCC has some influence and
arguable success, and the key features that make it distinctive among international courts. Wendy
Lambourne argues that whilst there are many compromises, there is symbolic value to the court,
12

Duncan McCargo, “Politics by Other Means? The Virtual Trials of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal,” International Affairs 87,
no. 3 (2011), 613-627.

13

“Home page,” Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), accessed October 25, 2018, https://www.
eccc.gov.kh/en.

14

Alexander Laban Hinton, “Justice and Time in the Khmer Rouge Tribunal: In Memory of Vann Nath, Painter and S-21
Survivor,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 8, no. 2 (2014), 7–17.

15

Joel Brinkley, “Justice Squandered: Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge Tribunal,” World Affairs 176, no. 3 (2013), 41–48.

16

McCargo, Politics by Other Means?

17
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These arguments follow Kamari Maxine Clarke’s critique of transitional justice whereby the global is not readily
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particularly as “some evidence suggests that the details of the charges are not as important for the
survivors as simply seeing their former leaders in court and behind bars.”20 Cheryl White argues
that civil party participation has led to discursive proceedings that complicated the international
frames of justice by expanding dialogue within the trial “beyond purely evidentiary matters,” thus
enabling restorative mechanisms more akin to Truth Commissions than international criminal
courts.21 Eve Zucker, meanwhile, suggests that one of its primary criticisms – the restriction of
personnel – may in fact work towards its restorative aims, by helping smooth some form of local
reconciliation made possible by laying the blame for the violence at the feet of only the high-level
Khmer Rouge, enabling low level cadre to re-enter communities.22
Whilst useful in consideration of the court as a central political institution in the process of
justice, by limiting their frame to the ECCC, these considerations omit the many facets of justice
that exist outside and beyond the court, and are part of the way Cambodian people make sense of
that specific part of history in their day to day lives. As Alexander Laban Hinton states: “one of the
key dangers of the transitional justice imaginary is that it directs attention away from social practice
and the ways in which the meaning and understanding of such transitional justice processes are
negotiated on the ground.”23 In his exploration of the trial of Duch, Hinton shows that while the
court opens some unique spaces for discussion, there are many encounters with the Khmer Rouge
regime in contemporary society that the judicial system cannot tackle: the affective dimension of
remembering; the way hierarchies of violence and victimhood created and reinforced by those
deemed appropriate for the court renders other forms invisible; the many violences which can
never be proven and may be more psychological than physical.24 Others who have worked on the
court, such as Tallyn Gray, Maria Elander, and Peter Manning, have likewise found that whilst the
court provides some justice for some people, it cannot encompass the many alternative spaces and
voices that need to be heard for reconciliation.25
This is partly a disjuncture of modes of understanding and enacting justice, and partly a result
of the temporal distance: as Anne Yvonne Guillou notes, the UN-backed courts were set up nearly
30 years after the Khmer Rouge regime officially ended, but in the meantime, local systems of
justice and remembrance have been in place. She argues that many Cambodians do not frame
themselves as passive victims as required by court narratives, nor do their modes of remembering
conform to those suggested by the ECCC. By considering how remembrance is embraced by the
Khmer annual ritual cycle, she shows how Buddhism allows people not only to remember the
20
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Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 8, no. 2 (2014), 35.

21
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Brants and Susanne Karstedt (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017), 173.

22
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dead, but also to position the regime itself within an episodic temporal frame that does not fit that
of the court. As such they have found their own ways of dealing with the past:
Cambodians have not remained silent, unconcerned or reluctant to try the Khmer Rouge
leaders, but had instead developed, decades before the trial, their own ‘relief device’ from
social suffering and their own sophisticated ‘memory device’ interlinked with the traditional
Khmer religious system. This has been working silently for 30 years now, far from the city
and the journalists.26

As she, and others such as Peter Manning argue,27 we must therefore pay attention, and remain
cognizant, to the resilience of Cambodian communities, recognizing their ways of establishing
relationships to their own history outside formal interventions such as the ECCC. These
relationships also provide ways of complicating the narratives created and reinforced within the
court, by allowing other possibilities to exist.
Buddhism and Karma
Theravada Buddhism has been Cambodia’s state religion since the Thirteenth Century.28 Whilst
I am mindful of the seductive appeal of depictions of it as being all encompassing (either before
or after Democratic Kampuchea), Buddhism is significant to many people’s lives, as well as to
community life in general in Cambodia. Except in a minority of locations, the Buddhist pagoda
is central to most villages, and is the place where many communal and community events occur,
such as voting, village meetings, and ritual and family-based ceremonies.29 The Khmer annual
calendar revolves around the Buddhist ritual cycle,30 and many of the practices of Buddhism infuse
everyday life, even for those following other religions. It also influences how people talk about
life and living, and the actions they take. Merit-making is at the core of Buddhist practice;31 the
aim of which is to improve one’s karma (or if providing merit by giving offerings to the monks,
the karma of a relative or friend), so that rebirth might be quicker and to an improved status. The
accumulation of karma, therefore, is a central driving force of Buddhist action in Cambodia, as well
as a cosmological means of understanding and narrating the world.
Viewed as a foreign import, with leaders whose education, and vocal political positions were
highly influential in local communities, Buddhism was considered a threat by the Khmer Rouge,
who took extreme measures in attempts to destroy it.32 It remained restricted even after the fall of
the regime as the Vietnamese led-government, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), asserted
control over the country and its population.33 Regardless of its public banning, however, many of
the cosmological concepts of Buddhism continued to exist throughout Democratic Kampuchea.34
As Judy Ledgerwood explains, Buddhist modes of “thinking, feeling, speaking, moving,” were
learned as children and “embodied as habitus;” they therefore continued to be important despite
(or perhaps because of) attempts to destroy them.35 Because of this, Buddhism and its central
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tenets, resurged, and were re-imagined after the regime,36 and have been central to the way many
Cambodians have come to deal with the Khmer Rouge. Reincarnation and karma (kamm) became
particularly salient due to the massive number of dead created by the regime.
Karma is accumulated through intentional acts conducted throughout this (and sometimes
previous) lives.37 It provides the force to affect the realms of existence into which beings are reborn
in samsara38 - the endless cycle of death and rebirth that is part of Buddhist life – a cycle of dukkha –
suffering. Meritous acts enable the accumulation of karma, adding force to the transition to the next
life. While the dhamma asserts that rebirth happens immediately upon death, for my participants
outside the sangha, karma also affects when and with whom people are reborn: a wealth of karma
means a quick rebirth with people you know; a lack of merit, and therefore karma, results in delays
between death and rebirth and an increased likelihood of rebirth with strangers. In this way,
historical and contemporary actions affect the life cycle of those in samsara and future positioning
in the world.
Like others such as Hinton and Ledgerwood, Tallyn Gray who works on post-Khmer Rouge
justice, considers Buddhism to be central to its understanding in Cambodia.39 He asserts that rather
than retribution or exoneration, justice for his participants meant “the opportunity to narrate and
not to be ignored,” thus creating a present no longer plagued by the past. For Gray, karma is used as
part of this as “a narratological device by which people situate themselves in time.”40 I further this,
by suggesting that karma also provides a means of positioning oneself within a wider cosmological
order, ontologically as well as narratologically. This order is shared by the vast proportion of the
population, and expounded by the influential sphere of politicians and, most importantly, the
Buddhist sangha, to whom people look for advice and guidance, particularly in a violent political
sphere that many people distrust. It is a device that can explain mass rupture and chaos, and
within which actions that seem incomprehensible and insurmountable can be made sense of and
understood. As well as providing a means of re-imagining historical events, karma also provides
a means of exploring the materialization of justice through social life, embodied experiences, and
narration, rather than as understood within a judicial framework.
“How Come I Survived?”: Case Studies of Karma
The following case studies consider the way karma was used by my informants to form some kind
of understanding of the violence of the Khmer Rouge regime. Whilst this was a concept used by
many, wide-ranging, informants, I have concentrated on three examples to elucidate its different
facets, following which I will discuss its position vis-à-vis justice and the ECCC.
Sreypich was around 50 years old when I met her. She was living by herself in a small village
not far from Phnom Penh. She makes a living as an occasional farmer and seamstress, subsidizing
her income with donations from a local church in times of extreme need. During the regime she was
repeatedly moved around the country as the Khmer Rouge re-organized community and family
living. While she survived, she lost over twenty-five members of her extended family. Her Uncle
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and his family were killed because he had been a soldier in the Lon Nol regime.41 Both her parents
died of starvation and exhaustion at a rural work-camp in Kampong Thom province; her sister also
died there, but of disease. Her brother was executed because he displeased an officer in the work
group he had been sent to. “Three died on my mother’s side,” she told me. “But on my father’s side,
there were more: seven people. All gone.” Other distant members of the family also died.
During the regime Sreypich worked in the youth section of a massive rural work-camp and
came close to losing her life several times. At one stage she was imprisoned and taken to be “built
up” (kāsang):
At that time, they captured us just because we screamed because of hunger. They called us
Neaytun Sakade Phum.42 We couldn’t even say aloud that we didn’t get enough rice. I, myself,
was at Tuol Krasang dam,43 oh my god… We ate just for the sake of eating. If there was a
camera at that time, you’d see how thin I was. Just stepping over grass I would trip and fall…
So many died. Some died of sickness, some died because they complained… They would
take us to build us up (kāsang) because they didn’t want us to think of the past. It was so
difficult… But according to Buddhism, I had good karma. That’s how I survived.

In contemporary Khmer, kāsang translates as “to build.” However, during Democratic Kampuchea
the word took on a dual meaning where to build also meant to destroy or tear down in order to
start building from scratch: a kind of death and rebirth of particular institutions, or, in this case,
individuals.44
Sreypich survived. Throughout Democratic Kampuchea she had been able to live and work
alongside others from her hometown. She used karma to explain to me why she had survived
whilst others had died:
All of these dead people must have had bad karma in the religion. Yes, now you think about
it - they were strong and physically healthy. What about me? How could I survive? I met a
don chee [lay nun], a monk, an âchaa [lay priest]. The monk was disrobed and had to carry a
gun. He told me so. But how come I survived?

During Democratic Kampuchea, Sreypich said, people were “forced to die.” When I asked her
to explain, she elaborated: “if they didn’t have karma, they would not die. It must be that they
committed bad deeds; that’s why they were killed like this.”
Ta Sann, an elderly man who lives close to Choeung Ek, also lost several members of his
family, including his brother, Sok. After the regime, he ran into a man who had worked in the
same commune as Sok. “As soon as he saw me, he asked if I was Sok’s brother because we looked
very similar. He told me that, ‘I worked with Sok. He was showering after we finished working moving soil. [His name] was called out. They killed him.’”
The man told Ta Sann the name of the cadre who killed his brother and where he lives now.
“I thought I wanted revenge,” he said. “But then I thought about the Buddhist teaching - that it
was probably his bad karma from a past life; that’s why it was like that.” His brother was a gentle
man, he told me, reserved and polite. We discussed his family and experience at some length,
and he repeatedly referred to karma when discussing people who had died. “The reason I think
about Buddhist philosophy” he said, “is because I had to face death [during the Khmer Rouge]
many times.” Like Sreypich he had been captured by the Khmer Rouge, but like Sreypich, he had
survived, while others, people he thought, stronger, had died or been killed.
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Although claiming not to be a fully-fledged cadre, following his capture and release, Ta Sann
had worked for the local Khmer Rouge commune. He was responsible for guarding food supplies,
and would sometimes deliver food and other goods to local Khmer Rouge meetings. After the fall
of the regime, Ta Sann joined the PRK, and later became a member of the CPP. Nowadays he claims
not to follow a political party, but to concentrate on doing good deeds and accumulating karma.
He goes to pagoda, to “practice Buddhism and gain merit,” both for himself, and for his brother: “I
[want] to help relieve my brother of his bad karma.”
The final story, of Dara and her son, shows further how karma is used to understand the
consequences of the regime. Dara was introduced to me one morning while I was researching in
a village close to Choeung Ek. Knowing I was interested in those with connections to the graves,
an elderly man I was interviewing advised me to speak to Dara because, “she got pregnant from
the graves.” Dara’s son, she told me, is reincarnated from someone buried in the mass graves at
Choeung Ek: she became pregnant after climbing into a pit to loot it in the 1980s.
Dara’s family is modest, and neither she nor her husband is educated. One of the reasons
she is sure her son is reincarnated from Choeung Ek, she told me, is his intelligence - he has been
successful throughout his education and his career. Those killed at Choeung Ek were mostly
brought from Tuol Sleng prison in Phnom Penh - the prison where, particularly in the early days,
high profile prisoners were taken, including those who posed the highest threat to the regime:
lawyers, doctors, and the intelligentsia. As the regime progressed and purges of cadre considered
to be spies or traitors increased, the site also became the final location for many cadre and their
families.45 In explaining how her son’s karma had led to his rebirth with her, Dara said:
According to Buddhism, if you do good things, you will be reborn quickly. If you have a lot
of sin, it’s not easy to be reborn. If you kill anyone or anything, you will not be reborn soon.
If you have good karma, you can be reborn with those you know.

Dara considered her son’s death at Choeung Ek, and his rebirth into a modest, uneducated family,
to be the result of his karma; although still human, she considered his status to be lowered. “I feel
sorry for my son. I’m not sure if it was his bad karma or something: if that was why [he was killed],
and why he was destined to be with me.”
His karma was also responsible, she thought, for his rebirth with strangers. Those who died,
she told me, were lonely because they could not find their families. But those ready to be reborn
needed a place, and without being able to locate their friends or relatives (which was only possible,
she told me, for those with good karma), they had to reincarnate with those close to their graves.
That is why her son had come to her. Others could not reincarnate, or at least not for a long time –
they are stuck, she said, as preta – hungry ghosts who suffer in the Khmer underworld and can only
come to the earth once a year during Pchum Benh (the annual festival for the dead) to feed. “Those
who had done good things [in the previous life] could be reborn. Some had a lot of sin and could
not go anywhere. They have to stay like that.”
The Justice in Karma
When my informants used karma to explain the deaths that had happened, their own survival,
or to provide narrations of consequences for torture and killing, they drew on pre-existing
Buddhist frameworks to make sense of the Khmer Rouge. Their narrations were as much about
understanding and creating meaning as they were about finding blame or punishing people for
crimes and misdemeanours. Sreypich survived, when many others did not, because of her karma.
Her family, friends, and thousands of others around her, suffered and died because of theirs. When
Dara spoke of her son, she considered his place of birth – with strangers not family, and to a lower
social status - to be a result of karma. Ta Sann used karma as a device to connect himself to a
Buddhist framework that enabled him to decide against revenge against the person who killed his
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brother, and he now works within that framework to make merit and accumulate karma for his,
and his brother’s, actions in the past.
In the nearly 30 years between the end of the regime and the establishment of the ECCC, people
found ways to narrate the period that fit within an acceptable cultural framework, a framework
that allows both recognition of the horrors of the past, remembrance of the many thousands, if
not millions, who died, and a practical means of living side by side with former cadre. According
to Judy Ledgerwood, many Buddhist practices have become embodied acts of remembering the
period before the regime, recreating senses of place and belonging.46 The strength of Buddhist
action and concepts is their persistence and the way they order life. None imply that nothing
changes, or that no-one is to blame for what happened - these are not fatalistic narratives – instead
they invite an understanding of chaos and destruction as elements of Buddhist life; as such, they
are both inevitable and transient.
Dara, and several others told me they follow the idea of bon/baap – good/evil: “if you do good,
you will receive good, if you do evil, you will receive evil.” These modes of narration do not
necessarily equate exactly to justice as understood within an internationalized judicial framework.
But they provide a means of making sense of the horror, or at least wrestling it into a conceptual
framework that makes sense. By doing so, they provide a way people can share stories, make
links between their own experience and the wider Cambodian context, and find some way of
negotiating a violent past that still interjects in the present. Karma and reincarnation are embodied
as well as narrated and allow people to continue existing in a cosmological sphere that makes
sense. In opposition to the concepts of reconciliation and justice provided by the court, which
necessarily flatten narratives and frames memory and understanding in ways that are, in many
ways, disconnected from local lives, most people have found their own ways of remembering and
re-connecting with the dead specifically, and the Khmer Rouge period as a whole, ways that enable
them to negotiate that period of history in their everyday lives.
One of the aims of the ECCC is a kind of truth-telling – the creation, through intense
interrogation, documentation, and other evidence, of a judicially (and politically) accepted
narrative of the Khmer Rouge regime. However, to be able to consolidate evidence, present
arguments, and make verdicts, the court has to contain and flatten narratives, understandings,
and experiences, of the past. It is part of the very nature of courts that they need stratified stories
and evidence that enable sense to be made within a legal system, however much that system is
aimed to complement local cosmologies, and however complex and confused the reality may be.
As Maria Elander notes in her consideration of expressivism in the court, while the ECCC attempts
a multi-dialogic interaction through the participation of victims as civil parties, “a court cannot
hold the complexity of victimization.”47 The result of this is a funneling of narratives where certain
types become normalized, and others are rendered invisible because they do not fit the structure
of the court. Stories of karma, however, allow different narratives to emerge, ones that encompass
the complexity not only of victimization, but also of perpetration. Ta Sann worked for the Khmer
Rouge, and now works hard to accumulate merit and improve his karma. Dara’s son, reborn from
the graves at Choeung Ek, where a large proportion of victims were Khmer Rouge, was reborn
with an unknown family. Other perpetrators are reborn as preta, or are yet to be reborn.
The use of karma and reincarnation in my informants’ stories, as well as other Buddhist
references, such at the Put Tumneay prophecies (ancient Khmer prophecies), may be narrative
devices that exist within an accepted cultural frame with which to talk about violence, and express
grief and loss. Eve Zucker suggests this may be the case for stories she heard that related the Khmer
Rouge to nineteenth century Thai invasions: “this employment of a cultural framework to discuss
and attempt to narrate the traumatic rupture that occurred may provide a means to express what
is otherwise inexpressible.”48 When Sreypich spoke of her grief at the loss of her extended family,
she reflected on it in relation to her own survival, a survival that seemed incomprehensible given
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the deaths of so many, seemingly spiritually superior, people – monks, lay nuns and priests, the
elderly and the sick. Karma provided some means to do this.
Beyond expressing the inexpressible, there may be another way justice is enacted through
karma: as a form of “ontological justice” (to follow Alexander Laban Hinton’s phrasing).49 In a
country where a culture of impunity condones violence past and present, where many ex-Khmer
Rouge hold positions of authority, where the Prime Minister has repeatedly interfered with the
ECCC, and where the ECCC is far distant from everyday lives, Buddhist frames are vital and
ways people make sense of what happened. Restorative justice focuses on the harms done and
their redress,50 but the court arguably does not address this. What space is there for former Khmer
Rouge who were child soldiers to have harm enacted on them redressed? What space to consider
stories outside the normative frames of perpetrators and victims? Karma allows the nuances of
perpetration and victimisation to be conceptualised and narrated. Like Dara, many other informants
told me that the karma of Khmer Rouge cadre will result in terrible suffering for them; for the next
life and potentially others after it.
Though there appears an element of fatalism to this, it does not mean that actions in this life
are meaningless and have no effect. Quite the contrary: the karmic force of bad deeds (or rather
the lack of karma accumulated by doing good deeds) will potentially affect people for many lives
to come. All subsequent actions are therefore important. As one informant commented, “whoever
Khmer Rouge wanted to kill, they would kill. They would accuse us of not respecting the culture,
or [would kill you] if you stole a piece of cassava or corn, or you were lazy about working. But the
ones who killed people during that time committed bad deeds.” My informants did not excuse the
Khmer Rouge cadre or those who were complicit in their regime of terror. But many did consider
their actions to have dire consequences for the future.
It is this certainty that led Kok-Thay Eng, a senior researcher at the Documentation Center
of Cambodia, a research facility aiming to “help Cambodians heal the wounds of the past by
documenting, researching, and sharing the history of the Khmer Rouge,”51 to use karma and
reincarnation as a plea for forgiveness and reconciliation within the Khmer population, in a
newspaper article in 2010:
The enormity of the crimes committed by leaders of the Khmer Rouge could make them the
worst bret [preta] (lost or wandering ghosts who have committed serious sins during their
lifetimes and cannot be reborn) of all, who would always be hungry and wandering without
destination. If they can be forgiven by survivors, their prospect for life after death could be
improved.52

Preta can only be released from their suffering (and Cambodia from their sinister presence)
once they are reborn. For that they need to accumulate merit, something hard to do if you are
a preta. However, it can be done. Annual ritual ceremonies during Pchum Benh and New Year
allow people to send merit to the nameless dead.53 The population has funded most of the pagodas
that have been rebuilt since the demise of the regime, with large donations often coming from
politicians or businessmen and women as modes of merit-making. The same is true of many of
the concrete stupa that have been built in recent years to replace the wooden ptĕəh kmoac (house of
the dead/ghost house) that initially contained the remains of those who died during the regime.
Ta Sann, who worked for the Khmer Rouge, goes regularly to the local pagoda to make merit for
himself and his brother, to help both their karma. Some ex-cadre have become âchaa (lay Buddhist
priests), don chee (nuns), or elders who live in pagodas and take care of the monks. These are all
sources of gaining merit and accumulating karma.
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Karma is, of course, not the only concept people use when discussing the Khmer Rouge. Many,
like Ta Sann, also made reference to forgiving and letting go of anger. Temporality was a central
mode of thinking about the different periods, and some informants referenced ancient prophecies,
and folk tales.54 Some of my informants considered the need for imprisonment following a formal
judicial procedure. One or two expressed anger and hatred towards the former cadre, and a desire
for revenge. Dara expressed frustration at the ongoing trials, arguing that Nuon Chea and Khieu
Samphan should not be given a trial because during Democratic Kampuchea: “they didn’t try us:
they grabbed our hands and took us away and killed us straight away.” In the same conversation,
as described above, she told me that many cadre were reborn as preta, and that even though she
thought it was unfair for the Khmer Rouge leaders to be tried when victims of the regime were
not, a trial was important to try and find out the root causes of the genocide: “why Khmer killed
Khmer.” She thus drew on both Buddhism and the ECCC to assert modes of justice in dealing with
the genocide.
The court does not entirely ignore Buddhism; it has attempted to encompass a degree of the
religion, as well as animism, within its limits: outreach projects have been conducted with the
sangha, monks attend the court, civil parties frame their expositions within the court related to
Buddhism, and like all Cambodian courts, the ECCC houses a neak ta (guardian spirit).55 However,
its interactions with Buddhism are necessarily limited by its retributive and internationalized
sensibilities, and therefore try as it might, the court cannot fit local needs and models of narrating
that period of history.
While there is a need, therefore, to take seriously other ways of thinking about justice, the
international/global eye cannot be removed for discussions on Cambodia – it is central to much
action by the government (and other elites), who remain keen to be in contact and co-operation
with foreign powers, with their borders relatively open to foreign visitors and investors.56 The
ECCC is a political act; of course it has to be, even where it does good. It belongs to a particular
temporality where Cambodia, and Southeast Asia in general is extending and asserting itself in the
global sphere. It belongs in a government that is trying to distance itself from the past, to create a
new political temporality, a government that, ever since the regime, has been attempting to exert
its position as the saviors of Cambodia. The ECCC is one small part of this wider interaction. As
such it is situated within a transitional justice model which “works discursively to establish a break
between the violent past and a peaceful, democratic future.”57 But there is, and can be, no break.
The violent past is present now and in the future.
Like many post-genocide states, contemporary Cambodia is a complex political sphere where
perpetrators and victims live side by side, and where these categories are not valid anyway,
encouraging, as they do, a simplistic dichotomisation of guilt and innocence which is not supported
by reality. Trying all the Khmer Rouge commanders, or all those who killed other people, would
not be possible. Trying everyone who aided the Khmer Rouge, or who were complicit in some of
the violence, would put a huge proportion of the country’s population on trial. For nearly four
decades now, people have had to determine on a daily basis how to live, often quite literally, with
the dead, as well as the living.58 How do you make sense of a world and rebuild a community,
where the person who killed your family lives in the next-street, or village, or commune? How do
you re-establish a world where every community and family, including Khmer Rouge of all levels,
lost friends, family, leaders, and trust?
The transitional justice imaginary is normative, performative, and productive, characterised
by linear temporality the aim of which is to provide a break between the violent past and the
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present.59 But tribunals, courts, and truth commissions are but one means of providing justice and
reconciliation. Parent suggests that “in order for transitional justice to be transformative it needs
to address the multiple justice needs and priorities of local affected populations, to transform
relationships as well as structures and institutions, and to focus on the future as well as justice
for past human rights violations.”60 The ECCC is only one tiny part of an ongoing process. By
wrestling the past into a comprehensible present and future using pre-existing concepts such as
karma and reincarnation, this is arguably what people do themselves.
As Eve Zucker comments “cultures endure because they manifest a variety of coping
strategies in dealing with trauma and rupture.”61 For most of my informants, who have been
dealing with this past and its present for decades, this break (that the court, and the government
attempt to create) between the Khmer Rouge regime and now is not possible – the violent past is
ever present. People have found their own ways of narrating the period; ones that fit the wider
cosmological understanding of a Buddhist world subject to chaos and transformation, and resists
the standardizing narrative of the state (and now the court), which collapses all narrations of
the period into one presentation of the past.62 Buddhist concepts offer a mode of narrating and
normalizing the events and could not be destroyed precisely because of their metaphysical nature;
Buddhist action provides a means by which the past can be wrestled back into control of everyday
life. These frames make sense of the past and allow it to exist in the present and the future, therefore
allowing people to get on with life, and living with the dead.63
However, while the conceptual bounds that frame transitional justice in the international
sphere, and karma in the Cambodian cosmology, seem in contrast to one another, they both
provide modes of narrating and making sense of the genocide and its aftermath. The ECCC is not
completely separate from lay experiences and understandings of justice in Cambodia: indeed, the
two are often in dialogue with each other, as shown by Dara, who drew on both spheres to talk
about justice. Both provide interaction with the violent past, and both are influenced by each other:
those attending the court take their experiences back to their communities; those communities
provide other ways of making sense of the everyday realities of living in post-Khmer Rouge
Cambodia; and those coming to court to participate as civil parties affect how it runs and the
sphere of its interaction.64 There IS a problem in reifying the ECCC as the only means of justice, but
not in asserting its place in a wider cosmology.
Conclusion
Justice works at all levels simultaneously, and in different, sometimes conflicting, frameworks.
This article has explored one Buddhist concept that is used as a framing of justice by research
participants in Cambodia. Karma is by no means the only way people think about, or narrate the
regime and its consequences. But it is central to the way many people talk about the death and
survival, as well as considering the consequences of the violence conducted by many Khmer Rouge
cadre. Sometimes the differing frameworks undermine each other; sometimes one is given priority
over the other; sometimes they co-exist with little effect on each other. My point here is to provide
other means of thinking about justice by taking it outside the court and its legalistic framing, to the
everyday ways people come to terms with the Khmer Rouge regime on the ground.
The sense-making that occurs after genocide takes place both within the court and outside it;
it could be argued this is one of the only truly shared aims between the two. In the court this plays
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out in a judicial system that enables the apportioning of blame to individual perpetrators and the
construction of a collectively acceptable narration of the regime. Outside the court, particularly in
rural Cambodia, this plays out as making sense within a wider, Buddhist, cosmology. Concepts
such as karma and reincarnation provide a means by which individual lives can be negotiated
and narrated in opposition to the cases in the court, which, through the selection of those that are
‘remembered’ publically, inadvertently renders invisible the many hundreds of thousands of other
experiences that affect day to day life of people across Cambodia. Tied in with Buddhist notions
of forgiveness and letting go of anger,65 karma provides a way of narrating the millions of deaths
caused by the Khmer Rouge. It also offers a means by which everyday people can make sense of
the complicated intertwining of past and present lives in today’s world and provide narratable,
shareable, and relatable stories by which people can connect to each other and the past.
In concluding this article, I pose a question. While I have argued that the court provides no
space for competing narratives, and that in understanding justice, we should step outside its bounds
to consider the ways people have, for decades, been dealing with the past, I wonder whether there
is space to think beyond the irresistible dichotomization an argument such as this can lead to.
I ask, therefore, whether the different narratives created and performed inside and outside the
court—even within different conceptual bounds—create incommensurable local and national
spheres of justice? Or are all frames used part of a sphere of justice that interact in multiple modes
and can co-exist imaginatively and practically as part of a world figuring out how to reshape itself
after mass violence? Perhaps the best way to think about justice, then, is as a system that allows
for many iterations and (re)creations; that leaves space for reimagining the past and the future
within the overlapping systems of the everyday and the extraordinary. Karma provides one way of
doing this.
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Introduction
“Genocide is not just an international crime, it is the international crime; to fight it is not an
obligation, but […] the obligation.”1 This emphatic declaration by Christian Tams, Lars Berster and
Björn Schiffbauer is not only a commitment to the unconditional fight against genocide but also
and foremost reflects the cornerstone of the 1948 United Nations Convention for the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide2 (UNCG). The quotation clearly points out what the duty to
prevent genocide is all about in international law: It is not only part of the unalienable jus cogens3
—it is even among the highest of all unconditional obligations under international law because
it affects the most fundamental conditions of the very existence of the international community.4
No State, no organization, not any reasonable person would deny that genocide is one of the most
hideous international crimes, in allusion to Raphael Lemkin often and still rated the “crime of
crimes”.5 Accordingly, it is a fundamental condition of both international law and the very existence
of mankind that any preparation or any act of aiding, abetting or committing genocide must be
averted as early as possible. The UNCG (concluded on December 9, 1948, entered into force on
January 12, 1951), for the first time, provided in its Article II a legal definition of genocide.6 From
then, this definition of genocide has not remained without objection as to interpretative details;
it also has been polished by further State practice on prosecuting genocide in domestic as well
as international law.7 However, the core elements of what constitutes genocide have never been
remarkably disputed.8 This is illustrated in the more recent international practice on treaty-making:
The wording of Article 6 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court9 (concluded on
July 17, 1998, entered into force on July 1, 2002), which defines genocide for the purposes of that
court, simply recites the UNCG. The general understanding of what constitutes genocide in legal
terms has remained the same since 1948: the destruction of (at least) a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group of human beings, which must be prevented and punished—without exception.
Article I UNCG has carved this imperative to mankind in stone:
The Contracting Parties Confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in
time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and punish.

1

Christian Tams, et al., eds., “Introduction,” in Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: A
Commentary (Munich, Oxford, Baden-Baden: C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2014), para. 4.

2

United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 260, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
December 9, 1948 (UN Doc. A/RES/260(III)).

3

The International Law Commission is still working on “Peremptory norms of general international law (Jus cogens),” but
there has never been a doubt that the prohibition of genocide is part those norms: e.g. Dire Tladi, Second report on jus
cogens, United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-ninth session, March 16, 2017. UN Doc. A/CN.4/707, paras. 44, 57, 85.

4

See on the concepts of “jus cogens” and “international community” in general William E. Conklin, “The Peremptory
Norms of the International Community,” European Journal of International Law 23, no. 3 (2012), 837, particularly on
genocide as one of the highest crimes in and against an international community 856.

5

Reaching back to Raphael Lemkin, “Genocide as a Crime under International Law,” United Nations Bulletin vol. IV,
January 15, 1948, 70; relevant case-law starting with Prosecutor v. Kambanda, International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, Case No. 93-27-S, September 4, 1998, para.16, followed by numerous other decisions; see further William A.
Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 10.

6

See for further details the analysis by Lars Berster, “Article II,” in Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide: A Commentary, ed. Christian Tams, et al. (Munich, Oxford, Baden-Baden: C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2014).

7

See eg. Table of Cases in Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: A Commentary, ed. Christian
Tams et al. (Munich, Oxford, Baden-Baden: C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2014), XXII.

8

I.e. the annihilation of a whole group; a group’s right to exist is the most important protected value in terms of genocide,
see further Berster, Article II, para. 2.

9

United Nations General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, United Nations Treaty
Series, vol. 2187, 3.
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Although it took some time until the legal status of the UNCG’s provisions became as solid as the
text of Article I never hesitated to imply, at least the State practice from the 1990s until now has
proven that the prevention of genocide is far more than a mere political agenda.10 Today the vast
majority of States in the world has enacted criminal legislation against genocide, which (some
more, some less) meets the UNCG’s requirements.11 The international law duty to hold génocidaires
criminally responsible seems to be widely implemented.
The Duty to Prevent Genocide: A Legal Approach
However, in contrast to prosecuting and punishing committed acts of genocide, the UNCG is silent
as to means of preventing future acts. Although Article VIII UNCG clarifies that State parties “may
call upon the competent organs of the United Nations” to take actions of genocide prevention,
the wording “may” easily discloses that those referrals are optional in a political sense, but not
legally binding upon Member States pursuant to Article VIII.12 In the subsequent practice of treaty
application, Article VIII has indeed contributed to some institutional and political progress within
the United Nations,13 but it has not proven to enrich the content of the peremptory state obligation
to prevent genocide.14 After all, the duty to prevent genocide in terms of international law is referred
to only in Article I UNCG, as cited above. Today, it is generally recognized that Article I entails
a legal duty to prevent genocide and is not only a programmatic statement.15 At the same time,
States still seem to be unaware of even a minimum legal content of the duty to prevent enshrined
in Article I UNCG. Therefore, a thorough legal interpretation of Article I UNCG is essential to
ascertain how States can or even must fulfill their common duty to prevent genocide in order to
comply with this important part of the international jus cogens.
The Legal Tools: The Rules of Article 31 VCLT
The interpretation of international treaties follows well-established rules, i.e. particularly the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties16 (VCLT) and corresponding (partly pre-existing)
customary international law. Thus, the rules of the VCLT17 provide the legal tools to access the
content of the duty to prevent genocide enshrined in Article I UNCG. The fundamental customary
international law rule on treaty interpretation,18 reflected in Article 31 para. 1, VCLT, demands that
10

At the latest by involving the ICJ in genocide cases – which lead to the first genocide judgment, Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Yugoslavia, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary
Objections, International Court of Justice, July 11, 1996 – the legal relevance of the crime of genocide and its
prevention cannot be denied; see on the implementation of the UNCG further Tams, et al., “Introduction,” foremost
paras. 56.

11

Listed in Annex 5 to Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: A Commentary, ed. Christian
Tams et al. (Munich, Oxford, Baden-Baden: C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2014).

12

Björn Schiffbauer, “Article VIII” in Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: A Commentary, ed.
Christian Tams et al. (Munich, Oxford, Baden-Baden: C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2014), para 11.

13

See further Ibid., para. 46.

14

See also Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, International Court of Justice, February 26, 2007, para. 427.

15

Ibid., para. 428; Martin Mennecke, “Genocide Prevention and International Law,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 4, no.
2 (2009), 171; William A. Schabas, “Genocide and the International Court of Justice: Finally, a Duty to Prevent the
Crime of Crimes,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 2, no. 2 (2007), 114; Christian Tams, “Article I,” in Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: A Commentary, ed. Christian Tams et al. (Munich, Oxford, BadenBaden: C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2014), paras. 20 and 31; Stephen J. Toope, “Does International Law Impose a Duty
upon the United Nations to Prevent Genocide?” McGill Law Journal 46 (2000), 187.

16

United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1155, 331.

17

Although the VCLT is not directly (i.e. as treaty law) applicable to the UNCG, its interpretative principles reflect
customary international law and are in that sense indeed applicable to the UNCG: see Tams et al., Introduction, para.
29.

18

Oliver Dörr, “Article 31,” in Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary, ed. Oliver Dörr et al. (Heidelberg,
Dordrecht, London and New York: Springer, 2014), para. 6; Mark E. Villinger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Leiden and Boston: Nijhoff, 2009), Article 31, para. 37; more details provided by
Jean-Marc Sorel and Valérie Boré Eveno, “Article 31 Convention of 1969,” in Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A
Commentary, ed. Olivier Corten et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), para. 10.
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interpretation be “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.“ Accordingly, the wording of
Article I UNCG (i.e. its “ordinary meaning”) is the starting point of any procedure of interpretation.
From then, the context of the treaty rule to be interpreted, as well as the object and purpose of the
treaty in its entirety have to be assessed and then to be applied to the aforementioned wording.19
The whole procedure of interpretation is guided by “good faith,” meaning that it is conducted
reasonably, for example by precluding obvious abuses of rights or open conflicts with the State
parties’ initial objectives.20
The Legal Tools of Interpretation Applied to Article I UNCG
In light of the duty to prevent, the ordinary meaning of the wording provided by Article I UNCG
is unambiguous: States “undertake to prevent” genocide.21 This means that every State party has
to take reasonable measures to prevent genocide.22 Furthermore, also the encompassing object and
purpose of the UNCG is undisputed: to avert situations of genocide from unfolding (or at least
continuing). However, these observations only confirm that States must act to prevent genocide.
But they still do not contribute to answer the question how prevention must be done. Without
prejudice to this still unsolved issue, the result that genocide must not happen is crucial and
unequivocal throughout the UNCG. It is therefore right to conclude ad interim that the UNCG is
strictly result-orientated towards the prevention of genocide. However, this must not be confused
with a potential success (or failure) of State actions taken in compliance with the duty to prevent.
As William Schabas rightly points out, States owe some conduct against genocide, but, if sufficient
measures were taken, they cannot be held responsible for a failed result.23 Nevertheless, the core
purpose of the UNCG is still that genocide must not happen—as a result. In other words: The
object and purpose of the UNCG and the State obligations to act in compliance with its object and
purpose may fall apart. On the one hand, the UNCG demands a complete result as an idealistic
aim, which reflects its object and purpose. On the other hand, States might not be held accountable
if the result remains incomplete, i.e. if they fail to reach this aim—as long as they seriously tried to.
The UNCG’s result-orientated approach is the focal point from which a more specific content
of the duty to prevent can be deduced.24 First of all, being result-orientated means that measures
of prevention need to start as early as possible, which may include taking mere measures of
precaution irrespective of any specific genocidal danger. For example, enacting effective domestic
legislation on genocide prevention (without prejudice to more specific criminal law provisions
corresponding with the duty to punish) pursuant to Article V UNCG is a suitable (and mandatory)
means.25 But not only legislative powers are addressed by the Convention and the duty to prevent.
Addressed is rather every State by its whole sovereign powers, including the executive branch.
19

See also Tams et al., Introduction, para. 37.

20

Dörr, Article 31, para. 61; Sorel and Boré Eveno, Article 31 Convention of 1969, para. 29; Villinger, Article 31, para. 6.

21

Article I indeed stipulates two different obligations – literally “to prevent and to punish” – meaning “one aimed at
precluding genocide from being committed, the other requiring the imposition of a penalty where genocide has been
committed”, Tams, Article I, para. 23. The duty to prevent “is not merged in the duty to punish, nor can it be regarded
as simply a component of that duty”: Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, International Court of Justice, February 26, 2007, para.
427. The duty to punish is generally understood as and restricted to an “obligation to impose criminal sanctions on
individuals responsible for acts of genocide or any of the other acts referred to in Article III”, Tams, Article I, para. 25)
and can therefore be neglected in this article.

22

Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, International Court of Justice, February 26, 2007, para. 162.

23

Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 521 [emphasis added].

On the duty to prevent in general: Eyal Mayroz, “The legal duty to ‘prevent’: after the onset of ‘genocide’,” Journal of
Genocide Research 14, no. 1 (2012), 79; Tams, Article I, para. 43; on the relevant jurisprudence: Orna Ben-Naftali, “The
Obligations to Prevent and to Punish Genocide,” in The UN Genocide Convention, ed. Paola Gaeta (Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 37.
25
However, it is uncertain how such preventive legislation should look like, see further Björn Schiffbauer, “Article V” in
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: A Commentary, ed. (Munich, Oxford, Baden-Baden:
C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2014), para 17.
24
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Having recognized that, it is compelling that any (foremost executive) measure in question
depends on the respective situation, particularly its gravity, proximity and specificity.26 Preventing
an abstract danger certainly requires softer and more general measures such as, for example
genocide-awareness training or teaching the elements of the UNCG. In contrast, a specific threat
or even the presence of a genocidal situation with clear parameters as to place and time likewise
requires rather forceful and tangible reactions.27 Thus, any measure dealing with how to fulfill the
duty to prevent is led by the principle of proportionality. Most measures contributing to the result
that genocide does not happen are suitable, but details depend on the respective situation. Again,
the all-encompassing aim is the object and purpose of the UNCG, enshrined by its Article I, to avert
the result of a genocide situation.
Similarly, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) pleads for preventive measures, as long
as they may be effective, relative to the capacity of the State in question within the framework
of international law.28 The Court also shows sympathy to the result-orientated approach of the
UNCG by clarifying that its 2007 genocide judgment is not to be understood as saying “that the
obligation to prevent genocide only comes into being when perpetration of genocide commences;
that would be absurd, since the whole point of the obligation is to prevent, or attempt to prevent,
the occurrence of the act.”29 In the same paragraph the ICJ then assumes a State’s “duty to act” if “a
serious risk that genocide will be committed” exists.30 However, this should not be misunderstood
as a restriction of the phrase cited before. Instead, the “duty to act” referred to was seen as a
qualified one to actually avert an ongoing situation. Softer measures of precaution were not subject
to the judgment at hand; therefore the Court was silent on them.
All this confirms the assessment made so far: States must at least try to reach the result
demanded by the UNCG. There is a duty to take measures to prevent genocide. This duty exists
irrespective of territory or a specific link to the State in question – each and every State party to
the UNCG is addressed and charged with prevention. Behind this background, Marko Milanović
concludes rightly that this “makes the obligation to prevent genocide vastly different from other
due diligence obligations.”31 The prevention of genocide is a global concern, whereas the details on
how to act depend on the circumstances of each situation’s context. Thus, taking into account the
legal tools of interpretation pursuant to Article 31 para. 1 VCLT, i.e. the wording of Article I UNCG,
its context to the other rules of the UNCG and in light of the encompassing object and purpose
of the UNCG, the finding so far is: The content of the duty to prevent is relative to the specific
situation, but it applies globally and truly literally erga omnes.
The Scope of Article I UNCG: Naming and Shaming as the Minimum Obligation to States
Irrespective of content-specific issues, it has become clear that one thing is never sufficient to
comply with the legal duty to prevent genocide whenever a genocidal action is at stake: doing
nothing. States must always overcome the threshold of passiveness; inaction would contravene the
object and purpose of the UNCG. This means that, as a minimum obligation, States must do at least
something to prevent genocide. Such a something is usually initiated by words rather than stronger
actions such as, for example, diplomatic negotiations or even a participation in collective (military)
interventions. Words are easily spoken and do not affect the national financial budget. To utter
words in terms of a genocide situation means at least to denominate the specific situation genocide;

26

See also Tams, Article I, para. 46.

27

This does not mean that genocide situations are generally easy to predict. Forecasts of genocide risks are generally
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more specifically: to name the actions referred to. Likewise, if an action is named genocide, it is,
at the same time, meant to be shamed as such—at least implicitly. In terms of genocide, there is a
correlation between naming and shaming. Since naming genocide points out the perpetration of
the “crime of crimes”; this cannot be expressed without a shameful context. Naming and shaming
a situation as genocide is the starting point for any further measures, because such determination
supports clarification of whether or not the definition of genocide is met in the specific case and
to sensitize other States to the situation. Global awareness is strengthened, thereby the object and
purpose of the UNCG is at least not missed and the ideal result to avert a situation of genocide is
(albeit only by small steps) approached. Furthermore, this minimum obligation also follows from
the context with Article I UNCG in its entirety as well as with the other conventional rules on
punishing genocide. Since persons having committed genocide can only be punished as perpetrators
of the “crime of crimes” if they acted in a genocidal context, to denominate a situation genocide
is the necessary starting point for criminal investigations in this direction. Without naming and
shaming a situation as genocide, the duty to punish genocide could not be fulfilled.
Certainly, further actions are not precluded. But if actual forcible interventions against
genocidal actions, for whatever reason, are neither possible nor suitable for a State, the same State
can nevertheless condemn those actions as what they are: genocide. Every State has the capacity to
do that. By doing so, it will not violate international law in this context. Admittedly, naming and
shaming may cause a (non-violent) intervention in internal affairs of a third State; however, such
intervention would be justified by Article I of the UNCG, i.e. the very duty to prevent genocide.
Moreover and essentially, naming and shaming is neither ineffective a priori but usually
supports the object and purpose of the UNCG. This is generally true because labeling actions as
genocide highlights the repugnance of the “crime of crimes”. Widespread reception of atrocities
is even stronger and provokes more profound reactions by the international community if such
atrocities are not just condemned as ordinary crimes—but named and shamed as genocide.
Several studies of scholars from different backgrounds have proven that naming and shaming
causes significant ameliorative effects.32 Hence, naming and shaming has a deterrent effect and
may potentially prevent further or similar actions from being committed. The génocidaire, who is
caught in the act and shamed for his deed, may be deterred. Moreover, a specific action denounced
to be genocide is unlikely to be committed again (at least under similar conditions). In addition,
if a genocide situation is not labeled as such, there is from the outset no chance to take preventive
measures at all.
Thus, naming and shaming is in general the least, never unreasonable and always suitable
contribution to the prevention of genocide. Exceptions to this assumption might only apply if, in
a certain case under its very particular circumstances, one could reasonably expect that naming
and shaming would incite and encourage an assumed perpetrator to take more genocidal actions.
Apart from such atypical instances, naming and shaming is the (first) necessary (though mostly
not sufficient) condition to comply with both the UNCG’s object and purpose and international jus
cogens; since (further) measures of genocide prevention need a target: situations labeled genocide.
However, as long as States in charge refrain from this minimum effort, they obviously violate
compelling international law. In recent times, the German government, for example, averted
such breach of international law by eventually naming and shaming the treatment of Yazidis
by ISIL terrorists to be genocide as late as in August 2014.33 Meanwhile, the Yazidi situation has
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been widely recognized as genocide, with continued naming and shaming.34 This example shows
unequivocally that naming and shaming is the first and necessary step to at least trying to avert
a genocide situation from unfolding, just as the object and purpose of the UNCG demands. Even
though the start of genocidal perpetration against the Yazidis could not be impeded, naming and
shaming this situation was at least the first step towards stopping its continuation. That there is still
a lot to do to the international community remains undisputed. But without States having started
to name and shame the ISIL massacres against the Yazidis, the current situation may have been
worse.
The Duty to Prevent Genocide and Retroactivity
With regard to the Yazidi situation, Germany’s compliance with the UNCG does not raise any
problems. Being a State party to the UNCG since 1954, there is no doubt that Germany has been
under the conventional duty to contribute to the worldwide prevention of genocide as reflected in
Article I UNCG. But questions arise on genocide-related situations that happened before a State
was bound by the treaty law of the UNCG. As recent developments show, those situations can
become practically relevant even in times of the now existing erga omnes duty to prevent genocide,
and thus be subject to State actions even today. A prominent example is the genocide against the
Armenians in 1915. Germany only recently (in 2016—for the first time) condemned the Ottoman
massacre against the Armenians as genocide,35 although the term “genocide” did not exist at that
time. Instead, “genocide” as a legal notion is firmly linked to the UNCG from 1948 (entered into
force in 1951). Looking at these dates, it might be questioned whether Germany had the right—
or even the duty—to name and shame the massacre against the Armenians from 1915 genocide
today. It is unclear whether the wording of Article I UNCG also addresses events occurring before
the erga omnes duty to prevent genocide was globally established. Can—or must—the legal term
“genocide” be used to classify situations that happened before 1948 (or even before 1951)? Such
questions seem to find their answers in the discussion on retroactivity in international law.
The General Assumption of the UNCG’s Non-Retroactivity
Article 28 VCLT and its equivalent in general international law (customary international law and a
general principle of law)36 regulate:
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions
do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which
ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.

Applied to the UNCG, which does not provide for a special regime dealing with situations
before 1951,37 international law scholars argue that the conventional duties to prevent and punish
genocide are inapplicable.38 The ICJ, in its latest genocide-related judgment of 2015, also points out:
The Court considers that a treaty obligation that requires a State to prevent something from
happening cannot logically apply to events that occurred prior to the date on which that State
became bound by that obligation; what has already happened cannot be prevented. Logic,
as well as the presumption against retroactivity of treaty obligations enshrined in Article 28
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, thus points clearly to the conclusion that
34
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the obligation to prevent genocide can be applicable only to acts that might occur after the
Convention has entered into force for the State in question. […] A State which is not yet party
to the Convention when acts of genocide take place might well be in breach of its obligation
under customary international law to prevent those acts from occurring but the fact that it
subsequently becomes party to the Convention does not place it under an additional treaty
obligation to have prevented those acts from taking place.39

The—quite obvious—conclusion from this would be: The UNCG, in its material parts,
turns a blind eye on events prior to its entering into force. This is definitively true to the duty
to punish genocide, for a treaty imposing criminal penalties with retroactive effects would be
extremely problematic by international human rights standards. But what does the UNCG’s nonretroactivity mean to the much broader duty to prevent genocide? Do international lawyers really
tell and believe that, for example, the Holocaust is irrelevant to the UNCG and therefore cannot be
classified genocide? A widespread blanked presumption of non-retroactivity would indeed lead to
this conclusion. Such an odd and even absurd result truly demands for a more precise assessment
of the ICJ’s arguments as well as the wording of Article 28 VCLT.
Retroactivity and the Duty to Prevent Genocide
Article 28 VCLT stands under the precondition “[u]nless a different intention appears from the
treaty.” The object and purpose of the UNCG is (inter alia, as shown above) to prevent future
(and stop ongoing) genocide situations. Thus, the duty to prevent genocide is logically directed
towards the present and the future. The problem of retroactivity, instead, arises whenever a State
has allegedly not complied with this duty and therefore might be held accountable and subjected
to international responsibility. In this respect, States usually cannot be treated different from
individuals: both have to pay dues only for violations of obligations having existed at the time
of their respective deeds or omissions. Otherwise, accountability would fail. This is exactly the
meaning of the rule reflected in Article 28 VCLT, namely that a treaty’s “provisions do not bind a
party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before
the date of the entry into force.” Or, more pointed in the words of the ICJ cited above: “what has
already happened cannot be prevented.”
But does this also mean that events from before 1951, although matching the (undisputed core
of the) definition of genocide under international law, are irrelevant? The ICJ seems to answer in
the affirmative by opining:
Logic […] points clearly to the conclusion that the obligation to prevent genocide can be
applicable only to acts that might occur after the Convention has entered into force for the
State in question.40

Taking these words literally, the Court apparently believes that measures to comply with the
duty to prevent must be directed pointedly against a specific (ongoing or future) action without
looking back. If this was true, the Court’s opinion would reflect only a one-way understanding
of logic—for at least two reasons: First, the ICJ then would ignore the (already cited) caveat to
the object and purpose of the UNCG enshrined in Article 28 VCLT. But, again, the object and
purpose is to prevent genocide in general by a result-orientated approach. It is hard to believe
that the Court intended to deny that.41 Second, the result-orientated approach by the UNCG to
prevent genocide is—indeed by logic—not limited to specific, well determined genocidal acts.
Instead, as seen above, it applies generally to an undetermined (and hopefully minimal) amount
of possible genocide situations. Thus, the duty to take measures of prevention does not start as late
39
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as when perpetrators grab their slaughter knives and atrocities appear to be imminent. Measures
of prevention are rather to be taken as early as when the first spark of a genocidal thought might
come to a potential perpetrator’s mind. Otherwise genocide prevention would hardly be effective
but rather degenerate into a hollow phrase. That would clearly contravene the object and purpose
of the UNCG and particularly its Article I. Therefore, the duty to prevent genocide cannot be
completely linked to the general non-retroactivity of the UNCG.
Retroactivity in Focus: Distinctions between Past and Future Situations
The answer to these facts in terms of international law is distinction in detail. There is a
difference also in international law between State responsibility on the one hand and general
compliance with the duty to prevent genocide on the other hand. Retroactivity of the UNCG is
only (and rightly) precluded when it comes to State responsibility under international law. That
was indeed the only aspect the ICJ had to rule on in its two genocide cases. Thus, it should not be
presumed that the ICJ would be reluctant to distinguish if it needed to. But State responsibility is
only one side of the coin which the duty to prevent genocide is engraved in. The other side is every
State’s obligation to contribute to the result demanded by the UNCG that genocide in general does
not happen, irrespective of States can be held accountable for any insufficient performance. Neither
the UNCG, nor general international law outlaws assessing situations from the pre-Conventional
era under the legal regime of the UNCG. Only State responsibility for those situations cannot be
based on the UNCG.
In contrast, whenever the object and purpose of the UNCG so demands, States may not and
must not ignore events from the time before the UNCG entered into force. Being aware of this
distinction, the duty to prevent genocide requires States to answer indeed two questions: first,
whether to act; second, how to act. The starting point to take measures against genocide is the entering
into force of the UNCG with respect to the concerned State—and the first question is to be answered:
whether. Before being bound by the UNCG, States may (without prejudice to jus cogens obligations)
discretionarily decide whether they take measures. From the day of the UNCG’s binding effect
with respect to the State in question, such discretion converts into the duty to prevent ongoing and
future genocide situations. From then, actions to prevent genocide have to be taken mandatorily
—at least as a soft measure of precaution contributing to the all-encompassing object and purpose
of the result-orientated approach. Then the second question becomes crucial: what measures are
to be taken, i.e.: how to act. This important differentiation is crucial to rightly comply with all
obligations of the UNCG. The reference point with respect to measures of genocide prevention
can also reach back to the past—if and whenever future situations can be averted that way. In this
respect, retroactivity of the UNCG is to be accepted, if the issue of retroactivity is addressed that
way at all. Since the duty to prevent genocide remains to be directed to the present and the future,
this does not cause retroactive effects at all. But the references taken to avert genocide in future
indeed may still reach back to the past.
The Duty to Prevent Genocide between the Past and the Future
As shown above, the UNCG is not a technocratic treaty but a living instrument that subordinates
everything to its encompassing, result-oriented object and purpose: the prevention of genocide.
The prevention of genocide necessarily links events and aspects from the past with those in the
future. Genocide (not only, but also) as a legal term has developed from the experience of past
events and exists to define what exactly to prevent in the future.
Learning from the Past to be Aware in the Future
In other words: Prevention also means to recognize what went wrong in the past to be aware that
the same or similar developments must be thwarted in the future. This leads back to the minimum
requirement to comply with the duty to prevent genocide: naming and shaming. Shaming genocidal
events from the pre-UNCG era and naming them “genocide” strongly supports the disclosure of
elements of the “crime of crimes” and sharpens the global awareness towards akin future events.
Just recently, in a broader context, Kerry E. Whigham has elaborately explained that remembering
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the past is a suitable and important element of prevention in the future.42 This is equally true to
international law and specifically to the legal duty to prevent genocide. Moreover, as mentioned
above, naming and shaming has positive effects.43 Even after 70 years of a codification against
genocide the ideal of a genocide-free world is far from being reached. This means also that learning
from the past is far from being exhausted, it is rather a continuing course of development. Or, as
James Waller recently argued: “the world as it is now is not the world as it has to be.”44 Genocide in
international law might be even more topical than before, making the process of reappraising the
past even more urgent in order to prevent future atrocities. In terms of genocide, this means that
past atrocities which meet the present definition of genocide as reflected by Article II UNCG need
to be labeled as such to identify and globally communicate what to prevent in the future.
This understanding of genocide prevention by naming and shaming indeed conducted the
whole drafting process of the UNCG, which started shortly after the Second World War and was
molded by the unutterable impressions from the Holocaust. The experiences of those days ignited
the need to find a name for what had just happened in order to choke comparable future situations
in their very beginning.45 Thus, naming and shaming reflects the spirit of the UNCG and the
eventually emerged erga omnes duty to prevent genocide.
From a Right to Name and Shame...
These remarks inevitably lead to the conclusion that every State has a right to name and shame
situations as genocide even if these situations took place before the UNCG was in force. If the need
to prevent genocide is taken seriously, international law cannot not preclude a State from naming
and shaming situations that undoubtedly fall under the definition provided by the UNCG, since
any other result would run contrary to the UNCG’s object and purpose and would contravene jus
cogens.
...Towards a Duty to Name and Shame
However, does the right to name and shame past situations as genocide correspond with a duty
under international law to do so? The UNCG’s major purpose to prevent genocide as effectively as
possible would opt for the affirmative. But it needs to be kept in mind that the facts of any situation
in question must be clear and thoroughly assessed because a State needs to be absolutely certain
about the elements of genocide. For this reason, with respect to past situations, a graded (instead
of an absolute) duty to name and shame appears to be more adequate. Aspects of such graduation
—emanating from the principle of proportionality in international law—could be the following:
The closer a State was involved in the respective situation (for example geographically, by bilateral
relations or as a host for refugees), the better it knows the facts and thus can assess whether or not
genocide was present. This proximity to a situation is crucial also to maintain the credibility of the
duty to prevent genocide. Mere speculations whether a situation could be labeled genocide would
even contravene the aim of a genocide-free world because the concept of genocide as a whole then
would lose clarity. Thus, a duty to name and shame in the light of the object and purpose of the
UNCG depends on a qualified link between the situation referred to and the State to name and
shame.
The Holocaust, for example, concerned virtually every State in the world and obviously
matches the definition of genocide. A more qualified link to the whole world could hardly exist.
It is therefore the duty of every single State to name and shame the Holocaust as genocide. In
contrast, the situation concerning the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire during the First
World War in 1915 did not immediately gain global attention in those times. Although this event
42
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made an obvious example of genocide under the conventional definition, it cannot be expected
that every State was or is close enough to the facts of this massacre. Thus, a remote and completely
uninvolved State like, for example, Panama (a signatory State from the first hour of the UNCG)
cannot be expected to condemn a situation from the other edge of the world (though it still may
do so). Turkey, however, a State party to the UNCG since 1950, definitely is in charge. But Turkey
instead conceals the atrocities committed by its predecessor’s troops and even prosecutes any
person naming them genocide. This is nothing else but a grave and flagrant violation of the UNCG.
On the other hand, the Armenian situation is indeed a good (although indeed terribly sad)
example of how a duty to name and shame can be complied with: As mentioned above, Germany
only recently named and shamed the Ottoman massacre against the Armenians as genocide.46 This
was almost 62 years overdue (since Germany’s ratification of the UNCG in 1954), not to mention
that many other States had already recognized the Armenian genocide.47 Moreover, the German
Reich as the predecessor of the Federal Republic of Germany was not only an ally to the Ottoman
Empire but also knew about the atrocities committed and nevertheless omitted to take any effective
measure against them. Thus, Germany was sufficiently close to the actions, which were even well
documented by its own diplomatic staff, and was therefore able to assess the situation properly.
After all, a qualified link cannot be denied. Nevertheless, Germany long refrained from naming
and shaming the Armenian genocide—for political reasons. Such motives cannot justify noncompliance with the duty to prevent genocide. However, after the Bundestag resolution—and a
formal expression of protest by Turkey—the German government (by its press release of September
2, 2016) strengthened its parliament and proved to be willing to condemn genocide seriously.48
The government’s legal opinion was certainly not completely precise when chancellor Angela
Merkel pointed out “that Bundestag resolutions are political in nature and are not legally binding.”
This is only right with respect to questions of State responsibility, which cannot be triggered
retroactively. As seen above, the question of being held accountable for past genocides has to be
split from the question whether such situations fall under the contemporary definition of genocide.
Underlining that there is no connection between claims for compensation under international law49
on the one hand and recognizing genocide on the other hand may even encourage more States to
name and shame past situations as genocide. Perhaps this late perception made it finally easier
for Germany not to do more than finally fulfill its obligation to name and shame the Armenian
situation as genocide. This duty evolved from the conventional duty to prevent genocide.
Conclusion and Outlook
Almost 70 years after the UNCG entered into force, the prevention of genocide is not yet a glorious
chapter in the modern era of international law. After Srebrenica and Rwanda, which awakened the
world to genocide and brought the issue back on the international agenda, annihilations of groups
still take their course. Darfur was largely ignored in 2007; likewise the ongoing genocide against
the Yazidis. But is this really surprising? How can members of the international community50
be legitimized to take effective measures to avert remote attacks against mankind if they fail to
process their past? Naming and shaming past situations of genocide might be painful; it may mean
conceding one’s own (respectively one’s ancestors’) guilt. But in the absence of condemnation,
perpetrators in other parts of the world certainly feel encouraged to carry out atrocities. The UNCG
has recognized that, and demands all States take any possible measure to prevent genocide—
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including to avow past misconduct preventing genocide is indeed not just a but the obligation,
regardless of the focus: Germany and the Herero and Nama,51 the United States and Native
Americans, Australia and Aborigines—there are many more examples around the world. A lot of
work remains to be done, and the object and purpose of Article I UNCG sets that work’s guideline
in an international law context: To prevent future genocide situations can only succeed if the past
is not concealed.
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Discussions about the victims of the genocide against the Tutsi2 in Rwanda tend to focus on the
estimated 500,000 to one million people who were killed between April and July 1994.3 Less attention
is paid to the number of people who were victims of sexual violence, many of whom have survived
to tell their story. This article discusses findings from interviews with 23 Rwandan women who
experienced sexual violence during the genocide and had their cases tried in gacaca community
courts between 2008 and 2012. The interviews explored the women’s needs and motivations to
participate in gacaca, as well as their experiences with the process.
Previous studies of gacaca have assessed victims’ experiences with the courts.4 However, only
a few of these studies focus exclusively on female victim-survivors of sexual violence5 and are
usually limited to gacaca’s information gathering phase, while the research discussed in this article
focuses on gacaca’s trial phase. This research also contributes to a better understanding of what
justice means to victim-survivors of conflict-related sexual violence6 beyond the case of Rwanda,
which, according to Bastick, Grimm and Kunz, is an under-researched topic.7 Various scholars have
conducted research with victims of human rights abuses to explore their “justice needs.”8 Most of
1
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these studies consider victims of violent conflict-related crimes in general,9 but only a few focus
exclusively on victim-survivors. While some of the needs of survivors of violent crime also apply
to victim-survivors,10 the latter have some distinct needs that differ from those of victims of other
human rights abuses.
This article starts with an overview of the role of sexual violence during the genocide in
Rwanda, the functioning of Rwanda’s gacaca court system and the handling of sexual violence
cases at gacaca. This is followed by an introduction to “justice needs” of survivors of sexual violence
and clarification of relevant terminology. The article then analyses two specific justice needs that
were discussed during the research interviews: punishment of perpetrators and perpetrators
taking responsibility for their actions and the harm caused.
Background
Sexual violence during the genocide in Rwanda was widespread and extremely brutal.11 Various
scholars use the term “genocidal sexual violence” to describe the sexual violence committed in
Rwanda in 1994,12 because it was ordered by the leaders of the genocide and specifically targeted
Tutsi women,13 “contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a
whole.”14 250,000 – 500,000 women are estimated to having been raped, primarily by members
of militia groups, government officials and civilians, who were, in many cases, neighbors or even
extended family members of the victim-survivor.15 Acts of sexual violence included rape, sexual

doi:10.1177/1077801205274450, http://vaw.sagepub.com/content/11/5/571.abstract; Kathleen Daly, “Reconceptualizing
Sexual Vicimization and Justice,” in Justice for victims: Perspectives on Rights, Transition and Reconciliation, ed. Inge
Vanfraechem, et al., (London and New York: Routledge, 2014); Nicola Henry, “Witness to Rape: The Limits and
Potential of International War Crimes Trials for Victims of Wartime Sexual Violence,” International Journal of
Transitional Justice 3, no. 1 (2009), accessed October 10, 2017, doi:10.1093/ijtj/ijn036, http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/
content/3/1/114.abstract.
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257-258; Nowrojee, Shattered Lives, 4; Emily Amick, “Trying international crimes on local lawns: the adjudication of
genocide sexual violence crimes in Rwanda’s Gacaca courts,” Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 20, no. 2 (2011), 8; de
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Mr. René Degni-Ségui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, under paragraph 20 of resolution S-3/1 of 25
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The Lancet 360, no. 1 (2002), 17; Françoise Nduwimana, The Right to Survive Sexual Violence, Women and Hiv/Aids
(Montreal: International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, December 2004), 19; Organization
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torture, mutilation, forced incest, sexual slavery and forced “marriage.”16 As a result, affected
women have been suffering from severe physical and psychological consequences, as well as from
social stigma that may attach to survivors of sexual violence.17
In the aftermath of the genocide, the United Nations created the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to prosecute the leaders of the genocide,18 while the majority of
genocide suspects was dealt with by Rwanda’s conventional courts and (from 2002) by the gacaca
court system. Gacaca comprised approximately 11,000 community courts that were established by
the Rwandan government to deal with genocide related crimes.19 In 2002, gacaca started as a pilot
project,20 and in 2005, the courts began operating throughout the country.21 On June 18, 2012, one
decade after its launch, the gacaca jurisdiction was formally closed, having tried nearly two million
cases of around 400,000 genocide suspects during its ten years of existence.22
The Gacaca Courts
The gacaca court system was based on Rwanda’s oldest conflict resolution model (traditional
gacaca),23 and was meant to combine “local conflict resolution traditions with a modern punitive
legal system.”24 Some of the core features of traditional gacaca were continued in modern gacaca.25
These features included the location of gacaca proceedings (usually outside in communal spaces), the
importance of community participation (local people participated as judges, witnesses, parties and
representatives), and links to reconciliation.26 Nevertheless, the modern post-genocide proceedings
reportedly differed in many ways from the former customary courts.27 While traditional gacaca
was typically conducted to settle minor civil disputes,28 modern gacaca, was established to try
genocide suspects, judged by a panel of gacaca judges who were elected by their communities.29

16
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Furthermore, modern gacaca represented a hierarchical state-directed initiative, rather than a grassroots approach like traditional gacaca.30 Finally, modern gacaca applied codified law, documented
in writing, rather than verbally transmitted, customary law.31
The Rwandan government was committed to “end the culture of impunity” and hold
accountable everyone suspected of having contributed to the genocide.32 Penalties for offenses
were determined according to the categorization and sentencing scheme of the gacaca law.33
Choosing gacaca to process the majority of genocide suspects, the Rwandan government had to
make a number of compromises, especially regarding the rights of the accused, qualifications of
gacaca staff and applicable legal standards.34 It was, however, believed that the transparency of the
process and the participation of the community would legitimize the process and protect the rights
of all participants.35
Gacaca functioned as system of three stages: information gathering, classification of genocide
suspects and trial of suspects. During the information gathering stage, gacaca judges (called
inyangamugayo, which means “person of integrity”) and their local communities met once a week
to collect information about victims, perpetrators and crimes committed during the genocide.36 In
the second stage, based on the previously collected information, the judges put together case files
of genocide suspects and categorized their crimes according to their severity.37 Based on a complex
categorization system from Rwanda’s genocide law of 1996,38 gacaca law classified alleged planners
and organizers of the genocide, as well as those accused of rape and sexual torture as category 1
suspects.39 People, who were accused of having been involved in killings and other violent acts
against people, both with and without the intent to kill, were classified as category 2.40 Category 3
comprised acts committed against property.41 During gacaca’s third stage, gacaca judges heard and
judged the cases that had been allocated to their gacaca jurisdiction.42
The Rwandan government introduced gacaca with the aim to end impunity, speed up genocide
trials,43 and promote truth, justice and reconciliation.44 Truth, justice and reconciliation were meant to
30
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31
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32
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38
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the sector level, see Republic of Rwanda, Organic Law No. 16/2004, June 19, 2004, articles 34, 42. Category 1 crimes
were tried by a number of different Rwandan justice initiatives. Initially, category 1 crimes were allocated for trial to
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After the genocide, approximately 120,000 suspects “were arrested and provisionally detained for the crime of Genocide
and other crimes against humanity,” see Republic of Rwanda, Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 14.
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be supported by a number of measures, including gacaca’s participatory and communal structure.45
Another important tool to foster reconciliation were special procedures for confessions, guilty
pleas, repentance and apologies specified in gacaca law.46 These procedures allowed for reduced
sentences for the majority of those who pleaded guilty.47 Opinions of survivors and scholars differ
in how far the guilty plea procedures contributed to reconciliation. Amstutz explains that many
survivors have expressed willingness to forgive perpetrators who confessed and apologized.48
Other survivors have reportedly criticized that perpetrators did not show genuine remorse but
only made use of the guilty plea rule to reduce their sentence.49
While gacaca included some restorative elements aimed at fostering reconciliation,50 various
scholars argue that the retributive nature of the courts prevailed by far and may have hampered
reconciliation.51 Another obstacle affecting the reconciliation process was the lack of compensation
for personal injury of genocide. Overall, gacaca had only limited provisions in terms of reparations.52
These provisions mainly applied to lower level crimes and consisted of symbolic reparations and
compensation for loss of property, including monetary compensation and unpaid labor.53 Gacaca
did not enable reparations for victim-survivors, which has frequently been criticized by a range of
audiences, including genocide survivors, scholars and aid organizations.54
Sexual Violence in Gacaca
Until 2008, rape and sexual torture committed during the genocide were not tried by gacaca courts,
but were dealt with by Rwanda’s national courts, since they were classified as category 1 crimes.55
humanity; to eradicate the culture of impunity; to strengthen unity and reconciliation among Rwandans; to prove the
Rwandans’ capacity to solve their own problems, Republic of Rwanda, Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 33.
45
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However, during the information gathering stage of gacaca,56 the community courts were
functioning as the prosecution and were collecting information about perpetrators, victims and
crimes committed during the genocide.57 This information included evidence relating to sexual
violence cases that would later be referred to in Rwanda’s national courts.58 During the information
gathering stage of gacaca’s pilot phase, affected women and other community members, including
perpetrators, could publicly raise cases of sexual violence at gacaca hearings. According to Kaitesi,
“a great deal was spoken about sexual torture” during these first years of gacaca.59 All Rwandans
were by law required to participate in gacaca,60 which may have prompted some affected women
and other community members to talk about sexual violence. Nevertheless, while an estimated
250,000 to 500,000 women were raped during the genocide, less than 7000 cases of sexual violence
have reportedly been brought to the Rwandan justice system.61 These figures demonstrate that
most survivors of sexual violence did not raise their case during gacaca. Several reasons are likely to
have contributed to the silence of many survivors of sexual violence, including shame,62 as well as
fear of re-traumatization,63 stigma and marginalization,64 or being unable or unwilling to identify
the perpetrator.65
In 2008, amendments were made to gacaca law, transferring competency from the national
courts to gacaca to try cases of sexual violence.66 According to Kaitesi and Haveman, “about
7000 cases of rape and sexual torture were tried by 17,000 judges … in 1,900 gacaca tribunals”
56

Information about the genocide was collected at gacaca between the 18th June 2002 (when the first gacaca courts of the
pilot project were launched) and the 30th June 2006; see Republic of Rwanda, Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 53, 87.

57

Republic of Rwanda, Organic Law No. 40/2000, article 34.
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Ibid.; Kaitesi, Genocidal Gender and Sexual Violence, 209.

59

Kaitesi, Genocidal Gender and Sexual Violence, 208.

60

Republic of Rwanda, Organic Law No. 16/2004, article 29.

61

According to Kaitesi, about 7000 cases of sexual violence were tried at gacaca; see Kaitesi, Genocidal Gender and Sexual
Violence, 385. Amick reports more specifically that 6608 cases of rape and sexual torture were transferred to gacaca
jurisdiction in 2008; Amick, Trying International Crimes on Local Lawns, 3, citing Republic of Rwanda, Gacaca Courts
Process: Implementation and Achievement (The National Service of Gacaca Courts, 2008). Before the referral of these
6608 cases to gacaca in 2008, sexual violence cases were dealt with by gacaca’s ordinary courts. HRW reports that 32
cases including charges of sexual violence were heard before the ordinary courts between 1996 and 2003, see Human
Rights Watch, Struggling to Survive: Barriers to Justice for Rape Victims in Rwanda, (New York: Women’s Rights Division,
2004), 18. This is also supported by Amnesty International who refer to an interview with the women’s rights
organization Haguruka in March 2004, reporting that “significantly less than 100 women” had their cases of sexual
violence tried by an ordinary court by 2004; Amnesty International, Rwanda: “Marked for Death,”16.

62

Kaitesi, Genocidal Gender and Sexual Violence, 210; Usta Kaitesi and Roelof Haveman, “Prosecution of Genocidal Rape and
Sexual Torture before the Gacaca Tribunals in Rwanda,” in Victimological Approaches to International Crimes: Africa, ed.
Rianne Letschert, et al. (Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland: Intersentia, 2011), 399; Uwigabye, Gacaca and the Treatment of Sexual
Offenses, 275.
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Many of those women whose cases were discussed publicly at a gacaca hearing suffered episodes of severe trauma, see
Karen Brounéus, “Truth-Telling as Talking Cure? Insecurity and Retraumatization in the Rwandan Gacaca Courts,”
Security Dialogue 39, no. 1 (2008). See also Wells, Gender, Sexual Violence and Prospects for Justice at the Gacaca Courts
in Rwanda. In the course of gacaca, the Rwandan government recognised the (re-) traumatisation potential of gacaca
and made various changes to the law to better protect women’s confidentiality and support them during the process.
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See Nowrojee, Shattered Lives, 3; AVEGA-AGAHOZO, Survey on Violence against Women in Rwanda, 22; Waldorf,
Transitional Justice and DDR, 20. Amnesty International explains that derogatory attitudes of both men and women
towards survivors of rape are deeply entrenched in Rwanda and that Rwandan women who were exposed as
survivors of rape were isolated from their communities, experiencing humiliations by men, women and children,
including their own families, Amnesty International, Rwanda: “Marked for Death,” 5. See also Christopher W. Mullins,
“‘We Are Going to Rape You and Taste Tutsi Women’: Rape during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide,” The British Journal of
Criminology 49, no. 6 (2009), 725.
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Many women were raped by strangers and the women could not report them at gacaca, since the perpetrators’ identities
were unknown.
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Republic of Rwanda, Organic Law No. 13/2008, article 1. More specifically, the changes made to gacaca law assigned
competency to gacaca to try most remaining category 1 cases, of which the majority were cases of rape and sexual
torture. 9352 category 1 cases plus 1265 additional cases from the Ordinary and Military Courts were transferred to
gacaca in 2008, see Republic of Rwanda, Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 208. According to Amick, these cases included 6608
cases of rape and sexual torture; Amick, Trying international crimes on local lawns, 3, citing Republic of Rwanda, Gacaca
Courts Process: Implementation and Achievement (The National Service of Gacaca Courts, 2008).
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between mid-2008 and mid-2009.67 As opposed to the usually public gacaca proceedings, all trials
that included charges of sexual violence were held in camera.68 An in camera trial required the
participation of five specially trained gacaca judges,69 the victim-survivor and the defendant(s) (in
cases where defendants had fled the country, trials could be held in absentia).70 Furthermore, the
attendance of gacaca court supervisors, security officers and a trauma counselor to accompany the
victim-survivor was permitted.71 Outside observers of gacaca trials dealing with sexual violence
were not allowed and gacaca documents on sexual violence are currently not publicly available.72
Therefore, “little first-hand data exists on how [these] trials were handled.”73 Since gacaca judges
and trauma counselors are bound by confidentiality,74 only the victim-survivors themselves can
currently provide information on what happened during these trials. Therefore, the research
discussed in this article provides unique information on the gacaca process and judgments reached.
Justice Needs of Survivors of Sexual Violence
Research shows that victims who have suffered gross human rights abuses need to experience a sense
of justice.75 If victims do not feel that justice has been achieved, they may suffer a range of potential
repercussions, including self or other harm, depression and aggression.76 That said, achieving
justice for victims is a great challenge. Bastick et al. point out that justice is “simultaneously personal
to each individual survivor, an issue for entire communities, and has national and international
dimensions and there are tensions inherent in locating justice in these different spaces.”77 Van der
Merwe stipulates that evaluating justice for victims should go beyond the question of whether
a perpetrator has been “sufficiently” punished, but should also consider other elements such as
vindication of the victim, information about why and how the victim became victimized, as well as
opportunities for victims to regain control, power and a sense of meaning in society.78 Researchers
such as Lambourne and Mani also propose different types of justice that go beyond legal justice
or punishment and that are relevant for meeting the needs of victims of genocide and other mass
violence.79
67

Kaitesi and Haveman, Prosecution of Genocidal Rape, 385.
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Republic of Rwanda, Organic Law No. 13/2008, article 6; Kaitesi, Genocidal Gender and Sexual Violence, 232. The
regulations concerning the in camera trials were established in response to complaints and episodes of trauma
experienced by women during public gacaca proceedings, see ibid., 7, 218, 232.
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Hugo Van der Merwe, “Delivering Justice during Transition: Reserach Challenges,” in Assessing the impact of transitional
justice: challenges for empirical research, ed. Hugo Van der Merwe, et al. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of
Peace Press, 2009), 123; Bastick et al, Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict, 165; Rama Mani, “Integral Justice for Victims,”
in Justice for victims, ed. Inge Vanfraechem, Antony Pemberton, and Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda (London and New York:
Routledge, 2016), 183; Wendy Lambourne, “Transformative justice, reconciliation and peacebuilding,” in Transitional
Justice Theories ed. Susanne Buckley-Zistel, et al. (London: Routledge,, 2014), 23-32; Jo-Anne Wemmers, “Victims’ Need
for Justice. Individual versus Collective Justice,” in Victimological Approaches to International Crimes: Africa, ed. Rianne
Letschert, et al. (Cambridge, Antwerp, and Portland: Intersentia, 2011), 145.
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Mani, Integral Justice for Victims, 183.
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Bastick et al, Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict, 165.
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Van der Merwe, Delivering Justice during Transition, 123.
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Rama Mani, Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War (Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press and Blackwell
Publishers Inc, 2002); Rama Mani, Integral Justice for Victims. Based on interviews with survivors of genocide and other
mass violence, Lambourne found that socio-economic justice, political justice, truth and acknowledgement were also
important in addition to punishment or legal justice; Lambourne, Transformative Justice, Reconciliation and Peacebuilding.
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Studies undertaken with victim-survivors in various contexts have identified several justice
interests that are specific to survivors of sexual violence. These justice interests include voice (tell
their story and be heard), participation, validation, vindication, accountability of perpetrators
(which includes perpetrators taking responsibility) and punishment.80 At the same time, Daly
argues that justice interests of survivors of sexual violence is “an emergent and untested construct,”
requiring further research.81 This article adds evidence to further develop the construct by analyzing
the needs, motivations and experiences of 23 Rwandan women who participated in gacaca. The
article focuses on two specific justice interests that emerged during the interviews: punishment
and perpetrators taking responsibility. Both terms are discussed below to clarify their meaning in
this article.
Punishment
Research indicates that punishment is important for some victim-survivors. For example, in
Sharratt’s study with victim-survivors who testified before the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the War Crimes Court (WCC) in Bosnia and Herzegovina,82
over 75% of the women claimed that the main reason for their participation was “because rape
and sexual assault is a crime and needs to be punished.”83 In contrast, Nowrojee, who conducted
research with victim-survivors who participated at the ICTR, comments that “punishment… [was]
astonishingly the least articulate reasons for why Rwandan women wanted and valued ICTR
prosecutions of rape.”84
From a legal point of view, punishment may be imposed for various reasons, including
retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence and incapacitation.85 Punishment, from the point of view of
a victim-survivor, may be valued for similar and /or other reasons, depending on the survivor’s
personal situation and context.86
A retributive approach to punishment assumes that the perpetrator “owes a debt” and
deserves to be punished.87 As part of a retributive approach, guilt is “established and appropriate
consequences (punishment) determined.”88 As a general principle, “appropriate consequences”
requires punishment to be “proportionate to the amount of harm done.”89 Research shows that in
cases where victim-survivors viewed punishment as too light, the punishment was perceived as a
minimization of the victim-survivors’ suffering.90 Therefore, from a victim-survivor’s perspective,
80

Daly, Reconceptualizing Sexual Vicimization and Justice, 388; Koss, Restoring Rape Survivors, 209; Herman, Justice From the
Victim’s Perspective; Henry, Witness to Rape; Sara Sharratt, Gender, Shame and Sexual Violence (Farnham and Burlington:
ASHGATE, 2011); Binaifer Nowrojee, “’Your Justice Is Too Slow’ Will the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Fail Rwanda’s Rape Victims?,” in Gendered Peace, ed. Donna Pankhurst (New York and Oxon: Routlege & UNRISD,
2008); Uwigabye, Gacaca and the Treatment of Sexual Offenses.
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also dealt with conflict-related sexual violence. Both tribunals contributed significantly to the recognition of sexual
violence and rape in the categories war crimes, torture, crimes against humanity and genocide.
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concept of punishment as a so-called debt to society found little support among … [the women interviewed for the
research]”, Herman, Justice From the Victim’s Perspective, 590.
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(London and Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications Limited, 2013), 352.
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Pennsylvania Press 2008), 44.
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punishment may serve as a personal means of validation of the harm experienced, which may or
may not be commensurate with the legal measure of retribution.
A victim-survivor’s demand for punishment may be driven by underlying interests and needs
associated with specific types of punishment.91 For example, various studies have shown that
punishment of the perpetrator in the form of imprisonment was linked to needs for safety of self
and others, since some survivors feared that their perpetrator was likely to re-offend in the future.92
Perpetrators Taking Responsibility
Various studies have identified that it is important for victims that their perpetrators take
active responsibility for their actions and the harm caused.93 Taking active responsibility can be
demonstrated by expressions of sincere regret and remorse, for example by way of an apology.94 Van
der Merwe suggests that taking responsibility may also involve perpetrators paying reparations
to the victim.95 Perpetrators may also assume responsibility by giving accounts for their actions,96
which includes an explanation of what the perpetrator did and why he/she did it.97 Perpetrators
may assume responsibility for their actions in front of a court or other official instance,98 or it may
involve accountability to the survivor and/or their communities.99
Some studies involving victim-survivors show that perpetrators taking responsibility is an
important justice interest of at least some affected victim-survivors.100 For example, in Herman’s
study, some victim-survivors “expressed a fervent wish for a sincere apology and believed that
this would be the most meaningful restitution the offender could give.”101 At the same time, the
topic of perpetrators taking responsibility appears to be less discussed than other justice interests
in relevant literature.
Methodology
The research discussed in this article involved semi-structured interviews with 23 Rwandan
women who met the following criteria: 1) The woman had experienced sexual violence during the
genocide and 2) the woman had her case tried by a gacaca court.102 All women had their cases tried
91

Herman, Justice From the Victim’s Perspective.

92

de Brouwer and Ruvebana, The Legacy of the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda: Survivors’ Views, 951; Ibid., 595. In her study
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by a desire for financial restitution, the survivor’s safety and vindication. Herman highlights in her analysis that the
majority of survivors interviewed had not raised their case to seek retribution, but to be vindicated, ibid., 590.
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accountability to refer to perpetrators taking active responsibility. Other scholars have used other terms to refer to
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acknowledgement; see Wendy Lambourne and Vivianna Rodriguez Carreon, “Engendering Transitional Justice: a
Transformative Approach to Building Peace and Attaining Human Rights for Women,” Human Rights Review (2015),
27-28.
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Two Rwandan professionals who worked with genocide survivors assisted in identifying women who met the selection
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in urban and rural locations in two different areas of Rwanda.103 The women were aged between 42
and 68; only one had a monthly income.
The methodology of this research was informed by phenomenological and feminist approaches
to research, which assisted in responding to challenges associated with qualitative research involving
vulnerable groups.104 Interview questions aimed at eliciting the women’s motivations, expectations
and needs when raising their case at gacaca and the impact of participating in the process from the
women’s point of view. The women were also encouraged to describe in detail what happened
during and after their gacaca trial. All interviews were conducted by the author of this article,
assisted by a Kinyarwanda-English interpreter, since the author did not speak Kinyarwanda.105 The
Kinyarwanda responses were later transcribed and translated by a Kinyarwanda-English translator
for the purpose of this analysis.106
Themes
The women’s motivations to raise their case at gacaca were diverse, including hopes for punishment,
perpetrators taking responsibility (particularly by way of apology / asking for forgiveness), truth
and reparations, including medical and financial support. The following discussion focuses on the
women’s views on punishment and perpetrators taking responsibility.107
Punishment
Punishment was a topic discussed by all 23 women at some stage during the interview. About
half of the women spoke about punishment when asked what they had hoped and/or expected
to achieve by raising their case at gacaca. All but one woman reported that at least one of their
perpetrators (many women had raised cases that involved multiple perpetrators)108 was found
guilty and punished, predominantly with life imprisonment.109 When sexual violence cases were
tried at gacaca, life imprisonment (with special provisions) constituted the maximum penalty
according to gacaca law.110 Some perpetrators received reduced sentences of 25-30 years since they
the professionals were encouraged to pass on the information about the study to other women who they knew met
the selection criteria.
103

Further details regarding geographical location of interviews are withheld for security and confidentiality reasons.

104

The research methodology used for this research is outlined in Judith Herrmann, “Experiences, challenges, and lessons
learned - interviewing Rwandan survivors of sexual violence,” Griffith Journal of Law & Human Dignity 5, no. 1 (2017).
The article explains in detail how the research met Rwandan and international standards, how interview participants
were identified and invited, how consent was gained, how the interviews were conducted, how rapport was
established and how other ethical and practical challenges were addressed.
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into English by the interpreter.
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For example, informant M16 had raised her case against 30 individuals; interview conducted with M16, December 29,
2015.
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her perpetrator was first sentenced to life imprisonment but was then acquitted in an appeals process.
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In the very early stages of gacaca, the maximum penalty was the death penalty. However, according to Amnesty
International, ‘the last death sentences were imposed in 2003’, while ‘the [first and] last executions took place in 1998,
see Amnesty International, “Rwanda: Abolition of the Death Penalty,” (public statement July 27, 2007). Brehm, Uggen,
and Gasanabo report that after 1998, executions reportedly stopped, and the death penalty was officially abolished in
2007, Brehm et al, Genocide, Justice, and Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts, 348. As per Republic of Rwanda, Organic Law 31/2007
of July 25, 2007, the death penalty was substituted by life imprisonment or life imprisonment with special provisions.
These special provisions include that 1) “a convicted person is not entitled to any king of mercy, conditional release or
rehabilitation, unless he/she has served at least twenty (20) years of imprisonment”, and 2) that “a convicted person
is kept in isolation.”About half of the women interviewed for this research went through appeals processes, some of
them initiated by the perpetrator, some initiated by the women themselves since they had not been satisfied with the
outcome of their first trial. Many cases had initially ended with the acquittal of the perpetrator/s and only the appeals
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had pleaded guilty during the trial.111
Many women expressed positive feelings about their perpetrators being punished, such as
M22.112
M22: I was happy about [the sentence, which was life in prison].
Interpreter (I): Why were you happy about it?
M22: Whenever someone has committed a crime against you and they get punished for it,
it makes you happy.113

M22 had raised charges of sexual violence against seven men. All men had denied these charges
but had been found guilty by the gacaca judges and sentenced to life imprisonment in solitary
confinement. M22 had raised her case in gacaca, because “she wanted the criminals to pay” for what
they had done.
It appeared that for some women, the punishment of the perpetrator was something that stood
out for them as a positive experience at gacaca. One woman (M7) had been raped and assaulted
by two men who both received a life sentence. While M7 had submitted her case at gacaca with
the main objective to expose the truth about what had happened during the genocide, she valued
the punishment of her perpetrators above all. When asked to reflect on gacaca and describe any
positive experience, M7 explained: “I was happy about the fact that the people who hurt me were
found and punished. That is what made me happy.”114
Some of the women alluded that they were satisfied with the penalty handed out by the gacaca
judges, such as M21. M21 had been raped by 20 men. While some of them had fled the country,
eight suspects were tried at gacaca. All defendants denied the charges but were sentenced to life
imprisonment with special provisions. M21 had raised her case since she “wanted the people who
had killed our family members and raped us to be punished”. When asked how she felt about the
life sentence, M21 explained:
I was happy with [the sentence of life imprisonment] because that is the biggest sentence you can
get in Rwanda. They have abolished the death penalty, so I had to be okay with that sentence.115

For M21, as for some other women, it appeared to be important that her perpetrators had received
the maximum penalty according to Rwandan law.
While most women considered the prison sentences that their perpetrators had received as
appropriate, one woman (M20) commented that even the highest possible penalty was inadequate
to capture the harm that she had experienced:
I feel like they were given a serious sentence [life in prison] even though it does not match
the fact that they killed my family and did horrible things to me. There is not a sentence big
enough to match what they did to me.116

trial resulted in a guilty verdict.
111

As per the Organic Law of 2007, defendants found guilty of rape and sexual torture were punished with life
imprisonment if they refused to confess or if their guilty plea was rejected. If the defendant had pleaded guilty after
being included on the list of suspects, the prison sentenced ranged from 25 to 30 years. If the defendants had pleaded
guilty before being included on the list of suspects, the prison sentenced ranged from 20 to 24 years, see Republic of
Rwanda, Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 101-103.
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Interview conducted with M20, January 4, 2016.
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M20 had been raped and viciously sexually tortured by at least ten men, of whom many were her
neighbours. Her perpetrators raped her and sexually ridiculed her in front of a group of schoolboys
to “demonstrate to those kids how to rape a woman.” M20 explained that she had not submitted
her case herself, but “had been summoned in front of the gacaca court by force” after her rape had
been exposed by some people in prison.
Two of the women whose perpetrators had received less than a life sentence – they had been
sentenced to 28 and 30 years in prison – were not fully satisfied with the verdict in their cases,
since they thought the penalties were too lenient.117 M17 had submitted her case at gacaca because
she had been “promised that those who had committed crimes were going to be punished.”118
M17 had been raped and assaulted by several perpetrators, but could only indict two of them.119
One of them had fled the country; the other one was sentenced to 30 years in prison. M17 did not
feel that the sentence of 30 years was enough. Instead, she “wanted him to go to prison for life.”120
M17 mentioned during her interview that she was scared that her perpetrator would return home
and murder her, which might have been the reason why she had hoped for a life sentence of her
perpetrator.121
While for most women the punishment of their perpetrators was crucially important, not all
women appreciated the prison sentence of their perpetrators in the same manner. For example, one
woman (M9) explained:
The prosecution can find evidence to convict someone without them having to confess but
it does not make me happy. I did not think that sending people to prison was my main
objective.122

M9 had not submitted her case herself, but her community had done so during the informationgathering phase of gacaca. M9 had been raped by several men, but only three of them were
known to her. Gacaca acquitted two of them of the rape charges, but sentenced the third one,
who had fled the country, in absentia to 30 years. Before fleeing the country, the perpetrator
had visited M9 and had asked her for forgiveness. Instead of punishment of her perpetrators,
M9 was hoping for someone to facilitate a meeting to enable an exchange of apology
and forgiveness:
The government has all the rights to punish their people the way they feel is right. I do not
give orders to the government but if I were the commander, I would tell them to forgive him.
I just wish that we could have someone who could organize that we meet with those people.
They should help us come together and they would ask us for forgiveness and we would
forgive them. We would have good relationships after that.123

Those women who appreciated the punishment of their perpetrators provided diverse insights
into why the sentence was important to them. Several women explained that the punishment in the
form of imprisonment helped to provide some psychological and physical safety. For example, one
woman (M8), whose perpetrator had been sentenced to life imprisonment, explained:

117

This is consistent with Henry’s research with survivors of sexual violence who testified at the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY): light sentencing represented a minimisation of suffering of the women, see
Henry, Witness to Rape, 131.
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The other perpetrators were unknown to M17, which is why she could not include them in her case at gacaca.
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Interview conducted with M17, December 29, 2015.
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Further below, this article discusses why women appreciated specific punishments, including for reasons of safety and
validation.
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Interview conducted with M9, December 28, 2015.
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Ibid.
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Gacaca has put him away and I was relieved because every time I saw him, I thought that he
was probably going to hurt me again. I sometimes feared to walk on the street because I did
not want to cross paths with him.124

While M8 had submitted her case because she “wanted … [her perpetrator] to be punished,” she
had also hoped that he “would ask … [her] for forgiveness in front of the authorities so that they
could be aware of it.” However, the perpetrator of M8 neither confessed nor apologized.
Several women mentioned the need for retribution and commented that it was important to
them that wrongdoing was sanctioned. For example, one woman explained:
I was kept strong by the idea that justice was coming to help Rwandans… I see justice as
helping someone suffering from injustice. The person who is found guilty of a crime needs to
be punished and the one who is not found guilty should go home… Whoever has committed
a crime needs to be punished for it.125

Another woman (M14) explained:
I wanted them to punish him. I wanted to make sure that he gets punished for what he did
to me. I was living in sorrow and I wanted to be sure that we have some laws to protect us.126

M14 was nineteen years old when her perpetrator had raped and assaulted her in front of her
mother and some other women. After the assault, her perpetrator had threatened that he would
return to rape her and finally kill her. M14 survived because she fled from the area and hid in the
country until it was safe enough for her to return.
In the eyes of some women, the sanctioning of wrongdoing was important for various reasons,
including to vindicate the victims, as well as to demonstrate that the culture of impunity had been
stopped and the rule of law had been re-established in Rwanda. For example, one woman (M13)
explained:
There were two positive things that happened during gacaca even though they are not that
positive. Seeing the person who has hurt you being punished is one and the fact that the
people understood that whoever commits a crime is going to be punished is the second one.
During the genocide, they were saying that it was the end for the Tutsis, and for a while
we thought that there was never going to be anyone to vindicate us or follow up on what
happened to us.127

Another woman commented that the sanctioning of wrongdoing helped to facilitate the coexistence of perpetrators and survivors:
…Whoever has committed a crime needs to be punished for it. The culture of impunity
needs to be abolished… There is no longer a feeling of guilt because those who were found
guilty of crimes have realized that it was something they should not have done to another
human being in the first place. If the person was sentenced to some time in prison and they
have come out, when you meet on the street, they say hello to you and they continue their
way and you go on your way.128

124

Interview conducted with M8, December 28, 2015.

125

Interview conducted with M6, December 19, 2015.
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Interview conducted with M14, December 29, 2015.
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Interview conducted with M13, December 29, 2015.
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Interview conducted with M7, December 19, 2015.
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Some women commented that the punishment of sexual violence at gacaca helped to validate the
harm they had experienced and supported their vindication. For example, one woman explained:
One day, the gacaca courts were introduced. I still did not feel human yet at that point. People
later understood that rape is a crime that cannot be forgiven. Before that, they would ridicule
me and make me feel like it was my fault. People finally got to realize that rape was a serious
crime and that it was punishable by law. People used to talk about it as a hot topic and they
would make fun of me. They would tell everyone in the neighborhood about it and those
people would tell me.129

M15 had been raped in front of her community by a group of young men from her neighborhood.
Some of them were her neighbor’s sons who she used to feed at her house before the genocide.
Another woman (M1), whose perpetrator had been sentenced to life imprisonment,130 said:
Gacaca went well. I was really upset by the first trial, but I got justice during the appeal. I
was not even interested in getting some reparation for the disability he gave me. I had had
enough with people whispering about me because I had been raped. People took it as if I was
a prostitute… I am happy that he was punished. People were accusing us of being sluts who
would have sex with men during the genocide.131

M1 had been gang raped by a group of man, of which she knew only one man. She had been
suffering from the direct repercussions of the assault as well as from the reactions of her community
to the rape. She explained that the one perpetrator whom she knew
would go and brag about it to people. He would always tell them that he has another wife
who he has sex with in the bushes. Those people whom I asked for refuge started rubbing in
my face that the man who raped me was always bragging about it to them.

M1 explained that she had been married before she was raped, but her husband left her and
remarried because he could not accept what had happened to his wife.132 The two comments of
M15 and M1 demonstrate that in the women’s view, the punishment of their perpetrators relieved
the women from the allegation that they were responsible themselves for what had happened to
them and that they had willingly offered sexual services to the other side.133
Many women commented on the impact that the punishment of their perpetrator had on their
lives. Women’s views on this impact were diverse. Several women explained that the punishment
of their perpetrator in form of imprisonment provided some safety, such as M8:
I used to feel scared of meeting him on the street, while I would be walking with my husband,
but I no longer have to worry about that because of gacaca. It has lifted a weight off my
shoulder. There was no other way for me to have some peace of mind, except maybe if I fled
and went somewhere far away. Gacaca was important to me because it has brought a sense
of security and I can go and live anywhere without fearing for my life.134

129

Interview conducted with M15, December 29, 2015.
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Even though M1 had been gang raped, only one of her perpetrators was known to her. Therefore, she could submit her
case only against that one man at gacaca.

131

Interview conducted with M1, December 18, 2015.
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Ibid.
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Similarly, Nowrojee had found in her interviewees with Rwandan survivors of sexual violence who testified at the
ICTR that they wanted the ICTR to condemn the violence committed against them and to acknowledge that “as rape
survivors … [the women] did not collaborate willingly with genocidaires who kept them alive to rape,” Nowrojee,
Your Justice Is Too Slow, 111.
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Interview conducted with M8, December 28, 2015.
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Similarly, M14, whose perpetrator was sentenced to life imprisonment, explained:
I used to always be on edge that he would come after me. His sentence reassured me that he
would never come back.135

Even though not all prison sentences imposed by gacaca could be executed because many
perpetrators had fled Rwanda, already the sentencing in absentia had a positive impact on women’s
psychological state. For example, M3 had been raped by three men at different times during the
genocide. She had raised her case against only one of her perpetrators.136 Since he had fled the
country, he was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment. When asked how she felt about the
judgment of her perpetrator, M3 responded:
I was happy to hear it. He has committed the crime and even though he was not present,137
I was happy to hear that he was being sentenced. I was relieved from a burden that I was
carrying.138

M3’s reaction to the verdict in her case shows that for some women the condemnation of the
violence, expressed by the life sentence, might be more or just as important as the actual execution
of the punishment to vindicate the victim-survivor.
Some women commented on further positive psychological effects that the sentencing of their
perpetrator had on their recovery, including strength, motivation and the ability to forgive. For
example, one woman (M16) explained:
I was happy and [the punishment] assured me that my life was able to keep moving on to
the extent that I started to feel confident enough to take on something big such as defending
other people. It provided me with more strength and I work hard today. It created a positive
result.139

M16 had been kept in house with 30 other women and their children, who were raped daily over
an extended period. All women and children were killed at one point in time except from M16.
She had raised her case “to get rid of the stigma… [she] was experiencing from everyone around…
[her]” and to “fight for justice in the name of all the victims… [she] was with”. M16 had submitted
her case against a group of 30 men who were all sentenced to life imprisonment with special
provisions.140 M16 worked as a gacaca judge herself and assisted other survivors or sexual violence
to report their cases. Furthermore, she was involved in creating a support group for genocide
survivors.
The comments of some women suggest that the feeling of safety due to the imprisonment of
their perpetrators supported their psychological recovery. For example, M8, who had previously
spoken about her fear of meeting her perpetrator in the street, explained:
Gacaca came and sent them all to prison and that helped me so much and it gave me peace of
mind. That was the reason why I started thinking clearly and realized that I have to forgive.141

135

Interview conducted with M14, December 29, 2015.

136

One of her perpetrators had apologized to her after the genocide and M3 did not report him at gacaca; another
perpetrator had died.

137

The accused had fled the Rwanda prior to the gacaca trial but was sentenced in absentia.

138

Interview conducted with M3, December 18, 2015.

139

Interview conducted with M16, December 29, 2015.

140

About half of the perpetrators had fled the country and were sentenced in absentia. 14 were present at the trial. Initially,
all men had been acquitted, but M16 appealed the judgment 4 times. The 5th and final appeals court concluded with
the sentencing of all defendants.

141

Interview conducted with M8, December 28, 2015. Most women discussed the topic of forgiveness at some stage during
their interview, which the author is planning to analyse in a separate publication.
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Those women who felt that the sentences given to their perpetrators were too lenient appeared
to suffer emotionally from the outcome of their trials, since the verdict did not validate their
experiences in the way they had hoped and/ or did not fully alleviate their concerns for safety. For
example, M17, whose perpetrator was sentenced to 30 years and not to life imprisonment as hoped
by M17, explained:
As a Christian, I am okay with forgiving them so that they can come back home but then
again, I am worried about my future. I am not able to work as I should. I am also worried
that if they came back home, they would murder us... I was stabbed when they were raping
me. I was trying to fight them and they stabbed me. That hurts me so much. That feeling is
never going to leave me. I am not able to work and I need to earn a living. That is what makes
me so upset. When it comes to the law, if it is their time to get out of jail, they will have to go
home and there is nothing I can do about that.142

The woman whose perpetrator was first convicted but then acquitted in an appeals process spoke
about how devastating the second trial and its outcome was for her:
When I went back to trial, they did not believe what I was saying. They made me feel like
I was crazy… I was not happy with the court’s second verdict. They concluded that the
man was not guilty… The people in his family and the other people who were in the attack
defended him and gave him an alibi… I cannot find anything good to say about Gacaca
because they would choose some of their own people and say that they did not participate
in attacks and they would become members of the jury.143

While many women spoke about the positive impact of the judgment of their perpetrator on their
own recovery, some of the women explained that punishment alone did not satisfy the needs
associated with the harm caused by the sexual violence, including medical assistance and other
forms of reparations. For example, when asked about how she felt about the life sentence of her
perpetrator, one woman explained:
No happiness can come out of this situation. I felt relieved though, because [before] I
would see him on the street and feel scared. My problems did not stop when he went to
jail. We just have to hang in there, but the truth is that those people have stripped us of our
dignity.
I: What problems are you talking about?
M19: Being raped has left me handicapped… We were lucky to have some military doctors
come here to give us some medical care… I had a small rock that was stuck in my ear from
that time… When that horrible man was raping me, he threw my back out. Those military
doctors helped us a lot. They removed that rock and I am now able to hear from that ear.
They also fixed my back and it is now better. I was mentally broken after the trial, but I am
doing better now.144

Another woman (M11) explained:
Gacaca happened and the criminals were sent to jail but nothing else happened… We did
not have the right to claim any reparations at that time. They would just tell us that we have
had our case and that was it. We did not have anyone to represent us and claim that for us.
Whenever the trial would be over, that would be the end of it. They would bring the criminal
to prison and we would go back home. 145
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Interview conducted with M17, December 29, 2015.

143

Interview conducted with M4, December 19, 2015.

144

Interview conducted with M19, January 4, 2016.

145

Interview conducted with M11, December 28, 2015.
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Like M11, several other women mentioned that they had hoped for gacaca to enable reparations or
various forms of support.
Perpetrators Taking Responsibility
Many women spoke about the need to hear confessions, apologies and requests for forgiveness,
which are summarized under “perpetrators taking responsibility” in this article. Some women also
spoke about wanting perpetrators to explain their actions or feel ashamed for what they had done,
which also fits the concept of taking responsibility, but this was discussed to a lesser extent.
Out of the 23 women, 17 explained that at least one of their perpetrators denied all charges
against him and did thus not assume any responsibility. Less than half of all women spoke about
at least one of their perpetrators confessing, apologizing or asking them for forgiveness. Women
placed high value on when, where and how their perpetrator assumed responsibility, including
whether it was done before, during or after gacaca, whether other people were present or not, and
whether the women perceived the demonstration of responsibility as genuine or as a strategy of the
perpetrator to reduce his gacaca sentence. Some women did not accept the confession, apology or
request for forgiveness voiced by their perpetrator, because the women did not consider the time,
forum, circumstances or reasons to be appropriate. Several women explained that in their view
their perpetrators only pretended to take responsibility to avoid or reduce their prison sentence.
For example, one woman explained:
He then kneeled down in court and started apologizing. I asked them to consider all the
years that had gone by from 1994 to 2008 and he was only asking for forgiveness because we
were in court. They asked him why he decided to rape me and what he wanted to get out of
it, and all he said was that he was sorry and he understood that he had committed a big crime
and that he wanted me to forgive him. In the meantime, before the trial started, he had sent
someone to me to ask me what I wanted. He wanted to buy my silence with money. When
he asked me for forgiveness, I thought about the fact that I could have died, that I was lucky
to still be alive, that he could have ruined my life and left me to deal with the consequences,
and I did not say anything. I told him that he had so much time where he could have asked
me to forgive him and he only sent someone to me after hearing that there was a letter. He
did not come to me on his own will.146

Other women highlighted that a confession, apology or request for forgiveness voiced in private
was not acceptable to them, since they viewed it as a strategy of their perpetrator to prevent the
truth about them to come out. For example, one woman said:
My aggressor was an Adventist. I asked around and found out that he was an Adventist and
that he was a pastor. He was disguising as a good person and I wanted to expose him in front
of God. He sent some members of his church to beg me to forgive him and keep quiet and I
refused. I told those people what he had done to me and the number of people he had killed.
I needed them to know who their pastor really was. I did not expect anything more. I just
wanted him to pay for what he had done to me. I had begged him to pardon me [during the
genocide] and he didn’t. I was not going to forgive him either.147

As indicated by this comment, it was important to many women that their perpetrators assumed
responsibility in public and not only in private.
Some women wanted to know from their perpetrators why they had been targeted, which
appeared to help the women assess whether their perpetrators were willing to assume active
responsibility. For example, M13 had submitted her case against a group of men “so that she could
ask them why they did what they did to… [her].”148
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Interview conducted with M6, December 19, 2015.

147

Interview conducted with M19, January 4, 2016.

148

Interview conducted with M13, December 29, 2015.
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M13: I asked them that questions… and they would just tell me that it was Satan who
pushed them to do it. They said that Satan used the government that was in place at the
time and the government ordered them to do what they did.
I: How did you take such a response?
M13: That response was not satisfactory to me because as a human, I know that a human
being is capable of differentiating what is good from what is bad. The court agreed with me
that their answer was not accurate and that is why they were punished.149

M13’s comment suggests that it was important for her that her perpetrators adequately assumed
individual responsibility rather than blaming others or external factors.
Some women appreciated confessions, apologies and requests for forgiveness if given under
circumstances that they considered appropriate. Some of these women spoke about the positive
impact on their personal recovery when their perpetrators genuinely assumed responsibility,
including that it gave them strength and helped them to forgive. For example, M21 explained:
The one who asked me for forgiveness did it from prison… It was not easy for me to go there
but I finally got the courage to do it. I went there and he asked me for forgiveness in front
of many people. He did it in front of the people who had come to visit and other prisoners.
His wife was also there. That gave me more strength and made me feel relieved… I sincerely
forgave him… He had not mentioned [what he had done] during Gacaca but he publicly
confessed to everything there and then.150

Similarly, M20, who had been raped and viciously sexually tortured by a group of men from her
neighborhood, reported:
They were sentenced to life in solitary confinement. However, they humbly begged me for
forgiveness and that made me feel happy… What made me sad was the fact that many of
them were our neighbors who had worked at our house. I kept asking them if there was
something I had done to offend them. “Wasn’t I a kind person to you?” I asked and they
told me that they were disappointed in their behavior. I forgave them and refused to receive
any of the reparations that they had been ordered to pay me. I truly forgave them and that
was the most important thing to do. I was very inspired by being asked for forgiveness. That
created something new in me.151

As previously mentioned, 17 women spoke about perpetrators denying all charges raised
against them. Many women commented on a general lack of responsibility shown by the accused
during gacaca, including in their own trial and in other women’s trials. For example, one woman
explained:
In all the trials that I have followed, no one has ever confessed to raping someone. Many
people have come forward to confess that they have killed someone, but no one has ever said
that they raped someone and they were sorry for it.152

Some women spoke about how difficult it was for them that their perpetrators did not take
responsibility. For example, when asked about what stood out as a difficult experience at gacaca,
one woman (M19) mentioned “the difficult part of the trial was that he refused to confess and
beg me for forgiveness.”153 Like M19, many other women had hoped that their perpetrator would
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Ibid.
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Interview conducted with M21, January 7, 2016.

151

Interview conducted with M20, January 4, 2016.
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Interview conducted with M5, December 19, 2016.
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Interview conducted with M19, January 4, 2016.
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assume responsibility. The responses of some of the women who had previously highlighted
the need for punishment and imprisonment of their perpetrator suggest that punishment alone
was not sufficient to meet their justice interests, but that they also desired a demonstration of
responsibility.154 For example, M8 explained:
I wanted them to take him out of my sight and imprison him, but I thought that if he
could come and ask me for forgiveness, I was going to forgive him. He did not ask me for
forgiveness and it was a shame because I could have forgiven him if he did ask me to. What I
wanted was for him to ask me for forgiveness in front of the authorities so that they could be
aware of it. He never did any of that. After spending some time in prison, he appealed and
I thought that he was going to ask for forgiveness during his appeal, but he instead insisted
that he had never done anything to harm any Tutsi. When he said that, I got traumatized and
upset… To this day, none of them has come to me and asked for forgiveness. I still wonder
how I was going to forgive people who did not ask me for forgiveness.155

The comments of some women suggest that perpetrators assuming responsibility might be even
more important than their punishment. For example, M1, who had previously highlighted her
appreciation of the punishment of her perpetrator, explained:
What hurt me was that he never even tried to apologize to me. I was not happy that he was
sent to prison. If he had confessed and begged for forgiveness, I would have forgiven him.
He denied all charges and tried to humiliate me again, so I guess he chose to go to prison
instead.156

As demonstrated by the comments above, some women not only desire(d) for perpetrators
to assume responsibility, but also appeared to be willing, some even keen, to forgive if their
perpetrator apologized.
The women had different ideas on whether a confession, apology or request for forgiveness
should affect the perpetrator’s prison sentence. Some women commented that while an apology
would positively influence their personal attitude toward the perpetrators, it should not make a
difference to the original prison sentence imposed by the gacaca judges. For example, one woman
explained:
The thing is that if he came to me and apologized, I would also forgive him because I have
already forgiven his family. You forgive him, but he still has to go to prison and pay for his
crime.157

Another woman suggested that a voluntary demonstration of responsibility should positively
affect the perpetrator’s standing in the community and future options, but that some form of
punishment was still necessary:
I think that if someone voluntarily confesses to their crime, they should be corrected and be
given an opportunity to come back to the society as a better Rwandan citizen who is ready
to make better choices.158
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This point is supported by de Brouwer and Ruvenaba who found in their study with Rwandan genocide survivors that
survivors were more satisfied with the punishment of their perpetrators when the latter had also “confessed to their
crimes and had genuinely asked for forgiveness,” see de Brouwer and Ruvebana, The Legacy of the Gacaca Courts in
Rwanda, 951.
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Interview conducted with M8, December 28, 2015.
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Interview conducted with M1, December 18, 2015.
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Interview conducted with M3, December 18, 2015.
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Interview conducted with M13, December 29, 2015.
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Some women commented that a genuine request for forgiveness could warrant the replacement
of their perpetrators’ prison sentence. For example, one woman said “I feel like if he was willing
to come and ask me for forgiveness, I would ask them to release him [from prison].”159 As this
comment demonstrates, an apology or request for forgiveness seemed to replace the need for
punishment of their perpetrator in the view of some women.
Conclusion
This article provided insight into how women who had suffered sexual violence during the
genocide in Rwanda experienced justice through the gacaca courts, including their understandings
of justice and how well gacaca assisted them in addressing their post-genocide justice interests. The
article focused especially on two elements of justice categorized as punishment, and the perpetrator
taking responsibility.
Justice, for most of the women, was defined in terms of the punishment of their perpetrator
by gacaca. The women’s emphasis on punishment was driven by several underlying needs that the
women articulated, including safety, retribution, validation and vindication. This range of needs
shows some consistency with the findings of other studies with survivors of sexual violence in
different contexts.160 However, the relatively high number of women who discussed retribution in
this research differs from other studies, including Nowrojee’s research with Rwandan women who
had testified at the ICTR, and is a question for further analysis.161
In addition to the punishment of their perpetrator, it was important for many women to also
see the perpetrator taking some form of responsibility for what they had done including by way of
an apology or request for forgiveness. Perpetrators assuming responsibility appeared to constitute
an alternative way for the women to experience justice through validation and vindication.
Whether women accepted a demonstration of responsibility as genuine depended on various
factors, including the timing, forum and circumstances under which perpetrators apologized or
asked for forgiveness.
The women who participated in this research valued gacaca particularly for its role in
providing punishment for the perpetrators. The life sentences of most of the perpetrators appeared
to alleviate women’s safety concerns, since women felt assured that they would never have to meet
or be threatened by their perpetrators again. The need for validation and vindication seemed to be
met, at least to some extent, because the sentence of life imprisonment constituted the maximum
penalty, which signaled to the women that the Rwandan government acknowledged the severity
of crimes of sexual violence. Those women whose perpetrators received a lesser sentence than life
imprisonment were less satisfied by the justice meted out by gacaca. These women continue to
worry about their safety and still long for validation and vindication.
While most women appreciated gacaca’s handling of punishment, the courts’ contribution
towards reconciliation was less valued. Some women mentioned perpetrators confessing,
apologizing and asking for forgiveness at gacaca; however, most of the women commented on a
lack of responsibility being facilitated during gacaca, as evidenced by the following discussion:
I: Do you think gacaca has helped you in any way to make those people ask you for
forgiveness?
M10: I did not mention anything about that. They were punished but there was nothing
done about asking for forgiveness.162
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Interview conducted with M12, December 28, 2015.
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Daly, Reconceptualizing Sexual Vicimization and Justice, 388; Koss, Restoring Rape Survivors, 209; Herman, Justice From the
Victim’s Perspective; Henry, Witness to Rape; Sharratt, Gender, Shame and Sexual Violence; Nowrojee, Your Justice Is Too
Slow; Uwigabye, Gacaca and the Treatment of Sexual Offenses. The findings in these various studies vary in terms of
which specific justice needs were important to the survivors who were considered in each study. For example, some
studies indicated that punishment of perpetrators was a priority for survivors, while survivors in other studies did
not seem to place high value on punishment, but prioritised accountability, validation, vindication or truth.
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Nowrojee, Your Justice Is Too Slow, 111.
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Interview conducted with M10, December 28, 2015.
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Some of those women whose perpetrators did confess and/or apologize at gacaca did not consider
these confessions and apologies as a genuine assumption of responsibility, but rather as a strategy
of the perpetrator to have the prison sentence reduced. Gacaca’s contribution to ending impunity
while falling short of promoting reconciliation has been highlighted previously by other researchers
who evaluated the achievements of gacaca.163 While the provision of punishment seemed to have
had some positive effects on many women (for example, women commented that seeing their
perpetrator punished lifted a burden from them, facilitated forgiveness, made them feel safe,
etc.), the refusal of perpetrators to take responsibility appeared to aggravate women’s individual
recovery. Many women commented on how difficult it was for them that their perpetrators
denied everything and how they had wished to hear a confession or even better, a request for
forgiveness. Some women shared their thoughts on how they believed they would respond to
genuine expressions of responsibility, including that they would forgive and even try to have their
perpetrators pardoned. These comments suggest that at least some Rwandan victim-survivors
might contemplate reconciliation with their perpetrators if the latter assumed responsibility in a
forum and manner that the women considered as appropriate.
The analysis of the women’s justice interests and evaluation of their court process experience
has implications beyond Rwanda and gacaca. This research adds to a better understanding of
justice interests of victim-survivors of conflict-related sexual violence, giving insight into why
affected women may value punishment and perpetrator responsibility as a form of justice. The
research also provides some ideas for the design of future justice processes dealing with sexual
violence. Victim-survivors’ requests for punishment require analysis to understand the range of
underlying justice interests and needs, such as safety, vindication and validation. In contexts where
punishment of perpetrators may prove difficult, justice processes should consider alternative ways
to meet victim-survivors’ underlying interests and needs. This research showed, for example, that
the need for validation and vindication can be assisted by perpetrators assuming responsibility for
their actions. Therefore, future justice measures could be designed in a manner that facilitates the
processes of perpetrators demonstrating responsibility towards their victims.
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This paper analyzes the generally muted international response to the protracted plight of the
Rohingya, a persecuted Muslim minority in Myanmar, from a sociology of law perspective. In
recent years, some human rights experts and scholars have suggested that the legal terms “crimes
against humanity” and “genocide” are applicable to the situation of this minority group. Under
international law and practice, such claims implicate obligations to act on the part of the government
of Myanmar and the international community. Yet international action on mitigating the risk of
crimes against humanity and genocide has arguably been limited.
To help explain this limited international response, this paper draws from and adapts the
now classic sociological framework developed by Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat on the emergence
and transformation of legal disputes. Following a background section on the Rohingya crisis and
relevant international legal frameworks, this paper examines some of the factors that frustrate
the processes of naming crimes, blaming perpetrators, and claiming rights and protection for the
Rohingya minority in the international context. Work by Bumiller and Edelman concerning models
of legal protection, legal ambiguity, and the mediating effects of symbolic structures of compliance
augment the analysis. Ambiguity as to when to apply the terms crimes against humanity or
genocide, the terms’ interrelationship, and the legal and political implications that flow from
naming such crimes, feed reluctance to act on the part of other states. A lack of a clear adjudication
process further complicates naming, as authority diffuses to a range of institutions or actors who
have variable power to name the crimes and determine appropriate actions in response. Competing
political and economic considerations obfuscate states’ willingness to engage the issue, and certain
organizations and bodies are given mandates with limited capacity to enforce those mandates or to
submit them to external scrutiny.
Together, these factors combine to portray a weak institutionalization of remedies, a condition
which Miller and Sarat have recognized serves to minimize disputing and limit the probability
of success. This weak institutionalization of remedies reflects a legal culture in international
institutions that is constrained with respect to enforcement. Institutions depend significantly on
political will and social consensus. While normative commitments are often invoked, action is
subject to the diffusion of responsibility in the naming, blaming, and claiming stages to a range
of variously coordinated and politically motivated actors and institutions. This sociological
approach thus helps to clarify fundamental constraints on the international legal system in
responding to mass violence. It in turn identifies bottlenecks and areas for potential reform,
and raises questions as to the uses and limits of law in improving prevention of and protection
against mass atrocities.
Background
The Rohingya Crisis
The Rohingya are a Muslim minority in Myanmar that have primarily lived in Rakhine State
bordering Bangladesh in western Myanmar for at least 200 years.1 The Myanmar government and
others in the country refer to them as “illegal migrants” or “Bengalis,” invoking the nineteenth
century migration of laborers and merchants from India under British colonial rule. The Rohingya
1

Martin Smith, “The Muslim Rohingya of Burma,” (presentation, Conference of Burma Centrum Nederland,
December 11, 1995), n.b. draft only for consultation, accessed December 15, 2017, http://www.netipr.org/policy/
downloads/19951211-Rohingyas-of-Burma-by-Martin-Smith.pdf. Martin claims that while no conclusive studies exist
regarding how Rohingya culture arose, what “is absolutely clear is that in Muslim-majority townships of Maungdaw,
Buthidaung and Rathedaung in northernmost Arakan [Rakhine State] a distinctive but local Muslim culture has
developed over the past two hundred years in which the inhabitants speak a distinctive local dialect which mixes
Bengali, Burmese, Hindi and English.” The background narrative provided here draws in part from Katherine
Southwick, “Preventing Mass Atrocities against the Stateless Rohingya in Myanmar: A Call for Solutions,” Columbia
Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2015), 139-142.
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were effectively stripped of citizenship under a law enacted in 1982, and for decades, they have
suffered discrimination, forced labor, and campaigns of violence largely inflicted by government
security forces and ethnic Rakhine Buddhists.2
Violence among radical Buddhists in Rakhine State and Rohingya Muslims flared in 2012
and 2013, resulting in over 200 deaths and around 170,000 persons internally displaced. Religious
nationalist movements led by Buddhist monks enflamed tensions through hate speech against
Muslim minorities.3 Many displaced Rohingya were confined to camps and villages where they
were required to obtain a permit to leave or seek health care. In July 2012, a United Nations
nutrition assessment found that
2,000 children in camps were at a high risk of mortality. A further 9,000 children needed
supplementary feeding of some kind, and 2,500 were at risk of acute malnutrition if their
needs were not met. Three months later, 2,900 children were estimated to be at a high risk
of death, and 14,000 children aged 6 months to 59 months needed supplementary feeding.4

Nearly two years later, in February 2014, the government banned Doctors Without Borders,
the primary health care provider for the region’s one million Rohingya. The organization was
forced to leave after assisting victims of a violent assault on a Rohingya village.5 A couple weeks
later, radical Buddhists, claiming that humanitarian assistance organizations disproportionately
favored the Rohingya, raided Red Cross and United Nations aid agencies, forcing over 300 foreign
aid workers to evacuate. Some aid workers believed they had been expelled “so there are fewer
witnesses to rampant mistreatment and occasional bloodletting.”6 Without outside assistance,
speculation mounted that deaths in the displacement camps in particular had sharply increased.7
Also in early 2014, the Myanmar government carried out its first census in three decades.
Rohingya who wished to be counted were required to register as “Bengalis.” In October 2014,
the government released its Rakhine State Action Plan, again insisting that Rohingya could
apply for citizenship so long as they registered as Bengalis. Those who “refuse to be registered
and without adequate documents” would be placed in camps.8 Most observers believed this Plan
would “entrench discriminatory policies that deprive Rohingya Muslims in Burma of citizenship
and lead to forced resettlement.”9 Meanwhile, thousands of Rohingya continued attempting to flee
the country every year, often on rickety boats bound for Thailand or Malaysia. Some boats were
pushed back to sea and at least hundreds of persons have drowned on the dangerous journeys,

2
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Thomas Fuller, “Extremism Rises Among Myanmar Buddhists,” New York Times, June 20, 2013, accessed November 15,
2018, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/21/world/asia/extremism-rises-among-myanmar-buddhists-wary-of-muslimminority.html. Fuller cites anti-Muslim pamphlets distributed by radical monks stating that “Myanmar is facing a
most dangerous and fearful poison that is severe enough to eradicate all civilization” and noting that even moderates
state they “are afraid of Muslims because their population is increasing so rapidly.”
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accessed November 15, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya/u-s-says-myanmar-shoulddraft-new-plan-to-give-rohingya-citizenship-idUSKCN0IX0LE20141113. Ferrie also reports that the U.S. has “urged
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while those Rohingya that reached land are sometimes held in crowded detention centers.10
The latest round of violence against the Rohingya was sparked on August 25, 2017, when the
militant group Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked 30 police posts and an army
base in Rakhine State. ARSA first appeared in late 2016, when its October 9, 2016 attack on three
border posts left nine security officers dead and provoked a counteroffensive that displaced around
100,000 people. Since the latest August 2017 attack and military counteroffensive, more than 730,000
Rohingya have fled the country and crossed into Bangladesh,11 joining more than 200,000 Rohingya
who previously fled over the past three decades.12 An estimated 30,000 non-Muslim civilians were
internally displaced within two weeks of the attack.13 Roughly half a million Rohingya are thought
to remain in Myanmar, largely cut off from humanitarian assistance.14 Human rights organizations
have documented the burning of Rohingya villages across three townships in Rakhine State.15
Many Rohingya have shared testimony of atrocities perpetrated by the Myanmar military and
Rakhine Buddhist groups, including gang rapes and indiscriminate murder of men, women, and
children.16 Throughout their time in Bangladesh, Rohingya refugees have had almost no access to
jobs, services, or citizenship.17
The last few years of persecution of and violence against the Rohingya have transpired
in the context of significant national reform. After almost half a century of authoritarianism,
the government ostensibly began a democratic transition in 2011. It allowed for parliamentary
elections, released political prisoners including Nobel Laureate and political opposition leader
Aung San Suu Kyi, and restored some civil and political rights. The government also took steps to
end armed conflict with some of the country’s largest ethnic groups. In April 2013, the European
Union expressed its validation of these reforms when it lifted nearly all of its economic and
individual sanctions against Myanmar. It kept in place an arms embargo, pending improvements
in the treatment of minority Muslims.18 In October 2016, the U.S. also lifted most sanctions in order
“to support efforts by the civilian government and the people of Burma to continue their process of
political reform and broad-based economic growth and prosperity.”19 Foreign aid and investment,
largely from within Asia, dramatically increased, and was valued at almost USD2 billion in 2013.20
10
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Investment from American and European companies has grown increasingly uncertain, however,
partly as a result of large-scale violence in Rakhine and the increased willingness of the US and the
EU to reimpose sanctions against military leaders.21
In November 2015, Aung San Suu Kyi’s political party, the National League for Democracy,
won a landslide victory in the country’s first openly contested parliamentary elections in 25 years.
Under the 2008 Constitution, a quarter of seats in Parliament are held by the military, enabling it
to veto constitutional amendments. Because Aung San Suu Kyi has immediate family with nonBurmese citizenship – her sons are British citizens – she could not become president, though she
has operated as the government’s de facto leader under the title of State Counselor. The military,
which operates independently of the civilian government, retains control over the ministries of
defense, border, and home affairs.
The post-August 2017 round of violence against the Rohingya, which is said to have caused
the largest and fastest exodus of people since the 1994 Rwandan genocide, has attracted more
international attention than past instances of persecution and displacement.22 On September
11, 2017, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights called this latest campaign
a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing.”23 In October 2017, the United States government
suspended military assistance to Myanmar units linked to violence against the Rohingya.24 The
United Kingdom and European Union similarly reduced military relations with Myanmar at this
time.25 Then U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson declared that the international community could
not “be witness to the atrocities that have been reported.”26 A U.S. State Department spokesperson
stated that, “It is imperative that any individuals or entities responsible for atrocities, including
non-state actors and vigilantes, be held accountable.”27 Also in October 2017, U.S. Senator Ben
Cardin of Maryland characterized the Myanmar government’s response as genocide.28 Together
with the late U.S. Senator John McCain, Senator Cardin proposed legislation to impose sanctions
and travel restrictions on senior Myanmar military officials deemed to be responsible for atrocities.29
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed the legislation in February 2018 for consideration
by the whole Senate. According to a December 2017 report, “Doctors Without Borders has called
the camps in Bangladesh a ‘time bomb ticking toward a full-blown health crisis’ as sanitation and
medical services and distribution of clean water have struggled to keep up with refugee arrivals.”30
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In December 2017, the U.S. government imposed sanctions on General Maung Maung Soe,
who oversaw the military crackdown against the Rohingya minority.31 In June 2018, Canada and
the European Union sanctioned seven senior military leaders. 32 The U.S. sanctioned four more
commanders and two military units in August 2018. 33 This decision almost coincided with the
September 2018 release of a U.S. State Department report documenting widespread, systematic
attacks and atrocities committed largely by the Myanmar military in the past two years. The
report was based on an April 2018 survey of more than 1,000 Rohingya refugees living in camps
in Bangladesh.34 Around the same time, an international independent fact-finding mission on
Myanmar established by the United Nations Human Rights Council released its own report.
Among its recommendations was a call for the United Nations to refer the situation of the
Rohingya, as well as violence in Shan and Kachin States, to the International Criminal Court or
other ad hoc international criminal tribunal. The report called for investigation and prosecution of
senior military officials for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.35 The fact-finding
mission’s detailed findings were published in a separate 444-page report.36 On September 6, 2018,
in response to a request from the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to clarify the
court’s scope of jurisdiction, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ruled that it could exercise jurisdiction with
regard to crimes within its jurisdiction, such as deportation and other crimes against humanity,
provided that they were committed on the territory of a State that is party to the Rome Statute, such
as Bangladesh.37 The ruling prompted the Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda to begin investigating
whether evidence is sufficient to file charges against alleged perpetrators.38
International Legal Frameworks: Crimes against Humanity and Genocide
Over the years and regarding the more recent attacks, various entities have applied the legal labels
of crimes against humanity and genocide to the situation of the Rohingya. Scholars and human
rights organizations, such as the Irish Centre for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch, have
characterized the plight of the Rohingya as crimes against humanity.39 Under the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, of which 122 countries (excluding Myanmar) are States Parties,
a “crime against humanity” means any of the enumerated acts in Article 7(1) “when committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge
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of the attack.”40 Some of the acts include murder, forcible transfer of population, torture, rape,
persecution, or other inhumane acts causing serious bodily or mental harm.41 On the application of
crimes against humanity to the situation of the Rohingya, experts have shared a general consensus
for several years.
Within the last few years, a growing number of experts and organizations also asserted that
the Rohingya community faced a high risk of genocide or that genocide was and continues to be
already under way.42 In addition to killing and causing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the group, among the acts that can constitute genocide under Article 2 of the 1948 Convention
is “[d]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about [the group’s]
physical destruction in whole or in part.”43 Such conditions could include, but are not limited to,
“subjecting the group to a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from homes and denial of medical
services. Also included is the creation of circumstances that would lead to a slow death, such as
lack of proper housing, clothing and hygiene or excessive work or physical exertion.”44 As the
International Court of Justice has elaborated, a key feature of the crime of genocide is the intent
requirement, that the acts are committed not only deliberately and unlawfully, but with “intent to
destroy” a racial or religious group, “as such.” This requirement is also referred to as a “specific
intent” to destroy a protected group.45 Proving genocidal intent carries a high burden of proof, as
“claims against a State involving charges of exceptional gravity must be proved by evidence that
is fully conclusive.”46
Reviewing the elements of this crime suggests that the possibility of genocide could be
seriously considered to describe the plight of the Rohingya over the past several years.47 The attacks
on Rohingya villages, mass arrests and murder of men and boys, allegations of gang rape, travel
restrictions, denationalization and denial of the group’s cultural identity, deprivation of access to
health care and food, particularly high starvation rates among small children, hate speech, and
mass displacement could plausibly constitute a cluster of facts from which genocidal intent could
be inferred.48 In identifying genocidal intent, the UN’s August 2018 fact-finding mission report
highlighted “the broader oppressive context and hate rhetoric; specific utterances of commanders
and direct perpetrators; exclusionary policies, including to alter the demographic composition of
Rakhine State; the level of organization indicating a plan for destruction; and the scale and brutality
of the violence committed.”49
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Yet even in 2013, before this latest round of mass violence, genocide scholar William Schabas
said, “We’re moving into a zone where the word can be used in the case of the Rohingya. When
you see measures preventing births, trying to deny the identity of a people, hoping to see that they
. . . no longer exist . . . these are all warning signs that mean it’s not frivolous to envisage the use of
the term genocide.”50 The Canada-based Sentinel Project for Genocide Prevention asserted in 2013
that interethnic violence in Rakhine State “is part of a state-sponsored campaign of ethnic cleansing
with the distinct possibility of genocide carried out either through extermination by killing squads
or more slowly by isolation and starvation.”51 In 2014, the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Early Warning
Project identified Myanmar as the country at greatest risk of state-led mass killing.52 In 2015, Yale
Law School’s human rights clinic determined that there was “strong evidence” of genocide against
the Rohingya population of Myanmar.53 The same year, the International State Crime Initiative
(ISCI) of Queen Mary University of London published a report, Countdown to Annihilation: Genocide
in Myanmar, which concluded according to social scientific frameworks that genocide was taking
place against the Rohingya.54 According to Dr. Penny Green of ISCI, the violence following the
August 2017 attacks by Rohingya militants on Myanmar border posts pointed to a “disturbing
yet entirely predictable escalation in the genocidal process.”55 In November 2017, Fortify Rights
and the Simon Skojt Center at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum released a report expressing
serious concern about “growing evidence of genocide against Rohingya Muslims.”56 While they
found that further investigation would be necessary in order to ascertain genocidal intent, they
emphasized that the Myanmar government and the international community “should not wait
for a formal legal determination of genocide to take immediate action.”57 Fortify Rights released
a lengthy report in July 2018 documenting “extensive and systematic preparations” on the part of
Myanmar authorities to carry out atrocities amounting to crimes against humanity and genocide in
the weeks and months prior to the August 25, 2017 attacks by a Rohingya militant group.58
Up until late 2017, neither foreign governments nor the United Nations had officially used
the term, “genocide,” in connection with the Rohingya. In April 2014, speaking in his personal
capacity, the then former UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights, Tomás Ojéa Quintana, said
at a conference: “There are elements of genocide in Rakhine with respect to Rohingyas . . . The
possibility of genocide needs to be discussed. I myself do not use the term genocide for strategic
reasons.”59 In 2014, in a public letter to then U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, 72 Members of
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the U.S. Congress expressed deep concern about “horrific images of emaciated children . . . from
Rakhine State in western Burma, where [violently displaced Rohingya] have been confined in what
some are calling concentration camps.”60 Based on these and other human rights concerns, they
requested the Secretary to “undertake a significant recalibration of U.S. policy” toward Myanmar.61
Official references to genocide begin to appear in the autumn of 2017, after the scale of killings
and mass displacement had reached the highest levels in the recent history of Rakhine State. In
September 2017, French President Emmanuel Macron asserted that attacks against Rohingya
constituted genocide.62 In December, at a special session of the UN Human Rights Council, the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, asked with respect to Myanmar,
“Can anyone, can anyone, rule out that elements of genocide may be present?”63 As noted, U.S.
Senator Cardin referred to the crisis in October 2017 as genocide, prompting the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee of the U.S. Congress to craft legislation imposing sanctions on top Myanmar
military leaders. At the same time, the U.S Secretary of State reportedly weighed whether to refer
to events as “ethnic cleansing,” which is not a legal term of art, but which would signal a political
willingness to take more action regarding the crisis.64 The same question arose with respect to the
August 2018 U.S. State Department report, which media outlets cited as having “stopped short” of
calling the violence genocide or crimes against humanity.65 Apparently, whether or not to use these
terms was intensely debated internally, delaying the report’s release.66 Notwithstanding the labels’
absence, U.S. officials said that the report could justify punitive actions such as further sanctions
against Myanmar leaders.67 Following the report’s release, the U.S. also doubled its humanitarian
aid for the crisis, pledging an additional US$185 million to assist Rohingya in Bangladesh and
Myanmar.68
Crimes against humanity and genocide ostensibly trigger legal obligations on the part of
the international community to act to protect threatened communities. Under the principle
of Responsibility to Protect, when a state fails to protect its populations from these crimes, the
international community must be “prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive
manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter [of the United Nations].”69
Under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, parties
“undertake to prevent and punish” genocide. Perpetrators “shall be tried by a competent tribunal”70
and “shall be punished.”71 Furthermore, “Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs
of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider
60
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appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide.”72 The ICC’s Rome Statute
affirms that these crimes are “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community
as a whole.” Additionally, they “must not go unpunished and [] their effective prosecution must
be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation.”73
The ICC may exercise jurisdiction over the crimes of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide on the basis of a referral of a plausible case to the Prosecutor from a State Party or the
Security Council, or if the Prosecutor initiates an investigation.74 While Myanmar is not a State
Party to the Rome Statute, it may accept jurisdiction in individual cases.75
The UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the UN Special Adviser on the
Responsibility to Protect have complementary mandates to “alert relevant actors to the risk of
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, enhancing the capacity
of the United Nations to prevent these crimes . . . and engage with Member States, regional []
arrangements, and civil society to develop more effective means of response when they do
occur.”76 Public statements from these offices on the Rohingya and Muslim minorities have been
scarce in the past few years. A March 2013 statement by the Special Adviser on the Prevention of
Genocide raised concerns about the spread of sectarian violence following anti-Muslim violence
in Meiktila.77 In September 2017, the same official stated that violence against the Rohingya “could
be ethnic cleansing and could amount to crimes against humanity.”78 Further, “In fact it can be the
precursor to all the egregious crimes – and I mean genocide. We are not yet there, we cannot say
we are facing a genocide, but it is time to take action.”79 During a week-long visit to the refugee
camps in Bangladesh in March 2018, the Special Representative asserted that international crimes
had been committed, but that it would be up to a court to make a final determination as to whether
the atrocities constituted genocide.80
Naming, Blaming, and Claiming Genocide
Despite the existence of relevant laws and legal obligations to act, steps to address the protracted
and worsening plight of the Rohingya have been limited and slow to emerge, both before the August
2017 attacks and afterwards. In seeking to help understand why international law and institutions
have not been effective, the approach here is to adapt certain sociology of law frameworks into
a lens through which to view and assess international responses as a legal process. Specifically,
insights are drawn from Felstiner et al.’s framework to describe the emergence and transformation
of legal disputes.81 As described in more detail below, this framework describes three stages –
naming, blaming, and claiming – that constitute the progression of a legal dispute. Literature
concerning models of legal protection, legal ambiguity, symbolic structures, and institutionalization
of remedies also enhances the analysis.
The intuition underlying this analytical approach is that if serious crimes such as crimes
against humanity and genocide are invoked in a context where mass atrocities are reportedly
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taking place or threaten to occur, then a legal process providing a remedy of some kind should
follow. However, responses that appear to be weak or limited in turn frustrate the expectation
of a generally linear legal process that leads to some sort of resolution or adjudication. Certain
factors are obstructing the process or the model of legal dispute resolution in the international
context may require some adjustment. Sociology of law theories such as Felstiner et al.’s can help
to delineate the components of a legal process that resolve a legal dispute or bring about the legal
change required by the applicable law in a particular context. Tracing whether and to what extent
international responses to the Rohingya crisis track the stages of legal dispute resolution can help
to clarify the points at which the international responses, or lack thereof, diverge from the legal
model. Such an analysis can elucidate what might be obstructing remedies at what stage of the legal
process. This information can in turn suggest where reform efforts should focus in order to improve
international legal responsiveness to mass atrocities. Such information can also help to demonstrate
how international legal processes can be distinct from domestic ones, prompting further reflection
on whether international responses to mass atrocities should take on characteristics that are more
or less law-like, or simply different, in order to be effective.
To be sure, analyses of the relative effectiveness or ineffectiveness of international institutions
in stopping or responding to mass atrocities in various cases have received significant scholarly
attention. However, a substantial portion of the literature has focused on international criminal
tribunals, their politics or technical aspects of international criminal legal doctrine.82 Similarly,
sociological theories are largely adapted to analyzing the activities of international criminal
tribunals, including the labeling of crimes such as genocide.83 These analyses are directly relevant
to part of the analysis undertaken here, and they help to underscore the contribution sociology
can make to international law and relations. For instance, Christensen points out how sociological
studies of the International Criminal Court (ICC) can play a central role in “analyzing the social
dynamics that structure its potential impact as an international institution that has been repeatedly
criticized for its lack of effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy.”84 Sociological studies similarly
can help to analyze the social dynamics that frustrate efforts to respond to atrocities effectively and
according to international normative commitments, under the ICC’s Rome Statute, the Genocide
Convention, or other law or doctrine, such as the United Nations Charter or Responsibility to
Protect. This paper expands on these efforts to adapt sociological theories to international law, but
broadens the focus to analyze how law matters both within and beyond international tribunals as
states and other actors perceive and confront their obligations to act in the face of mass atrocities.
To grasp more fully why international responses have not been effective, the vision must consider
the international legal system beyond international criminal justice.
Accordingly, the analysis here turns to what Galanter has called “the most important conceptual
tool in analyzing legal encounters and legal change—the dispute pyramid, which traces potential
pathways from ‘perceived injurious experiences’ to remedies, via grievances, claims, disputes, and
remedial institutions like lawyers and courts.”85 As Galanter asserts, “the urtext of this conceptual
track” is the paper, Naming, Blaming, and Claiming by William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, and
Austin Sarat.86 Several studies have deployed this framework in domestic legal settings to identify
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obstacles to effective legal responses and potential areas for reform.87 However, none appear to
have adapted the dispute pyramid to the international context.
In this work, Felstiner et al. identify three transformations that occur in the emergence of a
dispute. The first is “naming,” or “saying to oneself that a particular experience is injurious.”88
This transformation “may be the most critical,” according to the authors, as “the level and kind
of disputing in a society may turn more on what is initially perceived as an injury than on any
later decision.”89 The second transformation, “blaming,” occurs when a perceived injurious
experience (PIE) is turned into a grievance. “This occurs when a person attributes an injury to
the fault of another individual or social entity.”90 As they write, “the injured person must feel
wronged and believe that something might be done in response to the injury, however politically
or sociologically improbable such a response might be.”91 The third transformation is “claiming,”
or “when someone with a grievance voices it to the person or entity believed to be responsible and
asks for some remedy.”92 In the context of international law, claiming is better understood in the
broad sense of taking action on a PIE or grievance through various (legally justifiable) measures
that states, international institutions, and individuals may use to change behavior of or punish
perpetrators. This point is explored further in the subsections below.
Felstiner et al. observe, “PIEs, grievances, and disputes are subjective, unstable, reactive,
complicated, and incomplete.”93 Perceptions of injury, interpretations of grievance, assignation
of blame, and processes of claiming may change as a result of various factors. For instance, the
number of parties may not be fixed, as “new information about and redefinition of conflict” can
lead a party or officials to change views about appropriate adversaries or allies.94 The relationship
between the parties, whether they are linked through work, residence, or politics, or whether they
have a prior history of conflict, can shape their relative status and costs of disputing.95 As the
authors observe, reactivity in early stages of dispute formation is evident in how “individuals
define and redefine their perceptions of experience and the nature of their grievances in response to
the communications, behavior, and expectations of a range of people, including opponents, agents,
authority figures, companions, and intimates.”96 Characteristics such as class, education, and social
networks can also influence the development of disputes.97 Additional factors and actors play a
role or may evolve in the emergence and transformation of disputes, such as the identity of the
parties and the scope of conflict, or the extent of relevant discourse about grievances and claims.98
Other factors include choice of mechanisms, objectives sought, reference groups (audiences or
sponsors), and representatives and officials (such as lawyers, social workers, government officials,
and bureaucrats).99 The following subsections explore how these concepts and factors play out in
the context of the Rohingya crisis and international law and responses.
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Naming and Blaming: Different Legal Terms, Different Weights of Responsibility
Many of the challenges of naming, blaming, and claiming in the context of the Rohingya stem from
the relevant laws’ ambiguous terms and modes of application. As Felstiner et al. mention, how the
injury is perceived – or which word or words are used to identify it – “may be the most critical” to
how the dispute takes shape.100 As discussed, most experts would concede that a reasonable prima
facie case of crimes against humanity and at least risk of genocide can be established, if not genocide
itself. The ambiguity or challenge in the case of naming crimes against humanity and especially
genocide concern how much certainty of the crime’s likelihood or actual existence is required in order
to apply the name and justify a response. An additional question is what kinds of responses are
adequate to meet international legal obligations if the crimes likely or actually amount to crimes
against humanity or genocide.
Relatedly, another question is whether the distinction between crimes against humanity
and genocide even really matters. Two understandings of crimes against humanity and genocide
currently seem to coexist. The first, arguably progressive understanding is that since the UN
General Assembly embraced the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005, the obligations to act on
the part of states and the international community are the same whether the crimes concerned are
war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, or genocide.101 This reflects the evolved
view on the part of the international community that all of these crimes constitute “unimaginable
atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.”102 As U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell
said of the violence in Darfur, Sudan in 2005, whether or not the crime of genocide applied, U.S.
policy toward Sudan would remain the same in terms of pressuring the Khartoum government
to stop abuses and providing humanitarian relief; “applying the ‘genocide’ label would not
require anything more from the United States.”103 The second, traditional understanding is that
notwithstanding R2P, the notion of genocide continues to carry special meaning because of its
intent requirement; the specific intent to destroy an ethnic or religious group, “as such,” and thus
sits at the top of a hierarchy of grave crimes.104 As noted, this specific intent requirement imposes
a high burden of proof, demanding that evidence be “fully conclusive.”105 This strict standard thus
“renders genocide determinations unavoidably contestable.”106
In addition to the contestability of genocide determinations, R2P is at best an unsettled
doctrine.107 As Chesterman points out, by the time the UN General Assembly endorsed R2P in
2005, “its normative content had been emasculated to the point where it essentially provided that
the Security Council could authorize, on a case-by-case basis, things that it had been authorizing
for more than a decade.”108 It nonetheless had normative significance, in that while “the true
significance of [R2P] is not in creating new rights or obligations to do ‘the right thing’; rather, it
is in making it harder to do the wrong thing or nothing at all.”109 The terms regarding how the
international community can fulfill its commitment to protect populations are open-ended. As
provided in the Outcome Document, the international community, “through the United Nations,”
is to “use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means.” It is “prepared to take
collective action... on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations
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as appropriate.”110 In comparison, the 1948 Genocide Convention is a binding treaty with 146 States
Parties. It is clearer than R2P with respect to obligations to act and more concrete steps to take,
such as extraditing and trying alleged perpetrators in a competent tribunal, punishing offenders,
and submitting disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ).111
The sense of hierarchy between the two terms of crimes against humanity and genocide
feeds reluctance to act unless the term of genocide is applied. The genocide label heightens the
scrutiny and thereby the pressure applied to parties obligated to act. Presumably Secretary Powell
implicitly sensed this distinction when he, notwithstanding his remarks about the equivalence
of crimes against humanity and genocide, eventually commissioned an inquiry into whether the
events in Darfur constituted genocide.112 If genocide is therefore perceived to be a more serious
crime, triggering greater expectation of action, states and other institutions may seek to avoid
that label, depending on the interests they may have at stake. As a result, the crime is not named
and crimes against humanity in turn inspire less urgency. The dispute thus has limited scope for
transformation.
In some respects, this scenario appears to be playing out in the case of the Rohingya. For
a government or the UN to allege or name genocide or the risk of genocide would raise some
expectation of some kind of punitive or coercive action against the Myanmar government. Such
efforts could compromise the international community’s effort to incentivize further national
reforms in Myanmar and expand business and other opportunities for all through reduced
sanctions and increased investment and engagement. Having waited a half-century for the country
to move out of isolation and embrace democracy and human rights, international actors may resist
the idea of appearing to turn back the clock. Cognitive dissonance is also generated when human
rights authority figures such as Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi decline to discuss persecution of
the Rohingya, presumably out of concern for her own capacity to assert political influence towards
other ostensibly good ends within the country. Moreover, the question of naming has been taken
to an extreme with government officials requesting that the term “Rohingya” not even be used.113
This signals to the Rohingya and the international community that they too risk backlash if they
discuss the plight of the community, let alone label it genocide. Only since late 2017, when the scale
of violence and displacement had reached a mysterious threshold of egregiousness, could officials
no longer avoid the term genocide.
Another dynamic that complicates the naming process in the Rohingya case is the diffusion
of authority in naming the crime so as to compel or credibly pressure action. Perhaps the most
authoritative source absent adjudication by the ICC or ICJ would be the United Nations. Up until
late 2017, UN officials had described the plight of the Rohingya as a “profound crisis,” which
“has the potential to undermine the entire reform process in Myanmar.”114 In September 2017, a
UN official characterized the Rohingya crisis as ethnic cleansing, but none until December 2017
officially linked the situation with genocide. The Special Representative on Genocide Prevention
has on a couple of occasions identified the risk of genocide, but averred that only a court could
make a genocide determination. The fact-finding mission established by the Human Rights Council
assuredly found in August 2018 that genocidal intent on the part of Myanmar authorities could
reasonably be inferred based on the circumstances of the Rohingya case. Yet it went on to defer
to a judicial process to investigate and prosecute senior officials “so that a competent court can
110
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determine their liability for genocide in relation to the situation in Rakhine State.”115 Similarly,
back in 2015, while Yale Law School’s human rights clinic found “strong evidence that the abuses
against the Rohingya satisfy the [] elements of genocide,” it went on to call upon the United Nations
to establish an independent commission of inquiry on the human rights situation in Rakhine State
and whether the crime of genocide is applicable.116 These statements leave the impression that
courts or other authoritative bodies largely make definitive genocide determinations, typically
reached, if at all, years after the events have taken place. In the mean time, this deferral of authority
on whether or not a situation amounts to or could amount to genocide can confuse understanding
of appropriate responses, be they preventive or protective after the fact. Somewhat distinctively
and as noted above, the November 2017 report by Fortify Rights and the Simon Skojt Center at the
U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum was clear that the international community “should not wait for
a formal legal determination of genocide to take immediate action.”117
In line with that latter approach, in terms of obtaining some sort of action, states themselves
either need to broaden their openness to considering the application of genocide, at least acting
in the interest of preventing or reducing the risk of genocide, or accept a responsibility to act as
robustly if the crimes are deemed best described as crimes against humanity.
In addition to deferring to courts or official commissions to make definitive determinations,
diffusion of authority in naming also manifests in terms of the various actors who precede official
institutions in labeling atrocity crimes. From 2011 to 2018, scholars, activists, and organizations
have increasingly brought up the term of genocide, sometimes in terms of describing a risk of
genocide, though some could reasonably argue that a “slow-burning” genocide has been under
way for years.118 It therefore seems in this situation that the process of naming crimes is an uneven
consensus-building one that originates from civil society, academia, and the media and eventually
penetrates (or not) the legal departments of official institutions. This view is consistent with
Prunier’s characterization of atrocities in Darfur, Sudan as “the ambiguous genocide,” due to the
diverse positions on the question taken by the United States, the United Nations, the European
Union, and human rights organizations.119 These indefinite dynamics concerning which terms to
use to name injuries, and who has the authority to apply names, are consistent with Felstiner et
al.’s observation about the instability, complexity, and incompleteness of disputes. However, in
the international system, this instability is magnified, as no central body is consistently invoked
to pronounce in a timely way on whether a crime is appropriately labeled one thing or another.
Additionally, preventive norms allowing or mandating action in the absence of legal certainty
remain nebulous. Accordingly, naming and blaming become more difficult.
Claiming: Constrained Models of Legal Protection
Problems of ambiguity, vagueness, and diffusion of authority and responsibility also apply in the
processes of claiming rights and protection for the Rohingya. As noted above, “claiming” in Felstiner
et al.’s framework is “when someone with a grievance voices it to the person or entity believed
to be responsible and asks for some remedy.”120 In the context of international law, particularly
atrocity law, claiming is better understood in the broad sense of taking action on a PIE or grievance
through legally justifiable measures that states, international institutions, and individuals may use
to change behavior or punish perpetrators. The applicable legal authorities of R2P, the Genocide
Convention, and the ICC’s Rome Statute assign the roles of naming, blaming, and claiming to
additional actors beyond the victims. These include states themselves, regional organizations such
as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the UN Security Council, UN special
mechanisms such as Special Rapporteurs, and the ICC Prosecutor, among others. Civil society
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groups also take on these roles on behalf of victims, implicitly acknowledging that victims under
conditions comparable to crimes against humanity or genocide may be so suppressed or threatened
that advocacy on their own behalf is severely constrained. This variety of actors, and the range of
measures they might consider to assert claims or seek enforcement, would seem to amplify but also
complicate the possibility of dispute emergence and transformation (and consequent resolution)
for the Rohingya.
Bumiller’s notion of the “model of legal protection,” Edelman’s concepts of “legal ambiguity
and symbolic structures,” and Miller and Sarat’s observations on the institutionalization of
remedies are helpful in elucidating some of the claiming challenges. They also help to suggest
differences in the operation of international versus domestic law.
Bumiller observes that discrimination laws and policies – of which genocide and crimes
against humanity such as persecution can be said to constitute a version – are based on a model of
legal protection, “which assumes that those who have suffered harms will recognize their injuries
and invoke the protective measures of the law.”121 She adds that, “these laws tacitly assume that
such behavior is reasonably unproblematic.”122 However, in Bumiller’s study of the effectiveness
of antidiscrimination laws in the United States, she found that the success of these laws were
frustrated by what she termed an “ethic of survival,” whereby alleged victims did not pursue
claims for various reasons related to self-preservation and avoidance of potentially exacerbated
problems. For instance, they feared retaliation from employers in the form of job loss or increased
hostility or humiliation. They were deterred by the financial and emotional costs of disputing,
among other factors.123
R2P, the Genocide Convention, and the Rome Statute attach to the crimes they cover a sense
of egregiousness and outrage, suggesting that such crimes are and will be easily identified and
acted upon, tacitly implying, per Bumiller, that the appropriate response is unproblematic. Yet
as noted, unlike the domestic discrimination laws in Bumiller’s study, these laws do not solely or
explicitly place the burden of recognition of injury and initiation of action (naming and claiming)
on the victims. The burden of naming and claiming is shared with the international community,
states, international institutions, and implicitly civil society. Under these legal frameworks, the
states within which the crimes are occurring have the first responsibility to protect. However,
when the states are themselves implicated in the crimes, responsibility for action diffuses within
the international community, leading to a situation where others wait for others to act, displaying
a kind of “ethic of survival” whereby states and institutions such as the UN or ICC do not act
because they individually do not wish to risk compromising whatever interests or perception of
credibility they may have in the situation. These other interests may include other humanitarian
concerns in the country, an emotional or political investment in Myanmar’s eventual democratic
transition, business or regional security interests, fear of some sort of backlash that could damage
credibility or operations, or other global crises demanding resources and attention.
In avoiding the process of claiming, international actors draw upon legal ambiguity to erect
institutions, or what Edelman calls “symbolic structures,” that lack inherent enforcement capacity.
As Edelman explains
The opportunity for organizations to mediate law is variable. Laws that contain vague
or controversial language, laws that regulate organizational procedures more than the
substantive results of those procedures, and laws that provide weak enforcement mechanisms
leave more room for organizational mediation than laws that are more specific, substantive,
and backed by strong enforcement.124

121

Kristin Bumiller, “Victims in the Shadow of the Law: A Critique of the Model of Legal Protection,” Signs 12, no. 3
(Spring 1987), 422.

122

Ibid.

123

Ibid., 436-437.

124

Lauren B. Edelman, “Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law,”
American Journal of Sociology 97, no. 6 (May 1992), 1532.

©2018

Genocide Studies and Prevention 12, no. 3 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.12.3.1572

Southwick

134

She goes on to state that laws with “broad and ambiguous principles” can afford organizations
“wide latitude to construct the meaning of compliance.”125
In the case of the Rohingya, various institutions exist whose mandates would cover the abuses
the minority faces, but various factors mediate the effectiveness of enforcement. While the UN
Security Council has held briefings and even traveled to the region in April 2018,126 Russia and
China are widely expected to veto sanctions or other coercive steps against Myanmar that other
Security Council members might seek to apply under the UN Charter.127
The UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has a mandate to provide early warning
and build international capacity to respond to genocide. However, his office has issued few
statements on the Rohingya and whether any other diplomatic steps up until this latest round of
violence have been taken to promote action is unclear. His capacity to promote effective responses
depends in part on the political will of states to engage, and so limited action may therefore reflect
a lack of political will or the absence of “normative pressure from [his] environment to elaborate
formal structures to create visible symbols of [his] attention to law.”128 Somewhat insulated from
external scrutiny, this office is difficult to evaluate. As Edelman notes, “most organizations’
construction of compliance is never examined in court. Thus organizations’ collective response to
law becomes the de facto construction of compliance; it is shaped only at the margins by formal
legal institutions.”129
Special Rapporteurs for Human Rights have served a role in documenting abuses and
legitimizing efforts to name crimes, at least as crimes against humanity, and pursue claims. But
these roles too are shaped by the initiative or lack thereof of their occupants. In 2014, Special
Rapporteur Yanghee Lee took the opportunity to counter efforts to suppress the term, “Rohingya,”
stating that
I was repeatedly told not to use the term ‘Rohingya’ as this was not recognized by the
Government. Yet, as a human rights independent expert, I am guided by international human
rights law . . . the rights of minorities to self-identify on the basis of their national, ethnic,
religious, and linguistic characteristics is related to the obligations of States to ensure nondiscrimination against individuals and groups, which is a central principle of international
human rights law.130

In March 2018, before the fact-finding mission had released its report, she stated to the UN
Human Rights Council, “I am becoming more convinced that the crimes committed following 9
October 2016 and 25 August 2017 bear the hallmarks of genocide, and call in the strongest terms
for accountability.”131 Because the Rapporteur is directly engaged in Myanmar, perhaps she feels
greater normative pressure to take steps demonstrating compliance with the mandate of her
position. These statements also reflect the potential of rights to serve as a “cultural or symbolic
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resource” in promoting social change.132 As Albiston points out, “mobilizing rights, even in informal
contexts, can . . . delegitimize conduct previously accepted as natural or normal.”133
Another institution with a relevant mandate is the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission
on Human Rights (AICHR). While one of its purposes is to promote and protect human rights
in the ASEAN region, realization of rights is mediated and constrained by the fact that it has no
formal complaint mechanism and by principles of non-confrontation and consensus among its
members.134 Individual government responses are mediated by the complexity of formulating and
implementing foreign policy. In the U.S. Government, for instance, the process of pursuing claims
for the Rohingya involves coordination among multiple agencies within the U.S. State Department,
National Security Council, and U.S. Congress.
With respect to international tribunals, Becker finds that while the International Court
of Justice would have jurisdiction over a dispute regarding Myanmar’s compliance with the
Genocide Convention, persuading a non-injured state to bring such a case would be politically
difficult.135 The International Criminal Court (ICC), while empowered to bring justice to victims,
remains constrained. The ICC and other international tribunals depend on the cooperation of
states, including cooperation from states under investigation for criminal behavior.136 As Peskin
has documented, despite wide ratification of the Rome Statute, lack of political support hampers
state cooperation with the ICC.137 Accordingly, the distinction that Alter et al. draw between the
legal competence and actual, de facto authority of international institutions plays out with respect
to international legal responses more broadly.138
Together, the obstacles to naming, blaming, and claiming in the context of the Rohingya
crisis suggest limited institutionalization of remedies. As Miller and Sarat have observed, “Higher
levels of institutionalization . . . would be associated with higher rates of grievance perception and
claiming . . . and higher rates of success in recovery for meritorious claims.”139 Institutionalization
of remedies is denoted by “well-known, regularized, readily available mechanisms, techniques, or
procedures for dealing with a problem.”140 In the case of atrocity prevention and cessation, as in the
case of the Rohingya, remedies are not regularized or readily apparent, but are highly dependent
on the balance of and interaction of interests among states and the international community.
This makes for ad hoc, case-by-case, and overly slow approaches to allegations of crimes against
humanity and genocide, addressed by institutions with limited enforcement capacity.
Conclusion
The challenges in naming, blaming, and claiming rights and protection for the Rohingya largely
arise from the ambiguity in relevant laws concerning mass atrocity, the diffusion of authority
and responsibility that occurs in those laws’ application, and the relative lack of enforcement
capacity of institutions, such as the UN, ICJ, and ICC, squarely tasked with protecting against
or prosecuting grave crimes such as crimes against humanity and genocide. The international
system is a clear example of Miller and Sarat’s point that, “It is easier, on the whole, for societies
to declare rights than to provide remedies; indeed, the development of remedies almost inevitably
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lags behind the recognition of rights.”141 Seventy years since the adoption of the UN Genocide
Convention, however, seems like an unusually long lag for effective remedies to develop. Yet the
situation of the Rohingya illustrates some of the unique features of and constraints on international
law. The processes of naming and claiming rights is more diffuse, and thus generally renders
the emergence and transformation of disputes on behalf of victims more unstable, complex, and
arduous than in domestic settings. Courts such as the ICC and ICJ may or may not play a role, and
non-judicial responses, mediated by competing interests of actors obligated to act, arguably operate
less in the shadow of courts than they do in domestic legal settings. Legal concepts and structures
become more dependent upon, embedded in, and transfigured by political and social dynamics,
amidst negotiations among and between states and private actors, at international and local levels.
International human rights law is therefore less legal in nature and more social and political.
Felstiner et al. aver that “a healthy social order is one that minimizes barriers inhibiting the
emergence of grievances and disputes and preventing their translation into claims for redress.”142
By this measure, the barriers to remedies the Rohingya have faced for over thirty years would
signal that the international human rights order is unhealthy. It remains for further research to
identify the specific reforms needed to remedy these weaknesses, but the dispute pyramid helps to
identify areas for consideration, specifically the development of streamlined processes for naming
crimes and clarification of roles and responsibilities for states and international institutions to act
preventively and decisively in the absence of legal certainty. Such an approach would in a sense flip
the dispute pyramid to allow for claiming to precede definitive naming, moving toward a model
of crime prevention rather than legal dispute transformation. As the UN has stated, “prevention
is the first imperative of justice.”143 Prevention is explicitly the point of “Never Again.”144 More
broadly, the application of Felstiner et al.’s legal lens to the Rohingya crisis helps to uncover a
paradox about law in the international context, where law is both peripheral and central. Law
is peripheral because social and political dynamics obstruct and overwhelm its operation. At the
same time, law is central as it enshrines a moral, animating value that compels imagining more
effective institutions and enforcement procedures, whether they are increasingly law-like or not.
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New Documents Shed Light:
Why Did Peacekeepers Withdraw during Rwanda’s 1994 Genocide?
Emily Willard

University of Washington
Seattle, Washington, USA
The genocide in Rwanda in 1994, during which 800,000 to one million Tutsi and moderate
Hutus were killed in 100 days, is infamous not only for how brutally and quickly the killing took
place, but also because of the failure of the international community to act to stop the violence. Why
did the international community fail to intervene in time? Extensive studies have been conducted
to better understand how the genocide unfolded on the ground as well as why the United Nations
stood by as horror engulfed Rwanda.1 However, questions still remain about the international
community’s response, in particular the role of the United States.
Newly declassified documents indicate that the United States took the lead in encouraging
the international community to call for withdrawal of the United Nations peacekeeping troops
who were on the ground when the genocidal violence started in April of 1994, a continuance of a
larger policy shift away from United States involvement in peacekeeping.2 These documents also
further illuminate the political atmosphere in which the Clinton administration was pulling back
from peace keeping, even prior to the Somalia crisis in October 1993. This paper reports findings
of a research study to understand international decision-making before and during the Rwanda
genocide, making four major contributions to scholarship about the Rwanda genocide in particular,
and genocide studies and prevention literature in general.
Information obtained through newly declassified U.S. government documents and results
from a “critical oral history”3 conference shed light on, firstly, the timeline of U.S. decision-making
on peacekeeping in Rwanda. The evidence shows that United States was not in favor of supporting
the United Nation’s mission in Rwanda as of late September, prior to the United Nations (UN)
troops’ arrival, and prior to the killing of U.S. troops in Somalia in early October 1993.4 To be sure,
existing research acknowledges the overall draw down of US peacekeeping missions after the end
of the Cold War, however other scholarship and former political officials focus on the dominant
role of “Somalia syndrome” as the reason for U.S. drawdown in peacekeeping participation.5 The
decision to limit the Rwandan peacekeeping mission and general discussions of a shift in U.S.
policy resulting in Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) was made prior to the Somalia crisis.
United States policy makers in the National Security Council (NSC) were looking for a reason to
1
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limit support, and the killing of US troops in Somalia was the perfect opportunity. This paper,
however, does not go so far as to suggest that there was no link between the Somalia crisis and
the United States’ decision to limit support for the peacekeeping mission in Rwanda.6 The records
show that the movement to pull back on U.S. peacekeeping began prior to Somalia, and the killing
of U.S. troops in October 1993 provided additional momentum for this cause.
Secondly, evidence suggests that the United States used the killing of Belgium peacekeepers
to call for a full withdrawal of troops which resulted in the drawdown of the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) instead of sending reinforcements, which UNAMIR
leadership on the ground and Belgium had originally requested. This is a continuation of the more
general policy where the United States was looking for reasons to disengage from peacekeeping.
New evidence further clarifies the argument against the scapegoating of Belgium and contradicts
other arguments that the United States call for withdrawal was merely a defensive reaction due to
the Somalia crisis, and a move to give Belgium cover in order to save face.7
Thirdly, this paper provides an example of the use of the critical oral history methodology in
the study of historical events, leading to a better understanding of the event and suggests potential
concrete changes to policy that can work to prevent genocide in the future. This paper calls for
future utilization of this methodology and suggests ways to better include marginalized voices.
Finally, the results of this study support scholarship that notes the weakness of the Department
of State in U.S. foreign policy creation, and the argument that the NSC has “greater access to the
president and more impact on strategic and crisis decision-making.”8 The results speak to the power
struggle between U.S. agencies for influence in decision-making, and the complicated nature of
what influences U.S. foreign policy creation.9
These are important findings because they contribute additional key information, further
illuminating the historical record of the international response to genocide in Rwanda, particularly
of the United States. With a better understanding of how important policy decisions are made, it may
be possible to influence these decisions in the future, leading to better genocide and mass atrocity
prevention policy generally. For example, this research shows that key foreign policy decisions
were made within the NSC, as opposed to Department of State staff. This research therefore has
implications for scholars of the Rwandan genocide, as well as those interested in United States and
international response to mass atrocity, and the making of U.S. foreign policy.
Rwanda’s Genocide Unfolds
In August 1993, members of the Rwandan government, made up of mostly Hutus signed a peace
agreement, the Arusha Accords, with the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) a mostly Tutsi rebel
group, ending decades of conflict that was rooted in Belgian colonialism and ethnic tensions. Both
parties requested a U.N. peacekeeping operation to assist in implementing the provisions of the
Arusha Accords, including establishing a transitional government and instituting a disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program, among other goals.
Through a fraught process, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) debated the mandate
and capacity of the peacekeeping operation. Eventually, this led to a narrow mandate for supporting
the implementation of the Arusha Accords, and did not allow peacekeepers to use force.10 The
UNSC passed a resolution to establish UNAMIR on October 5, 1993 with a small force of 2,548
6
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troops and a narrow mandate that was “far short of what would have been needed to guarantee
implementation of the Accords.”11 UNAMIR was “constrained by the relatively small size of the
force as well as by a determination not to repeat the mistakes made in Somalia.”12
While this debate about UNAMIR was taking place at the United Nations, the United States
was engaged in a domestic political debate about the future of U.S. involvement in peacekeeping
operations. As such, the United States was reluctant to support UNAMIR from the beginning.
Richard Clarke, the National Security Advisor for peacekeeping at the White House, felt that
“news from Rwanda only confirmed a deep skepticism about the viability of UN deployments.”13
This political debate and eventual call for a drawdown of U.S. peacekeeping activities would gain
more momentum in the aftermath of the Somalia crisis in which U.S. troops were killed in a failed
military option, during which one of the bodies of the soldiers was dragged through the streets
of Mogadishu in October 1993, making nightly news across the United States.14 The reevaluation
of the United States’ role in peacekeeping would eventually result in the creation of the PDD-25,
providing criteria to guide U.S. decision making on support for peacekeeping operations. These
criteria called for a decrease in United States’ involvement and restricted support for humanitarian
intervention missions.15 While President Clinton did not sign PDD-25 until May 1994, the document
influenced the United States’ strategy for decision-making in response to the genocide in Rwanda
before it was officially released.16
In the autumn of 1993, Canadian General Roméo Dallaire was named force commander of the
peacekeeping operation consisting of contingents from Bangladesh, Ghana, Belgium, and other
countries. The first troops arrived in Rwanda in early November, and the bulk of the force arrived
on the ground in December, less than six months before the start of the genocide.17 From the
beginning Dallaire and his troops struggled with a lack of provisions and support, never having
received approval of standard Rules of Engagement (ROE) which guide the daily procedures of
the mission.18
Over the next months, in late 1993 and early 1994, the Rwandan government failed to
implement major milestones of the Arusha Accords, most importantly the Broad-Based Transitional
Government, which was the first step to implementing other main pieces of the Accords, such as
the DDR program.19 Dallaire and his troops struggled with basic lack of supplies as recorded daily
in his situation reports back to New York.20 On January 11, 1994, Dallaire sent an urgent fax to New
York about a weapons cache and possible plans of mass violence as reported by an informant.21
However, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) continued to deny
Dallaire’s requests for an expanded mandate, or needed supplies and equipment, despite the fax’s
warning.22
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Tensions continued to mount through the late winter and spring of 1994, erupting with the
shooting down of a plane carrying Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundian
President Cyprien Ntaryamira on April 6, 1994. That evening and the next day, April 7, Hutu
extremists and Rwandan government forces started targeting Tutsi and moderate Hutu politicians,
murdering them and their families in their homes. Soon, all Tutsis and moderate Hutus civilians
became targets, leading to mass executions, torture, rape, and massacres of men, women, and
children across Rwanda. Foreign governments, such as the United States, France, and Belgium
quickly shut down embassies, and evacuated personnel and all their civilians, abandoning
thousands of Rwandans to the fate of bands of Interahamwe, a Hutu militia, armed with machetes.
When ten Belgian peacekeeping troops were killed on the first day of the genocide, Belgium
initially requested reinforcements, and many members of the UNSC called for an expansion of
UNAMIR’s mandate and to send reinforcements. On April 15, the United States representative
to the UN dropped “a bombshell” on the UN Security Council calling for the full withdrawal
of UNAMIR troops, despite a strong movement among non-aligned countries on the UNSC to
extend the mandate and send reinforcements.23 Weeks into the genocide on April 21, the UNSC
passed a resolution to withdraw the majority of UNAMIR troops, leaving a “skeletal staff” of 270
down from approximately 2,500.24 Further clarity is needed: How did the United Nations Security
Council come to this decision to withdraw UNAMIR troops? What role did the United States play
and why?
Research Methodology
This study utilized qualitative research methods of analysis of declassified U.S. government records,
semi-structured oral history interviews, shorter reflective interviews, and a type of participatory
action research known as “critical oral history.” The author conducted this research between
January 2013 and December 2016 which consisted of conducting oral history interviews with key
stakeholders, submitting Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Mandatory Declassification
Review (MDR) requests, and analyzing declassified documents. Additionally, the author was a
participant-observer at the June 2014 critical oral history conference.25
In preparation for the critical oral history conference, the National Security Archive and U.S.
Holocaust Memorial Museum filed a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) request with the
Clinton Presidential Library26 in November 2013 for a series of approximately 120 NSC documents.
We identified the series of 120 documents out of lists of thousands of documents that were withheld
under the B1 exemption in prior FOIA cases with the Library. The lists contained the date, office,
and title of most of the documents, and the research team prioritized specific dates, titles, and
incidents, often-times guessing due to lack of information. After a year and a half of multiple
levels of bureaucratic review processes and sign-offs, including Obama administration officials
at the White House, approximately 550 pages were released publicly on the Clinton Presidential
Library website over several days starting on April 7, 2015.27 A selection of the released documents
94-97, accessed December 9, 2018, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB508/docs/Rwanda%20Final%20
Transcript%20Day%201.pdf. The scope of this paper does not include a detailed look into the international response
to Gen. Dallaire’s “genocide fax,” however this topic was extensively discussed in the first day of this conference, the
transcript of which is available in the link above.
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along with initial analysis are available in the National Security Archive electronic briefing book,
“1994 Rwanda Pullout Driven by Clinton White House, U.N. Equivocation” published on April 16,
2015.28 The twentieth anniversary of the genocide and the preparation for the conference provided
the key catalyst to push for this release of documents, however this collection of documents were
not released until nearly a year after the June 2014 conference, and are thus not a subject of the
conference conversation.
Critical oral history is a participatory action research method developed by James Blight and
janet Lang, which brings together former high-level government decision makers to discuss how
they made key policy decisions, drawing upon the declassified documents the officials created as
reference points to frame and direct the conversation. Scholars analyze the documents and pose
questions to the former officials regarding specific policy decisions and chronology of events.
This builds on traditional archival and oral history research because the conversation among the
participants and scholars often bring to light new information about how policies and documents
are created, and how decisions were made.29
The documents bring evidence directly into the conversation and prevents merely a recollection
or discussion about past events, but pushes participants to answer for past actions, decisions, and
writings. Ann Stoler writes that, “whether documents are trustworthy, authentic, and reliable
remain pressing questions, but a turn to the social and political conditions that produced those
documents…has altered the sense of what trust and reliability might signal and politically entail.”30
The critical oral history methodology illuminates the specific contexts, motivations, and informal
conversations during which key policy decisions are often made, though not recorded in official
documents, often advancing scholarship to new understandings of long-researched historical
topics.31 Stoler argues for the importance of “critically reflecting on the making of documents
and how we choose to use them...not as sites of knowledge retrieval but as sites of knowledge
production.”32 Critical oral history conferences can provide the space to produce conversations of
critical reflection and lead to new knowledge production.
The convening of a critical oral history conference is often the first time that officials from
different countries and intuitions are brought together since the time the events took place, or
possibly the first time they are ever meeting in one room together. These conferences can often be
the place where former officials find healing and reconciliation in light of past events, however
they can also bring back painful, traumatic memories.33 Coinciding with the twentieth anniversary
of the Rwandan genocide, the conference created a space and an opportunity to push for additional
declassification of government records, building upon extensive work from previous research
projects and declassification efforts.34 As officials were invited, they were inspired and encouraged
to bring declassified documents from their own governments, some of which were included in
the conference briefing books. Conference attendees provided documents from New Zealand, the
United Kingdom, and the Czech Republic.35 Prudence Bushnell provided a personal notebook from
larger declassification efforts associated with this project.
28
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the time, and several other attendees brought additional primary and secondary material such as
publications, working papers, and reports to circulate.36
The National Security Archive, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, and The Hague
Institute for Global Justice convened a critical oral history conference on the Rwandan genocide
in June 2014 in The Hague, the Netherlands titled, “International Decision-Making in the Age
of Genocide: Rwanda 1990-1994.” Conference organizers invited 35 former officials, high level
decision-makers, journalists, and scholars, representing 14 countries and the United Nations.
Participants included UNAMIR Force Commander Roméo Dallaire and his deputy Henry
Anyidoho, genocide survivor and civil society leader Monique Mujawamariya, Médecins sans
Frontiéres (MSF) representative Dr. Jean-Hervé Bradol, journalists such as Colette Braeckman
and Jean-Philippe Ceppi, and renowned Rwanda genocide scholars and academics such as Linda
Melvern, Andre Guichaoua, and Michael Barnett, among others. The critical oral history portion of
the conference took place over two days and was ordered chronologically and broken into thematic
segments. The participants were given bound copies (briefing books) of 160 declassified documents
to reference during the conference. The conference briefing books were prepared by researchers
after extensive analysis of the documents which were chosen based on themes and chronology of
events to be covered during the conference discussions. Simultaneous interpretation was provided
in both English and French. The conference was audio taped and transcribed, and a rapporteur’s
report, the document collections and an annotated, edited transcript were published electronically
in April 2015.37
United States Opposition to UNAMIR from the Beginning
The United States’ decision to oppose the implementation of UNAMIR in the fall of 1993 was part
of a larger shift in U.S. foreign policy at the time, away from supporting peacekeeping missions
due to the political context at the time, and the crisis in Somalia was the perfect opportunity that
policymakers were looking for to obtain public support for limiting UNAMIR’s mandate. Existing
scholarship points to this broad policy change, and its implications in the United States’ policy in
autumn 1993, however other research and former officials place an emphasis of the Somalia crisis
as the main reason for the policy shift.38 Grünfeld and Huijboom write that “after Somalia, the
Republican Party wanted the United States to get less involved in the peacekeeping missions of
the United States, which was shown in the development of PDD-25.”39 At the critical oral history
conference in June 2014, Ambassador John Shattuck explained that “the hangover with Somalia
produced a new peacekeeping directive, Presidential Decision Directive 25, which came out in
early May 1994.”40
However, recently released documentation supports the argument that the United States’
apprehension to supporting UNAMIR from the beginning was part of the larger trend in U.S.
peacekeeping prior to the Somalia crisis, not as a result of the Somalia crisis. To be sure, this article
does not go as far to claim that the Somalia crisis had very little impact on U.S. policy at the time,
as one recent study claims.41 The killing of U.S. troops in Somalia certainly had a chilling effect on
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36
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U.S. policy towards peacekeeping, and greatly informed the PDD-25 final document, however it
was not the central factor in causing this policy change; it provided more reasons for the United
States to continue strengthening the policy. The following section will explore the broader shift in
U.S. policy towards peacekeeping, as well as how this policy played out in a debate between the
NSC and Department of State regarding support for UNAMIR, both before and after the killing of
U.S. troops in Somalia in early October 1993.
Change in United States Peacekeeping Policy
The development of U.S. policy changes concerning peacekeeping operations is an example of
policy that sheds light on United States’ decision-making process. We see the existence of tension
in power relations between the NSC and Department of State in that the NSC led the policy shift
away from involvement in peacekeeping, and this shift was often in conflict with information and
policies coming from the Department of State.42 Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs, Prudence Bushnell described that the prevailing political climate leading up to
the Somalia crisis in early October 1993 created the context for whether the United States would
support UN peacekeeping troops in Rwanda and minimize existing ones.43 Bushnell explained
that President Clinton won the presidential election in 1992 and was inaugurated in January
1993 with a strong platform of economic reform. The post-Cold War foreign policy and domestic
political pressures about the economy called for the opening of new embassies in former soviet
bloc states, but without spending more money.44 At the time the U.S. was debating the future of the
Rwanda peacekeeping mission, the Department of State was “looking for money to fund the new
embassies,” so the agency made the choice to make cuts to missions in African countries, explained
Bushnell. This resulted in tension in the Department of State as the government was “in the process
of moving out, closing down AID programs, [and] closing down…CIA stations.”45 Bushnell’s job
was to “postpone the decision to cut off funding, or the other way is just get a little bit of funding”
and that she was relieved that “at least the door was open to a peacekeeping operation.”46 U.S.
foreign policy had already begun to shift in 1993, and Department of State officials like Prudence
Bushnell felt the political pressures for the United States to disengage from peacekeeping missions,
especially in Africa. United States support for peacekeeping missions “became an even harder sell
in October ’93” after to Somalia crisis.47 Even prior to the Somalia crisis, officials in the NSC were
struggling to find a way forward amid the lack of resources.
Tony Lake, National Security Advisor at the time, explained that in Clinton’s late September
1993 speech to the U.N., “the president began by calling for stronger peacekeeping operations by
the U.N. -- not say no, but learning how more effectively to say yes…In other words, to make the
U.N. more effective in all this, but at the same time, to recognize that you have to make choices, that
the U.N. cannot do everything.”48 This policy shift is evident in the Department of State documents
where there is an effort to support the peace process in Rwanda, however the documents also show
the pushback from the NSC, particularly Richard Clarke who is looking for opportunities to say
“no.”
In a newly released document dated August 2, 1993 from Susan Rice, a member of NSC
peacekeeping staff in 1993 and 1994, to Tony Lake described the challenges facing United States
support of peacekeeping at the time, even prior to the Somalia crisis in early October 1993.49 She
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wrote that while the United States has “interest in resolving” the five upcoming peacekeeping
operations, “we do not have funds to pay for them.” She continues: “The reality is that the U.S.
must begin immediately to make tough choices among new as well as existing operations, while we
fight strenuously to obtain sufficient funds from congress and support from the American public”
(emphasis original). Rice clearly explains the dilemma, indicating the interest in supporting the
peacekeeping, citing the “strenuous” fight, but also the lack of political will in congress, and lack
of public support. She identifies the specific financial concerns in “finding offsets to pay for new
operations since obtaining brand new money is obviously unlikely in the near term.” Rice cites the
“current hostility among congressional appropriations to peacekeeping” particularly in “regions
of little public interest” and indicates that “obtaining a budget amendment…could be difficult and
require, at a minimum, high-level administration lobbying.”
Rice explains that there are two main options the U.S. must choose from when facing these
upcoming peacekeeping operations and what she cites as the United States’ “$1 billion” debt to U.N.
peacekeeping: “voting for mission which we cannot pay for, or; vetoing resolutions because we lack
sufficient funds.”50 She sees that the first option is “irresponsible” because of the damage it would
cause to U.N. infrastructure, but also sees the second option as concerning as other permanentfive (P5) member nations might follow suit. This document further illuminates explanations of the
political climate leading up to the Rwanda genocide, even before the Somalia crisis as one that was
generally moving away from United States involvement in peacekeeping, mainly due to economic
concerns, and lack of public support, particularly from congress.51
Scholar Michael Barnett identified challenges the U.N. faced in a post-Cold War where
powerful states such as the United States “were openly questioning the U.N.’s role in world
politics.”52 He argues that this was then exacerbated by the crisis in Somalia and that the “United
States scapegoated the U.N. for its own policy failures,” causing a “positively poisons” relationship
between the United States and the U.N.53 Barnett explained at the conference in June 2014, that U.S.
lack of support for UNAMIR was “part of the broader climate…of that period…that the US [was]
impoverishing the U.N.,” and the United States was looking for any reason “to shut down the
operation.”54 The memo from Rice to Lake from August 2, 1993 clearly illustrates the pre-Somalia
crisis lack of support for the U.N., which then became further constrained after Somalia, and
continued through the genocide.
During the June 2014 conference, Former Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck remarked
that the political context in which the United States was moving away from humanitarian intervention
“began to evolve very rapidly after the Somalia crisis.”55 The United States’ involvement in and
support of peacekeeping missions was being reevaluated, somewhat in response to the disaster
in Somalia, explained Shattuck, but also a general “hardening of views in the U.S. Pentagon about
peacekeeping operations.”56 In his book, Shattuck explained that President Clinton was skeptical
of the Department of Defense and Pentagon, never having served in the military. Prior to Somalia,
the President’s relationship “with the Pentagon brass were strained during the early period of
his presidency” due to “the question over his draft service and his handling of the issues of gays
in the military.”57 By renegotiating the United States’ stance on peacekeeping missions globally
and placing strict requirements on U.S. involvement, as outlined in PDD-25, President Clinton
hoped to gain more credibility with the defense agencies. Shattuck explained that as the architect
October 10, 2018, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/docs/2014-0278-M_19930802.pdf. When the
author indicates the document is “newly released,” it is from the collection of records released by the Clinton
Presidential Library in April 2015, described in the methodology section of this paper.
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of PDD-25, NSC advisor Richard Clarke was attempting to save U.S. involvement in peacekeeping
by preventing further tragedies which would make the United States even less likely to support
future operations.
Clarke was the lead in creating the new, more limited U.S. policy toward humanitarian
intervention and peacekeeping, and as the documents show, had considerable influence on the
final decision-making on the U.S. support for non-intervention.58 Samantha Power wrote that
“what is most remarkable about the American response to the Rwandan genocide is not so much
the absence of U.S. military action as that during the entire genocide the possibility of U.S. military
intervention was never even debated.”59 Power’s assertion is logical because the NSC was looking
to drawdown the Rwandan peacekeeping operation from the very beginning, and U.S. intervention
would thus have never debated once the genocide started because of political pressures to reduce
U.S. peacekeeping. While the killing of U.S. troops in Somalia certainly had an impact on the
United States’ decision to only reluctantly support UNAMIR, these new documents point to a
more complex narrative of policy at the time, rather than seen as a predominantly defensive action
to withdraw support for peacekeeping operations in reaction to the Somalia crisis, which many
scholars and former U.S. officials favor.60 These documents support the argument of some scholars
and former officials that see the United States’ resistance to UNAMIR as part of a larger context of
change in U.S. policy on peacekeeping, which was exacerbated by, but existed prior to, the Somalia
crisis.61
Internal Debate over Support for UNAMIR
This broader change in peacekeeping had a clear impact on the discussion within the State
Department, and within the NSC, as well as a debate between the two organizations prior to the
Somalia crisis in early October 1993. This debate between the NSC and Department of State also
shows the tension between the two offices over the final say on U.S. foreign policy-making.
In a newly released document from September 28, 1993, U.S. representative to the United
Nations (USUN), Madeleine Albright reported that the Rwandan peacekeeping operation (PKO) “is
one of the better-organized PKOs we have seen” writing that it clearly fits the six points of criteria
discussed that would guide U.S. policy toward supporting PKOs. Two days later on September 30,
a U.S. intelligence assessment reported that “the United Nations peacekeeping plan for Rwanda
has excellent prospects for success” and warned that “failure to provide a peacekeeping force”
would be “adverse to U.S. interests.”62 The intelligence assessment went on to say that in the case
of UNAMIR in Rwanda, “support of UN operations should be inexpensive, uncomplicated, and
far less demanding than the PKOs…elsewhere in Africa.”63 High levels of the U.S. government not
only expected UNAMIR to be a success, but failure to support UNAMIR would result in “increased
regional instability” and a “breakdown of the peacekeeping process.”64 It seemed as though U.S.
support for the peacekeeping mission would be clear. However, members of the NSC had already
made up their minds that UNAMIR was not worth supporting.65
In a newly released Department of State cable from September 29, 1993 from USUN to the
Secretary of State in Washington, D.C., Albright wrote that “Dick Clarke intimated that Rwanda
may be the case the NSC is looking for to prove that the US can say “no” to a new peacekeeping
58

Power, A Problem from Hell, 364.

59

Ibid., 367.

60

Kroslak, The French, 207-208; Adelman and Suhrke, Early Warning and Response, 303.

61

Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide, 162-163; Lake, Interview by PBS Frontline.

62

Secret Memorandum, “Assessment: Peacekeeping Operations in Rwanda,” Electronic Briefing Book no. 511, Washington,
DC: National Security Archive, September 30, 1993, accessed June 4, 2018, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB511/docs/DOCUMENT%203.pdf.

63

Ibid.

64

Ibid.

65

Cable USUN 4735 from Madeleine Albright U.S. Mission to the U.N. to U.S. Secretary of State, “Rwanda and Criteria
for New UN PKO,” Electronic Briefing Book no. 511, Washington, DC: National Security Archive, September 28, 1993,
accessed June 4, 2018, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/docs/DOCUMENT%201.pdf.

©2018

Genocide Studies and Prevention 12, no. 3 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.12.3.1611

Willard

152

operation.”66 Despite the intelligence assessment from September 30, NSC advisor Tony Lake,
Richard Clarke and aide Susan Rice wrote in an October 1, 1993 email “while this operation may
have a better of success than some others, the Security Council vote [on UNAMIR’s mandate] comes
at a difficult moment for us given our stated reluctance to say ‘yes’ to every proposed operation.”67
Cleary, the NSC’s opposition to UNAMIR was not simply a reaction to the Somalia crisis which
would erupt into the killing of 18 U.S. soldiers two days later on October 3, 1993. 68 Additionally,
this opposition went against government intelligence which supporting UNAMIR would be in the
national interest of the United States, showing a disagreement between NSC and Department of
State on policy towards UNAMIR.
It is important to note these two different, but concurrent lines of thinking. The Department
of State had high hopes for the success of UNAMIR and saw that a successful mission would be
crucial for promoting regional stability. At the same time, we see a more general concern from the
NSC about the difficult economic and political situation the U.S. faced in developing peacekeeping
policy, as we see in Rice’s August 1993 memo. In a 2003 interview with PBS, former Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose explains that he had received “guidance” from
“senior people in the administration” to support the Rwanda peace processes because it “had great
potential, not only for Rwanda, but the entire region.”69 He continued by explaining there was
certainly concerns from within the NSC, parts of the Department of State, and the Department
of Defense about “about adding yet another major peacekeeping operation to a very long list of
peacekeeping operations we had in Africa alone.” He explains that there were not only concerns
in the Clinton administration, but also in congress: “[it was] a burden about cost, a question about
how you justify and rationalize all this to the appropriators and the committees on the Hill, many
of whom didn’t think we needed to be there at all.”70 There was strong resistance to support any
new peacekeeping mission, including Rwanda specifically due to economic issues and lack of
political will.
This tension between different parts of the government was discussed during the June 2014
conference. Scholar Michael Barnett, who was working for the U.N. at the time of the genocide
explained his viewpoints on the state of U.S. policy in 1993 and leading up to the genocide in early
1994. Shattuck spoke to the tension among different parts of the U.S. government, in response to
remarks by Barnett:
I do not think there was a unified position within the U.S. government that we had to
pick off peacekeeping operations and shut them down. I think there were parts of the U.S.
government that had a different position, the State Department in particular. President
Clinton had done a lot to contract out certain U.S. activities and obligations to the UN. There
was an ambivalence in the U.S. government about peacekeeping.71

We see this lack of a unified position between the Department of State and the NSC, particularly
around this issue of whether or not to approve the peacekeeping mission for Rwanda.
Despite the NSC’s opposition, on October 5, 1993, the UNSC authorized UNAMIR with
reluctant support from the United States, commissioning 2,548 U.N. troops to the mission in
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Rwanda.72 While the aftermath of the killing of U.S. troops and the graphic images of them being
dragged through the streets certainly had an impact on U.S. foreign policy, the United States’
opposition to UNAMIR was not simply a reaction to the Somalia crisis. The policy stance was the
result of a growing political climate to move to decrease the United States’ role in international
humanitarian intervention.
The disagreement among U.S. agencies about intervention in Rwanda and the “lack of trust”
in the Department of State is clear in these documents. Steven Hook wrote that this lack of trust
results in a situation where “the State Department is routinely neglected in each of its primary
areas of responsibility: the development and articulation of foreign policy; the conduct of private
and public diplomacy; and the transfer of foreign assistance.”73 This tension between the NSC
and the Department of State viewpoints influenced the United States’ and subsequently the
United Nations’ final polices towards Rwanda, from the months leading up to, and throughout,
the genocide. The United States had a strong voice in putting limits on UNAMIR’s mandate in
order to minimize the likelihood of a military or expanded intervention, affecting the capabilities
of Dallaire on the ground in Rwanda. As the UNSC debated the funding and mandate of the
would-be peacekeeping operation, Dallaire recalled during the June 2014 conference that he was
frustrated by “the impossible scenario of reducing [his] troop level request even before [he] started
to deploy.”74 Prudence Bushnell, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
explained that “UNAMIR was dead on arrival.”75
As evidence presented shows, the larger political context of U.S. policy to move away from
supporting peacekeeping operations prior to the Somalia crisis. The tension among agencies in
the U.S. government about this policy clearly influenced the U.S. stance on Rwanda throughout
the peace process and ensuing genocide. This policy stance eventually led to the decision to call
for a withdrawal of UNAMIR in April 1994. This shift in policy had consequences leading to an
underfunded UNAMIR, which eventually contributed to Rwanda’s descent into genocide, and the
failure of the international community to respond to stop the violence.
United States in the Driver’s Seat
The United States’ move to reduce support for peacekeeping fueled the U.S. government’s strategy
and efforts to limit and “pull the plug” on UNAMIR. This course of action in opposition to the
peacekeeping operation continued unabated even with the start of the genocide on April 7, 1994.
Looking closely at the international community’s decision to withdraw UNAMIR troops provides
a clearer understanding of the making of U.S. foreign policy, as well as international decisionmaking in the U.N. Evidence from newly declassified documents and conversations from the June
2014 critical oral history conference provide further illumination to what was going on behind the
scenes in the first weeks of the genocide, further clarifying the central role of the United States in
pushing to call for a withdraw of UNAMIR troops in April 1994.76
Existing literature and former officials paint the picture of the decision to withdraw UNAMIR
peacekeeping troops as Belgium’s defensive reaction to the killing of their 10 peacekeeping troops,
and the United States call for withdrawal as a symptom of suffering from “Somalia syndrome.”77
Other research considers a more complicated series of events, challenging the oversimplification
of Belgium’s role in the withdrawal of UNAMIR troops. Grünfeld and Huijboom write, “many
authors, political and military leaders indeed have interpreted the Belgian role in this way with
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some disgust, making Belgium an easy scapegoat for a world-wide failure to prevent the genocide
in Rwanda.”78 New evidence supports the argument that UNAMIR troop withdrawal was not
simply Belgium’s defensive reaction to the killing of ten of their peacekeeping troops. Documents
show that pressure from the United States via the NSC to find a reason to pull back on peacekeeping
missions resulted in stonewalling the U.N. Security Council despite well-organized Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM) efforts to expand the UNAMIR mandate and send reinforcements. In a puzzling
move, Belgium switched from calling for reinforcements to calling for a full withdrawal, lobbying
strongly for other governments to join them.79 Within the U.S. government tension mounted between
the NSC and Department of State regarding who makes the final call on U.S. decision-making
about the future of UNAMIR in early April 1994. This incident clearly shows how eventually, the
NSC made the final call on U.S. foreign policy to call for the withdrawal of peacekeeping troops as
the genocide in Rwanda raged on. The following section will explore the debate within the United
States government and its actions within the U.N. regarding the decision to withdraw UNAMIR,
as well as the aftermath of this decision, both in the U.N., and on the ground in Rwanda.
To Withdraw UNAMIR or Not?
Madeleine Albright, U.S. representative to the U.N. at the time, wrote that the U.S. decision to
withdraw was largely a response to the Belgian request to the U.S. to support its decision to
withdraw the UNAMIR troops.80 Power explained that the U.S. responded to Belgian requests
to provide “cover” and “support for a full U.N. withdrawal.”81 It was less of the United States
wanting to help out Belgium, and more that the NSC saw an opportunity to pull out which it
had been looking for since before day one. Melvern wrote that the United Kingdom and the
United States were set on the conclusion that the peacekeeping mission was no longer functioning
under its current mandate, and that the two nations were “considering whether or not to pull out
UNAMIR completely.82 A newly released document from April 9, 1994 shows that the NSC was
pushing “to terminate [the] U.N. mission,” because as NSC official Richard Clarke explained, the
mission is “not working” and should be withdrawn.83 He continues, “we make a lot of noise about
terminating U.N. forces that aren’t working. Well, few could be as clearly not working. We should
work with the French [sic] to gain a consensus to terminate the U.N. mission.”
The United States consistently refused any expansion in mandate or force size, in a
continuation of the policy of the preceding six months. The killing of the Belgian troops was a
convenient reason to further U.S. policy to pull support for the Rwanda peacekeeping mission. As
mentioned previously, Clarke was looking for a reason to “say no” to UNAMIR, and this time his
efforts were successful.84 U.S. and U.N. officials ignored requests from Dallaire and his second in
command, Henry Anyidoho, leaving the peacekeepers confused and lacking desperately needed
support: “The normal practice is that if you are in an emergency situation, and you come under
pressure, you are reinforced” explained Anyidoho.85 Nigeria’s representative Ibrahim Gambari
found it “baffling that at a time of crisis, by act of omission or commission, the council supported
the reduction option.”86
Meanwhile, the NAM caucus in the UNSC vociferously called for reinforcements for UNAMIR
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and an expansion of its mandate.87 The NAM caucus led by Nigerian permanent representative
to the U.N. Ibrahim Gambari wrote a non-paper making the argument for expansion and was
supported by the permanent representatives of New Zealand and the Czech Republic, Colin
Keating and Karel Kovanda, respectively. Gambari explained that “The Africans on the Council,
Djibouti and Nigeria, supported of course by Brazil and the Czech Republic, argued forcefully that
the idea of cutting and running was totally unacceptable...there was a deliberate proposal to reduce
and that was the option that was finally allowed.”88 However, despite pressure from the NAM
caucus, the United States maintained a firm stance in opposition to UNAMIR creating a chain
reaction which then resulted in the United Nation’s Secretary General to call for a full withdrawal
of UNAMIR troops.
Through political maneuvering, the United States was able to obtain a group decision to
withdraw UNAMIR, keeping in alignment with the consistent policy of opposition to international
humanitarian intervention in Rwanda. The U.S.’s lobbying and refusal to reinforce UNAMIR
resulted in the Belgian’s withdrawal of its peacekeepers, leading the UNSC to call for a nearly full
withdrawal of UNAMIR.89 Without reinforcements, Belgian officials felt that the threat to their
peacekeepers was too great. Belgian Ambassador to Rwanda, Johan Swinnen explained that “it
was difficult, if not impossible, to justify keeping Belgian troops in Rwanda any longer.”90 He
explained that “the Belgian Minister [Willy Claes] would not have called for withdrawal if we could
have rapidly revised the mandate to produce a stronger mandate for UNAMIR.”91 Subsequently,
without Belgian troops, officials at the United Nations felt that the entire UNAMIR force was no
longer viable. In a letter to the UNSC, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali called for a withdrawal
because without Belgian troops, “it will be extremely difficult for UNAMIR to carry out its tasks
effectively.”92 In this case, because the U.S. was so vehemently against the expansion of UNAMIR,
Belgium was pressured to call for a pullout. Either UNAMIR need to be reinforced, or it would fail,
and considering that a large number of the UNAMIR forces were Belgian, Brussels could no longer
support the mission.
Once Belgium announced the withdrawal of its troops from UNAMIR, the U.S.’s public
position moved from an opposition to the reinforcement of the peacekeeping mission to the public
call for full withdrawal of UNAMIR. The NSC took the lead on formulating a public statement,
as documented in notes from a top-level meeting of U.S. officials on April 11, 1994 in which
Richard Clarke directs the International Organization office of the Department of State to draft
the resolution to withdraw UNAMIR.93 Prudence Bushnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs at the Department of State recorded in her personal notebook (made public in 2014), that
the “NSC requested IO to draft resolution to pull UNAMIR” and recalled that the NSC request
came from Richard Clarke.94
Madeleine Albright, U.S. permanent representative to the U.N. wrote in an April 12, 1994 cable,
that “it is worth considering taking the lead in the Security Council to authorize the evacuation
of the bulk of UNAMIR while leaving behind a skeletal staff.”95 However, the NSC was set on
calling for a full withdrawal. In a newly released document from April 14, Richard Clarke is quoted
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saying in a teleconference, “there will be a short delay while we seek a mechanism to terminate
UNAMIR.”96 When that decision was made, Bushnell said she knew “that we had just signed the
death warrant of people.”97
United States “Drops Bombshell” Calling for a Full Withdrawal
On April 14 the United States put the plan to publicly call for a full withdrawal into motion;
however, there was heated disagreement between the Department of State and the NSC.
United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher wrote in a cable that “the greatly changed
circumstances in Rwanda have rendered untenable the continued presence of UNAMIR forces
in the country. We support a rapid but orderly withdrawal of UNAMIR forces.”98 As the United
States’ public narrative shifted from being against an expansion of UNAMIR to a full withdrawal
of the peacekeepers, Secretary Warren delivered instructions to the U.S. representative at the U.N.
to “approach senior secretariat officials urgently” and gain support. The cable also instructed the
U.S. embassy in Belgium to “urge the GOB [Government of Belgium] to make a similar approach
to the SYG [Secretary General] or his senior representatives.”99 The U.S. embassy in Paris was to
“inform the French government of our position and seek support.”100 The United States wanted to
gain support from a coalition of nations in the Security Council to pull the peacekeeping troops.
These records suggest that the United States requested support from Belgium to call for a full
withdrawal, contrary to the prevailing idea that the United States responded to Belgium’s request
for support to withdraw the troops.
Belgian Foreign Minister Willie Claes spoke to both Czech and Argentine officials, notifying
them of Belgian’s pullout of UNAMIR, and recommending a full withdrawal of UNAMIR troops
from Rwanda.101 Melvern described this lobbying by the Belgians as “a diplomatic blizzard.”102
During the June 2014 conference, Nigeria’s Ibrahim Gambari recalled that Belgium “had the right
to decide to withdraw, but they went beyond withdrawing. They canvassed strongly to bring to
an end UNAMIR entirely.”103 He said, “I do not understand how they went from the position
of calling for a strengthening in UNAMIR’s mandate in February 1994 to completely bringing
down UNAMIR, when a horrendous situation of genocide was going on.”104 Karel Kovanda of the
Czech Republic also recalled the morphing of Belgian policy from withdrawing its own troops to
“intensive efforts to scuttle UNAMIR as a whole.”105
Even after the murder of the 10 Belgian peacekeepers on April 7, Brussels was still calling
for an expansion of UNAMIR on April 8.106 Then, by April 12, Brussels was lobbying hard, “the
Belgians had spoken to USUN about this and expected shortly to send instructions to Belgian
embassies in UNSC permanent member capitals to ask for speedy decision on this issue.”107 The
Belgians had abruptly determined that the UNAMIR “should be suspended for the time being as
it no longer corresponds to the circumstances on the ground.”108 The NSC was looking for a reason
to withdraw UNAMIR, and the killing of Belgian troops provided the reason.
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During this time, the NAM caucus was launching a fierce argument in support of expanding
UNAMIR. At the conference in June 2014, Nigerian permanent representative Ibrahim Gambari
recalled the debate in the Security Council that day and explained that “There had never been an
interest on the part of the [permanent members] …or even to some extent the U.N. Secretariat, in
taking very seriously the positions of the non-aligned movement or the Africans who, after all,
are elected by the African constituencies to defend Africa’s position. The Africans are closest to
the events.”109 Gambari explained in frustration that even at a time when the NAM caucus was
considered powerful with six votes, their views were not taken seriously.110
A newly released Department of State cable from April 15 titled “U.S. Drops Bombshell on
Security Council” reported a member of the NAM caucus saying “while Belgian concerns are
understandable, they should not dictate the Council on the future of UNAMIR. UNAMIR should
not repeat not withdraw,” but still gave instructions for Albright to call for a full withdrawal.111
Albright wrote in her autobiography that her orders read: “Our opposition to retaining a
UNAMIR presence in Rwanda is firm…It is based on our conviction that the Security Council
has an obligation to ensure that peacekeeping operations are viable...and that UN peacekeeping
personnel are not placed or retained, knowingly, in an untenable situation.”112 There was, however,
disagreement within the U.S. government. Albright recalled that hearing Gambari’s presentation of
the NAM’s arguments and draft resolution to expand UNAMIR’s mandate and reinforce the troops
encouraged her to rethink the United States’ position.113 She considered that the U.S. was perhaps
on the wrong side and that the U.S.’s stance was being seen as obstructionist. In a 2004 interview
with PBS Frontline, Albright explained, “I had the instructions which made no sense at all.” She
left the meeting to go into the hall to phone Washington. Albright notes that while her orders
officially came from the Department of State, she thought she “might be able to get faster action
from the NSC.”114 “I decided not to call the State Department from whence my instructions really
came, but the National Security Council, because they were dealing with this on a very imminent
basis…they said… ‘we’re worrying about this, and these are your instructions.’ I actually screamed
into the phone. I said, ‘they’re unacceptable and I want them changed’,” Albright explained.115This
reinforces the view that the NSC had “more impact on strategic and crisis decision making” than
the Department of State.116
The United States’ hard stance in opposition to UNAMIR continued to influence the Security
Council’s decisions. Once Albright received more flexible instructions, the Security Council was
eventually able to pass a resolution on the fate of UNAMIR that decreased its mandate but did
not fully withdraw the troops. In a recently released document from April 19, NSC official Eric
Schwartz wrote to Susan Rice and Donald Steinberg at the NSC to report that Human Rights Watch
was “pleading that we oppose a quick UNAMIR pull-out from Rwanda” and if pulled out, “the
Rwandans will quickly become victims of genocide.”117 He asks, “Is this true? If so, shouldn’t it
be a major factor informing high-level decision-making on this issue? Has it been?” The Security
Council passed a resolution on April 21 drawing down troops from around 2,000 to 270.
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General Henry Anyidoho, in command of 800 Ghanaians on the ground as part of UNAMIR,
questioned the reduction of troops down to 270. He explained at the June 2014 conference, “We
were also on the ground and did not show any indication of leaving Rwanda. We were still ready,
doing our job, all over the country. So why 270?”118 Anyidoho and his troops remained in Rwanda
after the resolution was passed, as Gambari pointed out, technically in violation of the UN Security
Council decision on April 21.119 Anyidoho emphasized that in response to the drawdown: “we on
the ground felt it went against all logic that in an emergency situation, instead of being reinforced,
our force was reduced… It was as if the mission was being abandoned.”120 Colin Keating, the
permanent member from New Zealand explained at the June 2014 conference that “the only reason
the authorized level went to 270 was because this was the only figure which the U.S. team in New
York would accept.”121
Eventually, the U.N. labored to assemble an intervention force. Barnett writes that “at this
point, the United States government was alone in publicly denying that the killing in Rwanda
constituted genocide and was virtually isolated in opposing intervention.”122 A newly released
May 16, 1994 memorandum for Executive Secretary of the NSC William Itoh, lays out the variety of
options possible under the recently implemented PDD-25, making it clear that the United States will
not support a strengthening of UNAMIR.123 In a recently released June 15 memo from Steinberg,
regarding talking points for President Clinton, suggesting that “it would do the President well to
stand up for himself and say that genocide has occurred in Rwanda. Period.”124 Steinberg continues,
saying: “We have every reason to believe that [acts of genocide have] [genocide has] occurred in
Rwanda, as defined under the 1948 convention” (brackets original). If asked about obligations,
Steinberg notes, “The Genocide Convention does not impose a responsibility on the part of any
government to take any specific action.”125
Conclusion
The United States formed a policy in opposition to UNAMIR as the United Nations Security Council
Members debated its mission, and as discussed previously, Richard Clarke at the NSC determined
it would fail from the beginning, despite other U.S. intelligence suggesting it was viable, and likely
going to be a successful mission. The United States’ lack of support for UNAMIR was present
before the murder of U.S. troops in Somalia, where as existing scholarship argues that the main
reason for the United States’ lack of support for UNAMIR was in response to a drawback of United
States humanitarian intervention due to the disaster in Somalia in October 1993. This policy then
continued as the genocide unfolded, documents showing the U.S. maintaining a strong stance and
through political maneuvering was able to get the UNSC to vote for the withdrawal of UNAMIR
troops.
The documents show that the United States’ hard stance on foreign policy issues are often
influenced by actors outside of the Department of State, and often for complex reasons, supporting
existing scholarship on the creation of U.S. foreign policy.126 The documents provide supporting
evidence to the theory that often the NSC makes the final call on U.S. foreign policy in crisis
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situations. This is important for lobbyists, civil society members, and concerned citizens who may
want to influence U.S. decision-making and response regarding mass atrocity. It is an important
consideration for those working toward supporting better policies to prevent mass human rights
violations and genocide in the future.
While this paper analyzed the role of the United States in the U.N.’s decision to withdraw
UNAMIR troops, this was only one of the many pieces of the international community’s response
to the genocide in Rwanda. For example, France played a large role in international decisionmaking in response to the genocide in Rwanda, however access to declassified government
information from the French government is extremely limited to non-existent. During the June
2014 conference, former Secretary General of the French Presidency Hubert Védrine said called for
the release of French government records relating to the genocide in Rwanda: “France has already
made a lot public through the Quilès inquiry, but there are obviously many other documents [still
to be released]. I would like to improve access to the archives of all the protagonists.”127 Additional
declassification of French documents could greatly contribute to existing scholarly work on the role
of the French in the genocide. It would be beneficial for other scholars to push for declassification
of information from other governments and do similar studies to better understand international
and foreign policy decision-making, especially for nations who were present in the U.N. Security
Council during the genocide in Rwanda.
It would also be beneficial for scholars to heed Nigerian Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari and
more closely look at the roles, influence, and position of the non-permanent members and the NAM
caucus. He said that a failure to consider the perspectives of states other than the permanent five
will cause a continuation of the same issues that led to the failure of the international community’s
response to Rwanda in 1994.128 He stated at the June 2014 conference: “[W]hy is Africa’s role always
downplayed? It is as if we were ghosts…It is a mindset that continues, I am sorry to say, in the
Security Council even today…If we reduce discussion in the Security Council to the preferences
of the P5 or the P3, a lot of the issues that we are discussing here will continue. I feel very strongly
and passionately about this because I have seen it elsewhere, beyond Rwanda.”129 Further research
and genocide prevention work should more fully consider the role of states beyond the permanent
members to the UN Security Council.
While the use of critical oral history as a method of participatory action research is an
important research tool to more deeply engage the archival record of past conflict and policy in
response to genocide, further advancements can be made. Future research using the critical oral
history conference methodology could include a wider variety of actors, including members of
civil society, allowing for a perspective that is often excluded from national and international levels
of policy making. It was an important step in this critical oral history conference to invite the
participation of Monique Mujawamariya, a survivor of the genocide and a civil society leader,
however, additional voices at the table, and a wider discussion of civil society forces on the ground
in Rwanda would have been beneficial to understanding alternative responses to the genocide and
possible opportunities for prevention. These viewpoints could lend a further critical eye and deep
discussion of the documents themselves, and the context in which the documents were created,
leading to a richer understanding of the archives and their historical context of how policy was
made and potential alternatives. This could then lead to more successful prevention efforts.
It is also important to note that while the United States government released this large and
important new collection of documents in April 2015 about U.S. foreign policy in response to
the genocide in Rwanda, important information remains classified. Many of the newly released
documents can help us better understand the complicated intricacies of U.S. domestic and foreign
policy at the time, but key pieces of information are still not accessible. The U.S. and other foreign
governments need to place a high priority on the release of key information related to mass
atrocity, genocide and human rights violations that will allow a better understanding of how
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government policy is made. A better understanding of how policy is created can lead to creating
better preventative policy in the future.
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Introduction
Between April 1975 and January 1979 the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK; better known as
the “Khmer Rouge”) carried out a program of state-led mass violence that resulted in the death
of approximately two million men, women, and children.1 In just under four years approximately
one-quarter of the country’s pre-1975 population died. For many scholars and commentators, most
emblematic of the Cambodian genocide is the forcible evacuation of Phnom Penh, Cambodia’s
capital and focal point of the country’s political economy. Following the defeat of republican forces
loyal to then-President Lon Nol, the Khmer Rouge began the evacuation of the city’s population.
Within days, upwards of 80 percent of Phnom Penh’s inhabitants were forced to leave the city, most
often on foot, to be relocated on rural cooperatives and work camps. The evacuation was arduous;
and many people died along the way.
The standard interpretation of the evacuation, discussed ad nauseam, holds that the evacuation
of Phnom Penh (and other cities and towns) is a case of urbicide, that is, the deliberate targeting
and destruction of urban spaces.2 Martin Shaw, for example, contends that urbicide finds “its
most extreme expression in the Khmer Rouge’s emptying of Phnom Penh,” while Ryan Bishop
and Gregory Clancey describe the forcible evacuation as “the most infamous deurbanization of
modern times.”3 Scholars, by extension, premise the evacuation to be reflective of a supposed antiintellectual, anti-technological, and anti-urban penchant of the CPK.
Recent scholarship reassesses the standard explanations and calls to question previous
interpretations of CPK policy and practice.4 In contrast to the standard account, for example, new
documentary-based research argues that “the Cambodian city is no longer seen as an abandoned
husk forcibly depopulated to support a utopian ideology” but instead cities throughout Democratic
1
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Kampuchea—as the country was renamed—“re-emerged as pragmatic necessities to support
the life-functions of rural production and consumption.”5 In so doing, the CPK reorganized the
urban geographies of Democratic Kampuchea in conformance with broader political-economic
objectives, namely “to serve the people’s livelihood, and to raise the people’s standard of living
quickly, both in terms of supplies and in terms of other material goods.”6 The CPK sought to
achieve this objective through the satisfaction of a second objective, this being to “seek, gather,
save, and increase capital from agriculture.”7
Reinterpretations of the functions of cities within Democratic Kampuchea raises additional
questions regarding the evacuation itself. If the purpose was not to destroy cities for ideological
reasons but instead to transform urban areas to facilitate economic production, how are we to
reinterpret the quotidian experience of evacuation? In this paper, we provide a preliminary,
empirical reconstruction of the evacuation as experienced by survivors. Simply put, the broad
skeleton of the evacuation is well understood; and myriad personal accounts provide flesh to
bone.8 Missing, however, is a systematic reconstruction of lived experiences that takes seriously
the fluid geographies of the Khmer Rouge evacuation. Stated differently, we seek to provide a
geographically-informed account of the evacuation in order to provide a more fine-grained analysis
of Khmer Rouge practice. In so doing, we draw on, and contribute to, the ongoing ‘spatial turn’
in genocide studies, notably, the application of geospatial technologies, including geographical
information systems (GIS), to the study of historical and contemporary genocides.9 To this end,
we utilize an innovative, spatially-grounded interview procedure, this being the spatial video
geonarrative (SVG).10
Previous scholarship highlights the salience of personal narratives in genocide research.11
However, as Marguerite Madden and Amy Ross explain, the combination of geographic information
science (GIScience) technologies with qualitative narrative data provides an opportunity to analyze
critically spatial relationships of mass violence in ways not previously possible.12 Indeed, following
Brittany Card and Isaac Baker, spatial data guides the analysis in identifying specific geographic
areas of importance.13 The development of SVG, in particular, advances a spatial methodology
5
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to capture and analyze ‘lived experiences’ and provides an excellent tool to collect and interpret
data where none exists, or to add context to the spatial analysis of more conventional forms of oral
histories and witness testimony.14 In particular, our advance is a relatively easily operated form of
data collection and analysis whereby multiple geographically-grounded narratives can be overlaid
to build a contextual interpretation of violent practice—in this case, that of the forcible evacuation
of Phnom Penh.
The Context of the Evacuation
Between 1965 and 1973, military forces of the United States of America conducted aerial
bombardment campaigns over, and a covert military incursion into, Cambodian territory to: (1)
reduce the flow of arms and personnel from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to the
Republic of Vietnam (RVN); (2) deprive the National Liberation Front (NLF; commonly known as
the ‘Viet Cong’) of safe havens; and (3) support the broad objectives of communist ‘containment’
in Southeast Asia.15 The air campaign was especially devastating, as US forces dropped nearly
3 million tons of ordnance on Cambodia during this period, with casualties estimated between
150,000 to 750,000.16 Moreover, hundreds of thousands of Cambodian fled rural areas for the cities,
seeking refuge from US military action and an increasingly brutal civil war. When the Khmer
Rouge captured Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975, the city’s population had swelled from 1.5 million
to 3 million; upwards of 80 percent of this growth is attributed by rural refugees.17
For many people in Cambodia—but especially those finding refuge in Phnom Penh—hunger
was an ever-present reality. In the capital city, food was hard to come by, because of corruption,
infrastructure collapse, and the destruction of farms and fields. By war’s end, approximately
one-third of the country’s bridges were destroyed, two-fifths of the road network was unusable,
and the railroad was inoperable. The extensive destruction wrought by the sustained bombing
campaigns ravaged agricultural production: between 1970 and 1973, for example, the area under
rice cultivation decreased by 77 percent and the total rice harvest decreased by 84 percent.18
Upwards of half of Cambodia’s livestock had been killed, either through fighting or bombing or
as a food source for the starving people. And when food was available, it was often unaffordable
owing to rampant inflation.19
The violence of armed conflict provides the necessary context for understanding the conditions
of the evacuation of Phnom Penh and, by extension, for situating the lived experiences of evacuees.
As Emma Laurie and Ian Shaw explain, from economic conditions, to ecological conditions, to
psychological conditions, geography maps the inescapable situatedness of being.20 They continue:
“Conditions are the very geographies of being: the existential resources that nourish and sustain, but
also harm and violate.”21 In effect, years of war conditioned but did not determine the geographies
of evacuation.
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When Khmer Rouge troops entered Phnom Penh as victors on April 17, 1975 they constituted
neither a centralized, efficient political party nor military force. Indeed, occupying forces in the
capital city are estimated to have numbered approximately 20,000. Not surprisingly, security
concerns were prominent among senior leaders of the CPK. As Lek Hor Tan writes, Khmer Rouge
officials feared especially that the United States would resume its bombing campaign in an attempt
to restore Lon Nol to power. In addition, hunger and disease were widespread throughout the
city; and both of these conditions could spark massive protests and violence.22 However, to focus
exclusively on the immediate conditions of Phnom Penh is to lose sight of the broader material
objectives of the Khmer Rouge. Indeed, the decision to evacuate Phnom Penh apparently was made
sometime in February 1975 and was part of Khmer Rouge standard operating procedure when
territories were captured. Quite simply, the evacuation of cities, market towns, and villages was
a long-standing practice of the Khmer Rouge.23 As early as 1971 Khmer Rouge forces began to
systematically burn villages and hamlets that fell under their control as they attempted to ‘liberate’
the country and various forms of communes and co-operatives were established as early as 1973.
In 1973, for example, Khmer Rouge soldiers seized half of Kompong Cham City, forcing upwards
of 15,000 people into the countryside, while in March 1974 Khmer Rouge forces emptied the former
capital of Oudong, relocating more than 20,000 former residents onto agricultural communes.24
Consequently, the proximate concerns of security, famine, and health were paramount; but these
conditions underscored existing Khmer Rouge practice for a post-conflict society.
To achieve industrial self-sufficiency, the CPK decreed that they would “only have to earn
[foreign] capital from agriculture.”25 In practice, therefore, the CPK sought to extend production
through deforestation and large-scale irrigation schemes.26 The CPK subsequently coupled this
objective with the “relentless enhancement and expansion of cooperatives.”27 Hence, immediately
preceding and following victory in 1975, the CPK intensified its effort to bring together its citizenry
in the form of camps in order to achieve its economic objectives, namely the rapid increase in
agricultural crops for export. Initially, however, there was scant coordination in the establishment
of agricultural collectives—a problem that translated into the chaotic nature of the evacuation of
Phnom Penh.
Spatial Video Geonarrative as Methodology
Personal narratives, whether in the form of oral histories or witness testimonies, provide valuable
insight into the practice and experience of genocide and mass violence. As Mei-Po Kwan and
Guoxiang Ding explain, as a research method, the focus of narrative analysis is not only on people’s
experiences as stories but also on illuminating the social, cultural, and institutional contexts within
which those experiences were constituted, shaped, expressed, and enacted.28 The use of personal
narratives, however, is not without its problems. Indeed, all research—no matter how objectively
pursued—is confronted with some degree of uncertainty. Here, uncertainty covers a broad range
of doubts or inconsistencies and is not necessarily synonymous with ‘error’.29 Following Burleson
and Giordana, we can identify two primary forms of uncertainty: Ambiguous uncertainty, which
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describes characteristics of the data itself, and fuzzy uncertainties, which relate to the historical
event.30 With respect to the evacuation of Phnom Penh, there remains considerable fuzzy uncertainty
as to the decision-making of the Khmer Rouge; as well as the micro-geographies of when different
parts of the city were evacuated. The ambiguous uncertainty relates to the observation that despite
myriad personal accounts of the evacuation, we actually understand little of the evacuation
from a comparative standpoint. That is, scant empirical work has addressed the evacuation and,
consequently, our understanding is based on the compilation of memoirs and other forms of oral
histories. The ambiguous uncertainties surrounding the evacuation emanate from the paucity of
systematic accounts of the event that effectively capture the spatial variability of the evacuation.
A key element of uncertainty is associated with the source of the information, especially human
reporting, memoirs, and other forms of personal communication.31 It is of course disconcerting to
question the reliability or accuracy of survivor accounts; and yet, the issue of uncertainty remains
salient, in that “the credibility of human sources is a complex issue, combining elements of general
human perception and unconscious bias, specific characteristics that affect accuracy, and deliberate
decisions ranging from embellishment to outright deception.”32 Difficulties increase when we
add an historical component. Both perception and memory are selective and interpretive; and
uncertainty deepens when individuals retell their narratives many years, if not decades, after the
actual event.33 In our present study, for example, most of the participants were children during the
time of the evacuation, and they readily acknowledge the difficulties of remembering. According
to Participant #3, “I cannot remember everything for sure because one I was a kid and two I had
never been elsewhere before.” Here, he explains the difficulties of recollection; and of the fact
that he experienced the evacuation as a child of about twelve years old, and yet was providing
an understanding from the vantage of being an adult. For this reason, we premise, the use of
SVG provides a more robust methodology to offset partially the problems inherent to long-term
remembrance.
The benefit of SVG is that the physical environment, interviewee, and interviewer interact
in a way that provides a necessary geographic context to personal narratives. Locational cues,
for example, may trigger specific recollections and thereby contribute to a deeper, more nuanced
understanding of previous experiences. Moreover, through the overlay, or compilation of several
individual narratives, we achieve the triangulation necessary to gain previously unrecorded
insight about places and their interactions at the finest scale, something that is not possible through
individual memoirs or testimonies in isolation.34 Indeed, the use of SVG permits researchers the
opportunity to link video to places and experiences and thereby enrich our spatial understanding.
During two separate field stints in 2017, our team collected six SVGs of individuals who
participated in the evacuation of Phnom Penh. Participants were identified using snow-ball
procedures. Most of the participants were young boys during the time of the evacuation; were longtime residents of Phnom Penh; and each had evacuated with their families. Data collection consisted
of GPS enabled contour +2 cameras mounted on the inside window of the left and right side of a
vehicle; two audio recorders were placed on or around the subject, who was sitting in the front
seat. Prior to the geospatial interview, we provided participants a brief description of the project
rationale and asked for verbal consent for their participation in keeping with protocol established
by the Institutional Review Board of Kent State University. Each interview lasted between 60 and
90 minutes; the subject dictated the route to the driver—a native Khmer speaker and research
colleague—to conform as closely as possible to his/her evacuation path. We specifically asked each
participant to retrace the route they undertook during the evacuation; and to describe what they
saw, felt, experienced. After data collection, our team transcribed all narratives and subsequently
translated these into English. Time stamps were inserted proceeding each comment, for example:
30
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[00:23:54] Along the road, patients were abandoned in the fields. I saw them being left alone on the bed. They
were in the fields. I guess the medical staff members were ordered to move those patients out of the hospitals,
and when they got out of the city and did not see or know any relatives of those patients … then they just
abandoned those patients. Here, in this narrative extract, the participant recalls information triggered
by the participant driving past what was then a vacant field; his physically being at the location
sparked particular memories about what happened at that place.
Following transcription, project members read and coded each narrative for themes to guide
subsequent analyses. The analysis of geospatial narratives is an iterative process; and while project
members may approach the study with general categories known beforehand (e.g., concerns of
direct violence, hardship, exhaustion during the evacuation), the robustness of the geonarrative,
both contextually and spatially, expands the list of categories for further investigation. More
precisely, participants’ georeferenced cues about key events and places surface inductively as
primary avenues of research. Crucially, genarratives provide insight into the physical conditions
of Phnom Penh during the evacuation, conditions that are far removed from the city experienced
today. In 1975 Phnom Penh was a smaller, more compact city; indeed, the distance from the
‘downtown’ hub of the city and the rural hinterlands was not so great as it is now. Moreover, the
city was less dense; there were many more vacant fields, rice paddies, and fish ponds—a landscape
vastly different from the congested megacity of Phnom Penh today.
Computationally, we extracted also a global positioning system (GPS) path from the audiovideo recordings using Contour Storyteller software; this permits us to layer participants’
geonarratives onto a composite image. In this paper we provide one component of our analysis,
this being the micro-geographies of evacuation routes out of Phnom Penh. As a preliminary
investigation, we suggest that this aspect of the evacuation has received insufficient empirical focus
and, in turn, may provide a necessary spatial context for understanding post-evacuation practices
undertaken by officials of the CPK.
Retracing the Evacuation
A composite image of participants’ SVG illustrates vividly the circuitous routes of the evacuation
(Figure 1). Indeed, preliminary evidence suggests that evacuees did not, and equally important, were
not necessarily forced to take the most direct (hence, efficient) path out of the city. This observation
provides insight into both the confusion and deliberate decisions undertaken by evacuees under
the threat of violence. To begin: Documentary evidence, combined with testimony provided by
both survivors and former Khmer Rouge soldiers suggests that little planning went into the specific
procedures.35 Regardless of the degree of forethought into the evacuation, the actual displacement
involved considerable uncertainty—some of which was deliberate, while other aspects were the
result of the ‘fog of war.’ For example, Khmer Rouge soldiers deceptively told evacuees that they
could return in three days. However, senior commanders apparently provided Khmer Rouge
soldiers with contradictory orders and incomplete information. To this end, it remains uncertain if
some of the rank-and-file Khmer Rouge soldiers did not actually believe the rouse perpetrated by
their superiors.
The chaos and confusion of the evacuation process provides a necessary condition in
understanding individual pathways away from the city. Informed that the evacuation would last
only two or three days, many families only took sufficient supplies, such as food and water, to
last a short duration. Participant #5 explains: “We were worried. We were not certain whether the
Khmer Rouge were lying to us or telling us the truth. They said we would leave for only three days,
so we did not pack enough food to eat.”
Still other families disbelieved the evacuation orders and, for one or two days, attempted to
carry on with their lives. Participant #3 remembers, “We did not want to leave. We delayed our
journey until late afternoon. We did not trust them.” Participant #2 explains that the “Khmer Rouge
said they had to evacuate people out for three days” but “my two siblings continued to sell fish.
On the evacuation day, my two sisters were separated from our family. They continued to sell fish.
35
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Figure 1. Composite image of evacuation routes of six participants.

They went to do business on April 17.” When Participant #2’s family was forced to leave, they were
unable to reconnect with the two sisters.
For those families that did not carry sufficient food and water, it became a challenge to obtain
the necessary items during the evacuation. Participant #5 explains, “We searched and went to
empty houses or asked the owners to cook rice and food to eat…. [We] used well or pond water.
Sometimes, we drank water without cooking or boiling it.” Other families were able to purchase or
trade for food, often from other households that had not yet evacuated. “At that time,” Participant
#2 explains, “people were selling [rice and pork] at low prices along the roads. At that time, people
continued to trade. We bought those things along the roads.” For Participant #4, however, conditions
were different: “We bought some items along the roads, but everything was so expensive.”
Several factors operating in combination influenced the path of evacuation out of the city,
including one’s location at the time of evacuation (e.g., the location of their residence), the intended
destination, the mass of other evacuees, and the presence of Khmer Rouge troops. All six of the
participants in this study hailed from families that were residents of Phnom Penh; consequently,
all began the journey from their homes.
Having captured Phnom Penh, the Khmer Rouge divided the city into zones; in principle,
residents in each zone were to be directed toward a particular path out of the city. During the
evacuation, families were simply ordered to leave the city; they were not, at this point, necessarily
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directed where to go. Participant #2 explains: “I do not think that we could freely go to our
homeland. Certain people in each divided zone were supposed to go and leave the city based on
their direction.” In practice, many evacuees altered their routes in anticipation of joining friends
or family members outside of the city. Participant #4 describes the difficult decisions confronting
his parents: “My father was from Chy Kraeng, Siem Reap. He said he wanted to go there, and my
father often went to visit my mother’s homeland in Prey Veng…. At that time, my mother insisted
of going to her place because she had relatives there…. We could ask them for help because they
had come and asked for our help in Phnom Penh. They came and visited, and we took them to the
hospital for medical checkup.” Here, the difficulty was compounded because Siem Reap is to the
northwest of the city and Prey Veng is in the opposite direction, to the southeast. Consequently,
the initial decision was often of primary importance, in that Khmer Rouge soldiers would prevent
evacuees from reversing course. Participant #4 expands that people “could not return freely…
[The Khmer Rouge soldiers] blocked the roads and only let people move out.” He concludes,
“No one could come from our different direction. When the Khmer Rouge came, they fired into
the air … because it was too crowded. They fired into the air so that people could make way
for them.”
During the course of the evacuation, families often decided to alter their course. For example,
from their initial location, Khmer Rouge soldiers might direct families to leave toward the
northwest. However, as illustrated by Participant #4, the family may decide that their best course of
action is to rejoin family members to the southwest. This decision would force evacuees, if possible,
to circle back toward their preferred route. According to Participant #1, “After crossing Sla Kou
Bridge, we decided that we would return to our [father’s] homeland…. We wanted to go to my
father’s homeland, because it would be hard and a long distance to go to my mother’s homeland.
Therefore, we had to go to my father’s place. We turned our direction….” Participant #1 describes
a similar experience: “We went straight and then turned. We went through such direction because
we wanted to visit our rented house. We went there and were supposed to turn, but the Khmer
Rouge did not allow us. They forced us to go through here.”
Other families, also hoping to avoid leaving the city, attempted to hide. Participant #5 explains
that his family sought to hide in his uncle’s house. However, the Khmer Rouge soldiers were everpresent and his family was caught. “They said that if they say us hiding next time,” Participant
#5 recalls, “they would shoot us dead.” The family of Participant #4 likewise held out for two or
three days before eventually leaving the city: “We did not leave on April 17, but many people
left. I think we left our home on April 19 or April 20.” For this family, the added days were
spend in preparation of the likelihood of evacuation. “My father prepared some stuff,” Participant
#4 remembers. “My father was secretly making a cart. He thought of bringing some items [to]
exchange them along the way.” Moreover, he continues, “before leaving our home, I went to one
place with other people, and there were lots of packed noodles there.”
As indicated earlier, the Phnom Penh of 1975 was considerably smaller and less dense than it
is today; there were numerous vacant fields, rice paddies, and fish ponds. All these sites became
places of temporary refuge, as evacuees sought respite from the heat or to rest. Participant #2
recalls, “During mealtime, we tried to find a place or shade where we could stop and cook rice.”
Participant #1 also remembers: “We tried to find houses where we could seek shelter. There were
wooden houses near the drainage system or canal.” Seeking shelter, however, often held traumatic
consequences. For the first night, Participant #1 explains, “we went in [one house] and checked
whether we could stay and cook there. However, we could not find one, because of the smell. There
were dead and swollen bodies inside those houses…. We went in and checked many houses, and
they smelled [because of decomposing bodies].”
Sanitary facilities, and the ability to urinate or defecate, were ever-present problems for the
evacuees. “There were no toilets, and there were thousands of people,” Participant #2 remembers.
He continues: “There were too many people, and there were feces everywhere, and it smelled
bad. People did not go and defecate further from the road.” When combined with the necessity
of drinking water from polluted ponds or canals, health problems were recurrent. During the
interview, Participant #4 points to a location, now a densely crowded neighborhood but then, a
small lake. “We had stomach-aches and diarrhea there,” he explains.
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During the evacuation, bridges assumed tremendous importance, as these became choke
points for the masses of men, women, and children. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the convergence
of multiple evacuation routes across Monivong Bridge and the bridge at Veng Sreng Boulevard,
respectively. At both locations, participants converged at these bridges, despite having traveled
different paths. Indeed, Monivong Bridge assumes importance as it was one of the few bridges
in existence to cross the Bassac River and, consequently, myriad columns of people converged on
the site. Importantly, the convergence of paths added to the congestion and confusion. “People
were pushing each to move forward,” Participant #5 remembers. He adds: “It was very crowded.”
Participant #4 also remembers that at the bridge, “We could move very slowly. We got stuck on the
bridge until 4pm or 5pm… It was very difficult traveling on the bridge. It was hot, and we were
thirsty.”

Figure 2. Convergence of routes at bridge along Veng Sreng Boulevard.

During the war, many bridges were destroyed and this contributed to the difficulties of
evacuation. Participant #1 explains, “We left this area … through the National Road 3. I know
this because I remember too well that we went through Sla Kou Bridge. I remember because they
bridge was broken at that time. People had to cross the water, which was flowing fast. People had
to find a way to cross it.”
Bridges also became symbolic focal points. During the time of the evacuation, Phnom Penh,
as indicated, was considerably smaller and less dense. Bridges, such as the Monivong Bridge or
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the bridge at Veng Sreng Boulevard (Figure 3) were located at the outskirts of the city. Participant
#1 explains: “When we reached the outskirt, we waited near Stung Maenchey Bridge. We thought
that they would let us go back, because they said that they let us get out for only three days.” Not
wanting to leave their homes, many families congregated at these locations, hoping to ‘wait out’
the three days before they would be able to return. Participant #1 continues: “Those people did not
want to walk fast. They wandered around this area, hoping that after three days, they would be
able to return.”
The emotional trauma and physical hardships of the evacuation intensified at these geographic
points of convergence. It is not surprising that participants recall scenes of violence, including the
sight of dead bodies, at these locations. Participant #1 remembers, “After crossing the bridge, I
began to see dead bodies along the road. We saw the bodies, but what the elderly people tried to
do was to make us walk further and avoid seeing those bodies.”

Figure 3. Convergence of routes at Monivong Bridge.

In none of the narratives was there a consistent Khmer Rouge presence; families may walk
for long stretches where there were no soldiers. Likewise, Khmer Rouge soldiers were not always
present when families sought shelter at night. According to Participant #1, at night, “there were no
Khmer Rouge guarding us.” Indeed, it was more likely that evacuees encountered soldiers only at
key locations, such as major intersections or bridges (Figure 4). [According to Participant #4, “The
main road was very crowded, so people walked along the small roads. The Khmer Rouge pushed
them to move forward… And we heard gunshots.”
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Figure 4. Location of Khmer Rouge Soldiers based on Evacuee Interviews.
Conclusions
The evacuation of Phnom Penh beginning on April 17, 1975 is a key moment in the unfolding
genocide that gripped Cambodia between 1975 and 1979. However, despite myriad references to
this event, both in scholarly and popular accounts, there exists scant empirical analysis of the lived
experiences of the evacuation. This lacuna translates into a myopic understanding of the evacuation
and thus calls to question interpretations of post-evacuation Khmer Rouge policy and practice.
In this article, we provide a systematic examination of the evacuation, as retraced by individuals
who lived through the event. With a novel geospatial technology, that is, spatial video geonarratives
(SVG), we provide insight into the experiences of survivors as they make sense, retroactively, of
the micro-geographies of evacuation. In so doing, our analytic procedures provide a multimedia
environment for the compilation, interpretation, and analysis of participants’ oral histories. Key
findings include the identification of circuitous routes of evacuation, the manifestation of choke
points as sites of violence, and the haphazard presence of Khmer Rouge soldiers. Crucially, while
narratives and memoirs describe in general the physical and emotional toll of the evacuation, our
analysis provides insight into the specific routes taken; where conditions worsened; and where
soldiers were stationed.
As a part of an on-going project that uses geospatial technologies to better understand the
Cambodian genocide, this paper is not without its limitations. A key shortcoming of this paper—
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and the basis of our future work—is that of a diversity of social conditions. More precisely, it
is necessary to capture more effectively the diversity of experiences of the evacuation. In this
preliminary investigation, all participants were at the time young boys; and all were of families
of long-term residency in Phnom Penh. Missing from our account are the experiences of women
and of peasants who had recently arrived in Phnom Penh. Also required are interviews of former
Khmer Rouge soldiers, for their experiences will provide insight into the micro-geographies of
enforcement during the evacuation. Despite these exclusions, we conclude that this empirical
investigation of the evacuation of Phnom Penh reveals, first, several insights heretofore neglected in
previous studies and, second, the feasibility of spatial video geonarratives as a robust methodology
for the study of genocide and mass violence.
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Canadian courts hear claims that violate Canada’s domestic law. But what happens when a
corporation violates fundamental human rights enshrined in customary international law, such as
the prohibition against slavery, forced labor, and torture? Can the victims of these human rights
violations bring a claim against the corporation in Canadian courts? Will Canadian courts hear this
customary international law claim?
These questions are at issue in Araya v Nevsun Resources Limited. If the answer is yes, this case
could open the door to judicial remedies for victims of a corporation’s customary international law
violations.
Case Background
The Plaintiffs in this case are Eritrean refugees, Gize Yebeyo Araya, Kesete Tekle Fshazion, and
Mihretab Yemane Tekle. They allege they were conscripted into the Eritrean National Service
Program and forced to work in the Bisha gold mine.1 Nevsun Resources Limited is a British
Columbia mining company that contracted with the Eritrean government to develop the Bisha
gold mine.2 The Plaintiffs allege Nevsun is directly liable for the mine’s forced labor practices.
Eritrea introduced compulsory military service in 1995, requiring every person under the age
of 50 to serve in its National Service Program.3 This Program provides labor for various companies.4
By rule, the Program requires each Eritrean citizen to serve 18-months—six-months of military
training and 12-months of military service.5 But, in reality, military conscripts are enlisted in the
program indefinitely, serving an average of six and a half years.6
The Plaintiffs allege Nevsun used Eritrean National Service Program laborers to build
infrastructure and mine facilities at the Bisha Gold Mine. They assert Nevsun forced them to work
12-hour days, six or seven days a week, fully exposed to the sun, in temperatures reaching 47
degrees Celsius.7 The Plaintiffs also claim they were tied up and beaten, received little food, and
were housed in huts without beds or electricity. 8 Human rights groups reported that laborers who
attempted to flee these egregious working conditions were detained and tortured.9
The Plaintiffs brought a claim against Nevsun for damages under both Canadian domestic law
and customary international law.10
Issue: Will a Canadian Court Hear a Claim for Damages under Customary International Law?
The Plaintiffs allege their treatment as laborers for Nevsun violates customary international law
prohibitions against forced labor; torture; slavery; and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.11
Customary international law is a binding source of international law rooted in widespread and
consistent state practice with opinio juris— a state’s belief it has a legal obligation to conform with
the widespread and consistent practice.12 Once a rule attains customary international law status,
1
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2
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it becomes universally binding with very few exceptions.13 Canadian law directly incorporates
customary international law into its domestic legal framework.14 As such, Canadian courts can
enforce customary international law without domestic legislation.15 The Plaintiffs rely on Canada’s
incorporation of customary international law as the basis for their claim to damages.
Nevsun challenged the Plaintiffs’ ability to bring a claim for damages under customary
international law by bringing a motion to strike the claim. A motion to strike is a preliminary,
procedural tool that prevents courts from hearing claims that lack a reasonable prospect of success.16
Courts may grant a motion to strike if (1) the party cannot reasonably make the claim; (2) the
claim is unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious; (3) the claim may prejudice, embarrass,
or delay the fair trial of the case; or, (4) the claim abuses the court process. Importantly, a motion
to strike safeguards judicial efficiency and integrity but does not prevent courts from recognizing
a new cause of action.17
Because Nevsun argued the Plaintiffs could not bring a claim for damages under customary
international law, Nevsun had to prove that the Plaintiffs customary international law claims had
no reasonable likelihood of success. 18
Motion to Strike Dismissed: The Law is Not Settled and the Court is Reluctant to Reject a Novel
Claim
A court will only grant a motion to strike if it is plain and obvious that the claim has no reasonable
prospect of success.19 Canadian courts apply this test generously, erring on the side of allowing a
novel, but arguable, claim to proceed.20 If a plaintiff’s case has a chance to succeed, a court must
give the plaintiff the opportunity to present its case.21 A novel claim alone is not sufficient grounds
for the court to grant a motion to strike.22
Applying this test, the British Columbia Supreme Court found that the Plaintiffs’ customary
international law claim was not bound to fail because the law on this issue is not settled.23 The Court
further held that expanding a customary international law cause of action would not radically
transform Canadian law.24
Nevsun appealed the decision to the British Columbia Court of Appeal.25 The Court of
Appeal remarked that the Plaintiffs would struggle to establish a claim for damages in customary
international law. It nonetheless upheld the lower court’s decision and denied Nevsun’s motion
to strike.26
On June 14, 2018, the Supreme Court of Canada granted Nevsun leave to appeal to Canada’s
highest court.27 If the Supreme Court of Canada upholds the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s
decision, judicial remedies could become available for victims of corporations’ customary
international law violations.
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The Plaintiffs May Have Won the Battle but Not Necessarily the War
At this point, all the Plaintiffs have won is the ability to put their arguments before a court and have
a judge consider them. In denying the Nevsun’s motion to strike, neither the trial court nor the
court of appeal considered the substantive arguments underlying the Plaintiffs’ claim for damages.
Instead, as a preliminary matter, the courts assumed the Plaintiffs’ facts, as alleged, were true and
only considered whether the Plaintiffs had a reasonable basis for the claim based on the current
state of the law.28
If the Supreme Court of Canada permits the Plaintiffs’ claim to proceed, it will allow the
Plaintiffs to test the customary international law basis for their claim, provided the Plaintiffs can
prove the wrongful conduct they allege.
To determine if the Plaintiffs can bring a claim for damages against a corporation for violating
customary international law, the Court will need to answer two questions: (1) can customary
international law provide an independent cause of action in Canadian domestic law, and (2) does
customary international law bind corporations?
Can Customary International Law Norms Provide an Independent Cause of Action in Canadian Domestic
Law?
The Plaintiffs will likely argue that Nevsun, a Canadian corporation, violated customary
international law prohibitions against slavery and forced labor as incorporated into Canadian
domestic law. But in doing so, the Plaintiffs are asking the Court to expand its traditional use of
customary international law, which to date the Court has principally used to interpret Canadian
domestic law.
The Supreme Court of Canada found that customary international norms are directly
incorporated into Canadian law.29 But Canadian courts rarely rely on customary international law
norms alone and instead primarily use customary international law to inform the content of Canada’s
domestic legal framework.30 For example, in Suresh v. Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada, in an
unanimous decision, held that customary international law informs the principles of fundamental
justice enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.31 Customary international law
therefore informs the interpretation of Canadian constitutional laws and legislation, as well as the
development of the common law.32
The Plaintiffs’ argument is novel, but not far-fetched: common law jurisdictions, including
Canada, have used customary international law to develop private law obligations in commercial
transactions, interjurisdictional marine transportation, and disputes relating to shipwrecks,
hostages, and ransom bills.33 And Canadian courts have confirmed that civil causes of action can
be based in customary international law if jurisdiction is otherwise established.34
The Court’s decision on this question will either create a new cause of action based in customary
international law or risk limiting judicial use of customary international law as an interpretative
aid for existing Canadian law.
Does Customary International Law Bind Corporations?
Nevsun will likely argue that even if the Court finds the Plaintiffs can bring a claim based in
28
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customary international law, the Plaintiffs cannot bring a customary international law claim
against a corporation.
International law only binds subjects of international law: states and international organizations
that have an international legal personality.35 While individuals are the primary subjects of
domestic law, states are the primary subjects of international law because, at its core, international
law (including customary international law) governs state conduct.36
But corporations act like states in many ways. They frequently conduct economic activity
across international borders, contract with foreign states, and often have more resources and
greater diplomatic power than some small states.37 This ability for corporations to act like states has
led some scholars to argue international law binds corporate actions.38 Corporations, however, do
not have international legal personality.39 A private corporation’s legal personality—including its
rights, obligations, and capacities—are defined by its domestic legal system.40 Even multinational
or transnational corporations are domestic, not international, legal entities; they are merely a series
of corporations created under domestic law of several different states and linked together to form
an international corporate network.41 And, notably, the Supreme Court of Canada has historically
recognized that “a corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty
by which it is created.”42
Following this reasoning, Nevsun will likely argue it is not bound by customary international
law—that as a British Columbia corporation, the Business Corporation Act solely governs its rights,
obligations, and capacities.43 The intuitive argument, therefore, is that without a specific rule to
bind corporations to customary international law, the Plaintiffs cannot bring a claim for damages
based in customary international law.44
The Plaintiffs, however, will likely counter that even though Nevsun is not a subject of
international law, the international community agrees that corporations must comply with human
rights obligations.
International human rights treaties—the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment—indisputably prohibit slavery and forced labor. But Professor
John Ruggie, the United Nations Special Representative for Business and Human Rights, concluded
these treaties do not impose direct liability on corporations.45 Likewise, the United Nations Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights are voluntary; they do not impose binding international
obligations on corporations.46
Both the Plaintiffs and Nevsun relied on US court decisions to support their arguments. But
the United States Supreme Court has since clarified the law. In Jenser v. Arab Bank, the US Supreme
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Court found that while corporations may be liable in some circumstances, there is no “specific,
universal, and obligatory norm of corporate liability.”47 The Canadian government appears to take
the same position. In fact, Canada objected to the US district court’s jurisdiction in Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, an earlier case brought against a Canadian corporation for
allegedly aiding and abetting the Sudanese government’s human rights abuses.48
The Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling on whether customary international law binds
corporations raises two possible problems. First, while unlikely, if the Court finds that corporations
like Nevsun are subjects of international law, immunity could prevent the claim from proceeding.
International law affords international organizations with international legal personality state
privileges and immunities, including immunity from civil proceedings in foreign states where the
organization conducts activities.49 If Nevsun were an international legal subject, it could attract
immunity from foreign civil proceedings in certain circumstances. On the facts of this case, the
problem is moot because Nevsun is a Canadian corporation and the Plaintiffs brought the case
in Canada. But had the Plaintiffs brought the case in Eritrea, and Eritrea’s courts recognized
customary international law as binding on corporations, Nevsun could argue that its immunity as
a foreign international legal subject bars the Plaintiff’s case.
Second, if the Court finds that customary international law provides a cause of action but that
it does not bind corporations, the Court will render the cause of action meaningless. For the Plaintiff
to bring a claim based in customary international law against Nevsun, Nevsun must have binding
obligations under customary international law. So even though the customary international law
cause of action exists, this subsequent procedural bar could prevent the Plaintiff from bringing the
claim.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision could very well open the door to a new customary international law
action in Canada. If the Court denies Nevsun’s appeal and upholds the lower courts’ decision, it
affords the Plaintiffs the opportunity to prove the legal basis for their customary international law
claim. Proving this claim will not be easy but, if the Plaintiffs succeed, Canadian courts will, for
the first time, provide judicial remedies for victims of a corporation’s customary international law
violations.
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When I tell my undergraduate International Studies students that the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) did not deal with matters of human rights until 1991, they are invariably
surprised. In the 1970s, when the Cambodian genocide took place, “references to human rights
were inappropriate and illegitimate for Security Council deliberation,” and the genocide was never
discussed there.1 When Vietnam’s military action brought the genocide to a halt in 1979, however,
it was condemned at the Council as an unacceptable breach of United Nations (UN) rules and
Cambodia’s sovereignty. Today, of course, issues of human rights are an integral component of
Security Council discussions and deliberations. But that it was not always so, and how it came to
be, are adeptly elucidated in All Necessary Measures. In this volume, the author illustrates how both
human rights and sovereignty norms have coevolved since the end of the Cold War, changing the
meaning of state sovereignty and the nature of military force at the United Nations.
The central claim of the book is that discourse matters. The arguments made at the Security
Council about the cause and character of conflict, and the source of sovereign authority, shape the
likelihood that the UN will or will not intervene in defense of human rights. As Walling states:
“Power at the start of the twenty-first century is no longer simply about whose military can win but
also about whose story can win.”2 Walling’s extensive analysis of Security Council documents has
enabled her to adroitly build her case. She identifies three ways in which conflict is conceptualised
at the UN, before analysing how these frameworks impact on UN responses. The intentional causal
story characterises a conflict as one-sided, with systematic repression and widespread human rights
violations. The inadvertent causal story presents a conflict as one of two or more parties involved
in a cycle of violence, in which deaths and human rights violations occur but are not the purpose
of the violence. The complex causal story characterises a conflict as multifaceted, complicated and
tragic, with diffuse responsibility for human rights violations. Security Council members may tell
these stories “sincerely or strategically”, and they may evolve over time, but the framework in
which they present the conflict influences subsequent responses.3 As Walling remarks:
The predominant story shapes Security Council decision making, and each story type has
a different propensity to trigger the use of military force. The discursive representation
of a conflict as intentional creates opportunities for humanitarian intervention while its
discursive representation as inadvertent or complex forecloses such opportunities.4

In the chapters of All Necessary Measures, Walling illustrates her argument with several case
studies. Chapter 2 explores the emergence of human rights discourse in the Security Council
through the case of Iraq, 1990-1992. This chapter provides a refreshing and informative examination
of the conflict in Iraq in this period. It guides the reader through the changing norms in Security
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Council behavior, while avoiding the mire of what has become a deeply politized conflict. Chapter
3 examines the state collapse in Somalia, and the emergence of Security Council humanitarian
intervention. In this case, the UNSC authorised an armed intervention for a strictly humanitarian
cause for the first time. Genocide studies scholars might be less familiar with a crisis such as that
in Somalia, but the evolution of UNSC discourse around humanitarian intervention and human
rights, and the impact of the Somali case on subsequent Security Council deliberations, make this
compelling reading.
Chapters 4 and 5 cover more familiar ground, examining UNSC discourse concerning Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Rwanda. I was shocked to learn that the first mention of the word ‘genocide’
in Security Council records was not until 16 May 1994. This highlights the strength of the norm
of non-intervention in domestic affairs prevalent within the Security Council until the end of the
Cold War, notwithstanding the Genocide Convention or the commitments to human rights in the
UN Charter. In chapter 5, Walling meticulously examines the UNSC response to the genocide in
Rwanda. She makes a convincing case as to the central role of discourse in framing how Security
Council members conceptualised the violence, and how this in turn influenced the responses for
which they advocated. The situation in Rwanda had come to the attention of the Security Council
in the early 1990s as one of civil war and been articulated as an inadvertent causal story. When
the violence became both civil war and genocide, the inadvertent story continued to dominate.
Efforts by non-permanent members (consulting with international NGOs) to present an alternative
intentional causal story were not effective until June 1994, by which stage widespread evidence
of the genocide made the inadvertent story untenable. It was only then that the Security Council
began to respond meaningfully. By that stage it was far too little and far too late.
Chapter 6 explores another example of UNSC inaction, that of Kosovo. The response to
the genocide in Darfur, the focus of chapter 7, was hardly more successful. But the case studies
end on a more positive note, with chapter 8 focusing on the intervention in Libya. This is a rare
example in which the UNSC did respond in a timely and decisive manner, in line with the new
norm of the responsibility to protect. The articulation of only a single causal story in the UNSC
about Libya—“an intentional story in which Libyan authorities were perpetrators of widespread
and systematic crimes against innocent civilians”—contributes to explaining this response.5
In this chapter Walling explores the continuing evolution of norms around human rights and
sovereignty. UNSC Resolution 1973, as she explains, was historic as the first “explicit authorization
to use military force against a UN member to stop a perpetrator government from committing
human rights atrocities.”6 A short section towards the end of the chapter also examines why Libya
provoked a humanitarian intervention but the subsequent crisis in Syria has not. Perhaps a new
and updated edition might explore this more thoroughly in future. The volume overall presents a
positive trajectory with respect to the UNSC’s record on human rights, but Walling does not fail to
recognise the inconsistent and exceptional nature of humanitarian intervention. One can only hope
that progress continues.
All Necessary Measures is an outstanding book. Thoroughly and impeccably researched, it offers
a compelling argument as to the power of discourse at the UNSC, and in international relations
more broadly. It has much to offer students and scholars of the United Nations, human rights, and
in the field of genocide and mass atrocities. Diplomats and public officials could also learn a great
deal from this analysis.
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Maddy Carey, author of Jewish Masculinity in the Holocaust: Between Destruction and Construction
has written a book accessible for anyone interested in understanding a nuanced aspect of the
Holocaust. This book is filled with thoughtful and well-constructed information and analysis.
Reading the title, one might think it is an effort to deal with questions concerning the supposed
lack of Jewish resistance to the murderous Nazi regime between 1933 and 1945. While present
that argument, is not the overriding theme of the book. Instead, the reader will find a book based
on a current day interpretation of spoken and written stories and other material from a variety of
sources, perpetrators, bystanders, victims and others who experienced, watched or were somehow
affected by the events of that historic time.
Carey analyzes Jewish masculinity within the context of Nazi rule in Germany. The first
chapter described Jewish masculinity, an essential chapter for non-Jewish readers and for those
not familiar with gender studies. Chapters two and three were aligned with distinct periods within
the Holocaust. Her delineation of the periods was not based on dates, but conditions caused by
German actions across the European continent.1 Each period was marked by a change in the
living conditions of an ordinary Jewish man in Europe beginning with the rise of Hitler to the
Chancellery and ending only with Allied victory in Europe and the liberation of the camps. Each
chapter presented unique characteristics or descriptions of male behavior based on the climate
within the communities, the living conditions, established by the Nazis and the influence of the
conditions on Jewish men. Chapter four had a different focus which was affirming the concept of
masculinity in the Jewish culture through stories about the influence Jewish fathers had on their
children during and after the Holocaust.
Within the introduction Carey informed the readers of the purpose of the book, partially
recounted the background of Holocaust-related gender studies, described the research method
and addressed problems and concerns of various types related to this research. Her attempt
with this book was to examine “…the detail of these (Jewish men) lives including the role of the
men in the home and in public, the significance of fatherhood and parenting and multiple and
diverse masculinities practiced by Jewish men in this period.”2 By examining masculinity during
the Holocaust from the perspective of Jewish lives affected by the event Carey was conducting
research into a neglected area. While the introduction was valuable it was also long. A shorter
introduction with less time spent on the arguments for and against this research may have provided
the necessary identification of the problem and method without the length. After all the reader
needs to focus on the main content not the introductory material.
Chapter one of this work is entitled Jewish Masculinity in Theory and Practice. In this chapter
Carey provides an overview of theories about masculinity including definitions and different
characteristics and how research methods have produced many different ideas about masculinity
in general. After laying out a framework of masculinity studies as a subset of gender studies,
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primarily for the uneducated it seems, she proceeds with a description of Jewish masculinity
specifically during the interwar period up to the point deconstruction begins, 1939.
The material in chapter one is essential to understand the complex nature of the German
approach beginning in 1939. It is also important for any reader who might not be familiar with the
field of study. The combination of the information in the introduction and chapter one created a
good foundation to build the rest of the book upon. Chapter one also enables the reader to see the
problem from a different perspective and provided an understanding of how Jewish men perceived
themselves as men before the beginning of the destruction.
Carey entitled Chapter two, Masculinity in Crisis: Persecution and Collapse. Chapter two covers
the period referred to by Carey as Destruction. This period extended between the beginning of
the war and occupation of non-German lands through the beginning of Ghettoization. While the
beginning of the war is tied to a specific date by Historians, Carey does not use a date but considers
the pre-war preparation and events as part of the period of destruction of Jewish masculinity in
Europe. During this period Carey focused on the continual open humiliation, degradation and
public harassment of Jewish men by the Nazi perpetrators their collaborators and, in some
instances, ordinary citizens. This period saw Jews, men and women alike, modify their behavior
as the changes Hitler and the Nazi Party planted and rooted across Germany began to grow,
bloom and deeply influence the lives of normal people in a negative sense. Destruction, as an
organism, did not consider the birthplace of the Jew. German-born Jewish men suffered through
the emasculation just as much as a Jew born in another place.
The negative environment during Destruction was caused by the continuous outward, violent
antisemitism of the German perpetrators. Carey notes this was antithetical to the period before the
Nazi rise particularly in Germany. Prior to this time Construction might have been the term used
as Jews prospered across Europe and were integrated into society in most instances.3 Destruction
was a different experience for each person and much depended on one’s station in life. Carey does
a remarkable job of collecting those different experiences and relating the collection to the concept
of breaking men, like breaking horses, of accepted gendered roles and behaviors. This was not
limited to one person at a time but effected an entire segment or group within European society. As
the German military and Governments of occupation targeted men for mass round-ups or specific
individual attacks or arrests, the Jews response seemingly contributed to the emasculating process.
According to Carey the Jewish men determined that resistance would not be effective. As a result,
they opted for “…obeying, hiding and running”4 as a means of survival. It seemed as if the entire
population of Jewish men across Europe chose the same response at the same time. Jewish men
may have thought obedience to the German authority was the best means of long-term survival,
but it came with consequences according to Carey.
Unmerited obedience did increase their personal survival chances, but it also enhanced the
effects of the German techniques and abuse. Carey explains that more and more Jewish men,
especially those who chose to obey or hide, were seen by others as feminized, they declined in
community status, could not maintain their families social position or in the worst cases their own
position of leadership within the family. The combination of German humiliation tactics and the
lack of acting to defend themselves crippled the Jewish masculine identity. This continued across
the continent into the time of Ghettoization beginning in late 1940 and differed for nearly every
Jewish community. Basic humiliation and bullying would occur in one town while in another the
men had moved past the first stages and faced mass round-ups, forced labor and mass executions.
Carey points out that men were in different places, with different experiences occurring at the
same time so there was no clear Jewish masculine identity across the Nazi occupied territories.
Chapter three describes how Ghetto life changed Jewish men by remasculinizing them. This
was the Enclosure and Stabilization period. During Ghetto confinement Jewish life existed in a
totally Jewish community. The Jews were segregated from the German or Aryan communities and
that of other European cities in which most had assimilated. They were forced into small spaces
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for the size of the population without adequate housing, food, water or any other resource. Many
times, they were joined by Jews from other cities and even other countries which exacerbated the
existing problems. During this period Carey argues, Jewish men began to regain their masculinity.
She presents the case this was because of the reestablishment of a form of normalcy and community.
She even argues, while Ghetto life was exceptionally difficult, it had many benefits regarding the
reappearance of masculine attributes because the entire community was Jewish and understood
the Jewish culture and traditions. They were not interspersed within a Gentile national culture
and community. Jews were living with other Jews and governing their daily lives through Jewish
customs, as much as possible.
During Stabilization the Jewish men faced much less public bullying or harassment which
allowed them to individually and collectively regain the position or honor once held within Jewish
circles. Carey does not imply abuse and killing no longer existed, only that the frequency of the
lesser forms of public humiliation, for example, was less. Masculinity and masculine roles and
actions returned as the public humiliation subsided and a new normal of family life, for those with
families, and community life began to reappear. Carey states that many Jews saw this as the end
state of Nazi aggression against the Jews. Some Jews even believed nothing worse would happen
and normal cycles of life and death would continue in the Ghettos until the war ended. History
informs us, that mindset was short sighted and wrong. As Ghetto life was normalized men took on
many roles or reassumed those masculine roles they may have laid down at one point. Therefore,
Carey labels this period as enclosure and stability.
One shortcoming of the book is the lack of discussion concerning the worst part of the
Holocaust. Carey does not describe the Nazi goal of complete elimination of the Jews in Europe. I
assume this is due to Execution being the ultimate emasculation, one impossible to recover from.
As a reader though, one expects to move from the pseudo-stability of Ghettoization into the period
historically labeled as the Final Solution. Carey did not approach it this way and instead moves
into a discussion of filial bonds. The lack of discussion of attempted total elimination misses an
important part of the narrative. Also, the move into the discussion of the importance of fathers in
family life seemed almost disconnected from the remainder of the book even though the topic is
important and almost uplifting considering the topic and context of Carey’s writing.
The last chapter describes the personal relationship between a father and his children through
the eyes of many such relationships. The nature of the father child relationship and how masculinity
influences the relationship seems hard to describe within one family let alone an entire population.
While Carey attempts to do justice to the concept she leaves important aspects uncovered or,
perhaps better stated, under the covers of the years in between then and now and the resulting fog
of the past. She simply does not give enough time to one of the most important relationships within
the human community. This does not mean that her analysis is incorrect or shortsighted. Instead it
is only enough to keep the reader wanting to read more. To appreciate the relationships, to identify
with the people, to grieve for the loss of so many just when the need was so great, and to grasp the
pain associated with missing that masculine influence as one continues to live. This chapter really
forces the reader to contemplate one’s relationship with their father or one’s children. In doing so,
Carey has moved past a discussion of the horror and desolation felt by reading about the Crime of
Crimes, the complete destruction of so many men, women and children, to a place of reflection and
perchance of hope. The hope that future generations will not destroy each other, will not attempt
to eradicate the masculinity or femininity or any other aspect of a group. Instead there is hope that
thinking about personal bonds of family will cause us to love one another more.
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In his book The Other Slavery: The Uncovered Story of Indian Enslavement in America, Andrés
Reséndez documents the little-known history of slavery of indigenous peoples in the Americas,
focusing specifically on the geographic expansion of slavery in North America from the early
1500s, starting in the Caribbean, moving to Mexico, and then to western United States through
the mid 1900’s. As a historian, Reséndez chronicles not only an understudied part of the history
of the Americas, but also provides an incisive exploration of the workings of genocide.1 Readers
are likely familiar with the argument in Jared Diamond’s book Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of
Human Societies, in which he argues that indigenous peoples of the Americas were mostly killed out
by diseases, particularly smallpox.2 Through meticulous archival research and revisiting early texts
about European conquest of the western hemisphere, Reséndez offers a compelling alternative
argument to understanding the genocide of indigenous peoples in the Americas.
While acknowledging that slavery existed in the Americas prior to European colonization,
Reséndez’s book places much more responsibility of native genocide on European conquistadors
and slave traders, not “weak immune systems.” For example, Reséndez argues that the vast
population decline of indigenous peoples in the early years of the conquest can be attributed to the
horrific conditions of enslavement of indigenous people to mine gold in the Caribbean. Smallpox
only came later when large percentages of the population were already dead. Whereas populations
in Europe that were decimated by diseases such as the Black Plague could bounce back naturally,
indigenous peoples of the Americas could never bounce back naturally because of the harsh
conditions of the massive slave trade.3 To be sure, Reséndez does not argue against the impact
of the spread of disease on the decimation of indigenous populations in the Americas, he argues
the importance of understanding the “synergistic relationship” between slavery and epidemics of
disease.4
Reséndez explains that one of the reasons slavery of indigenous people has been less
understood is that it was illegal, so often operated in the shadows of the well-studied slavery of
African and African-descent peoples in the Americas. He argues that “one of the most revealing
aspects of this other slavery is that since it had no legal basis, it was never formally abolished like
African slavery.”5 Through meticulous archival research and revisiting historical texts from the age
of the conquest and through the European settlement of the western United States, Reséndez pieces
together information about how indigenous people were owned, sold, and traded by Europeans,
but also by each other. One of his objectives, Reséndez argues, is that a better understanding
complex systems of this “other slavery” is important because “a similar multiplicity of coercive
arrangements is still prevalent today in what is often called ‘the new slavery’…in the contemporary
trafficking of humans.”6
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Elucidating these key differences between systems of slavery lies at the root of how this book
contributes to understanding why and how enslavement of indigenous people was used as a tool
to carry out genocide. Reséndez defines key difference between the systems of slavery, beyond just
legality and illegality, including the motivations for enslavement, percentage of the population
enslaved, the results of enslavement, who was being enslaved, and the movements to abolish
slavery.
Within this nuanced narrative, he also explains the details of different types of indigenous
slaves, such as slaves of war, and captured (ransomed) slaves,7 as well as different systems of
enforced labor, such as encomiendas (people were forced to pay a tribute to Spanish officials,8 and
were allowed to live in own communities and travel to mines for work), repartimientos (remunerated,
but compulsory work)9, debt peonage (forced to work off debt), and the mita (forced, salaried work
or “draft labor”).10
Indigenous slavery offered a kind of gendered “mirror image” to African slavery. While
African slavery revealed a preference for men (who outnumber women two to one) indigenous
slaves tended to be women and children. The motivation for enslaving indigenous people were
to convert them to Christianity, and integrate them into mainstream European colonial society,
whereas enslaved African people were seen as separate and sub-human. Enslavement of indigenous
peoples often resulted in death, and this process of either assimilation or death is what Wolfe
would argue is the settler-colonial state’s “logic of elimination.”11
The book clearly sheds light on a relatively unknown history of the Americas, providing
compelling arguments for how it has fundamentally formed colonial and post-colonial America.
One of the many strengths of this book is that in the telling the history of “the other slavery,”
Reséndez does not shy away from telling a full and complicated history of the systems of
enslavement in the Americas, particularly the fact that many European slavers built upon existing
systems of slavery that existed within native communities prior to European conquest and
colonization.12 Additionally, Reséndez writes of the impact of the Spanish inquisition, and that
many of the European slavers were Jewish people who used the economic promises of the slavery
system as a way to leave Europe for the New World in an attempt to more safely live abroad.13
Reséndez careful research and depth of narrative provides for an unfolding of the complicated and
multiple layers of oppression at the time.
His research draws a broad arc, showing connections between past systems of slavery and how
they have morphed and continue to today. Reséndez writes of the movement to abolish African
slavery, explaining that during the reconstruction period, the government was forced to define
precisely what the meaning and extent of the thirteenth amendment was, and whether or not it also
abolished Indian slavery.14 Reséndez explains that the historical record is unclear regarding exactly
when Indian slavery was abolished, and he argues continued well into the twentieth century.15
This book provides several compelling arguments backed up with rigorous archival research,
though there are areas which could have been further developed. Reséndez clearly intends to focus
on indigenous slavery and is not a comparison between indigenous slavery and African slavery,
however it lacks a clearer connection about how the two systems of African and indigenous
enslavement interacted with each other in order to fully understand the nature of and implications
of the system of enslavement of indigenous people. For example, the way that peoples from Africa
were brought in to replace the population of enslaved workers of the indigenous population that
7
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10

Ibid., 124.
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was dying out as a result of the harsh conditions. An important part of this conversation that
Reséndez also did not adequately address is how, while Bartolome las Casas argued against the
enslavement of indigenous peoples, for part of his life he advocated for the enslavement of Africans.
Additionally, while Reséndez notes a different times the nonexistence of written, detailed
accounts by Indian slaves,16 he finds the testimony of several people in the records of Spanish court
cases elucidating a rare view into the lived experiences of Indian slaves. That being said, Reséndez
seems to rely entirely on archival and written records, usually written from the view point of
European settlers either as slavers, or observers, to understand the experiences of indigenous
people. In one instance, he references “oral traditions of Hopi villages—which are corroborated at
least in part by documentary information,”17 suggesting the higher value placed on written versus
oral histories. While there may be a disciplinary argument for the centralizing of written records, it
seems that a project focusing on the experience of indigenous people should ideally include much
more from the perspective of indigenous people themselves. Further research could include a more
comprehensive study of oral traditions of indigenous peoples about their own past, including
experiences of slavery.
Overall, Reséndez provides a nuanced and well-researched history of a previously unknown
system of Indian slavery, providing a compelling argument for an alternative cause of indigenous
genocide in the Americas.
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Ibid., 166.
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How is it that the Holocaust, which ended more than seven decades ago, still remains such a
powerful force in our culture? What exactly is its legacy? Why is it that Holocaust memory still
speaks to us in such stirring tones? And what, for those of us listening intently as these questions
are posed in this bright new book, is the “broken voice?” Before we are invited to delve deeply into
an understanding of Robert Eaglestone’s concepts about the powers of narrative—powers which
he believes are capable of providing the answers—the author offers a story for us to ponder.
The tale begins with Imre Kertész, a Jewish Holocaust survivor from Hungary who became
a highly acclaimed novelist and a translator of works of philosophy into Hungarian. In 2002, he
won the Nobel Prize for Literature, the first Hungarian to do so, “for writing that upholds the
fragile experience of the individual against the barbaric arbitrariness of history,” according to the
judges. His novels deal with genocide, dictatorship and personal freedom, subjects with which
he was deeply familiar, as he himself was deported to Auschwitz at the age of 14 and spent years
at Buchenwald. In his Nobel Laureate acceptance speech, Kertész asked the provocative question,
“Which writer today is not a writer of the Holocaust?” He explained that works do not have to
specifically focus on the Holocaust for readers to sense what he called the “broken voice” in modern
European art, a voice that he said has been dominant in contemporary literature for decades.
Eaglestone, of course, tells us this story for a reason. And once it is done, he states that the
goal of his new and insightful book is “To attend to this ‘broken voice’ in literature in order to
think about the meaning of the Holocaust in the contemporary world.” His aim is to examine
how the concepts of meaning are inserted in literature about the Holocaust and genocide, and
he succeeds masterfully. Using a compact, six-part format, Eaglestone begins by explaining how
literature can shed more light on the Holocaust than history can. To elaborate, he extensively cites
Hannah Arendt, the Jewish, German-born, American philosopher and political theorist who is well
known for her comments on totalitarianism, the nature of power and evil and the way in which
ordinary people become unwitting actors in totalitarian systems. One of Arendt’s most salient
statements is that “storytelling reveals meaning without committing the error of defining it,” and
Eaglestone fully accepts this and builds on her distinction between meaning and truth. He posits
that meaning is derived from reason and from speech, and that if evidence is employed to bring
facts from the past into focus with historical events, then we are likely to understand that past by
first acknowledging that it is shaped by meaning based on how the evidence is used.
Thinking and facts are, of course, inexorably joined, and Eaglestone forcefully agrees with
Arendt that fiction and memoir, both of which he defines as forms of storytelling, offer meaning
by providing shape. He also describes in depth his belief in the primacy of literature over history
as a most powerful tool for understanding the past, going so far as to suggest that it is engagement
with memory that provides meaning to us and is a fundamental way of understanding our basic
human nature. Regarding the Holocaust specifically, Eaglestone argues that although a great deal
has been written about the events themselves, and they have been presented in various forms of
theater and visual art, he believes there is a virtual canyon between what the public understands
to have happened and how the scholars and historians describe the facts that took place and the
concepts that drove the events forward. He believes that our culture and society require new ways
to analyze what happened in order for concepts of thinking about genocide to evolve.
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This short but cogent book is divided into sections that offer five new methods of listening to
the “broken voice” in order to create new ways to hear it clearly and understand its thrust. Each
chapter is insightful on its own yet also presents material that is further illuminated by the ideas
the author develops in the others. Overall the contextual cross-references help us understand not
only the parts of the argument but the greater whole they form when taken together. The tone of the
book is scholarly yet accessible, generously enhanced with quotes from philosophers, historians,
and literary figures in ways that add weight and gravitas to the already deeply explicated theses.
Footnotes throughout add to the story, and a well-documented index efficiently points the reader
toward the desired subject matter. Eaglestone, as a literature professor, is fully enmeshed in his
subject matter, telling us in no uncertain terms that “the past is too important to be left solely to
historians.”
Reviewed to critical acclaim in journals of philosophy, the book is highly recommended
for upper-level undergraduates, graduate students and faculty, particularly those who have an
interest in the relationship between ethics and genocide. It would also be of interest to lay persons
with a grounding in philosophy who want to undertake a study of the interrelationships among
literature, history, truth, meaning and thought, and to those who seek a deeper understanding of
these different forms of knowledge.
Philosophical thinkers will find a great deal to learn about epistemology in this slim volume;
in addition, they stand to gain critical skills in understanding the nexus of art and culture as related
to power and evil. New constructs through which to view and understand the Holocaust can be
gained from a thorough reading. Although the book is dense with facts, theories and references, it
is focused successfully throughout on bringing the reader through exacting analyses to the logical
conclusions briefly stated in the introduction. The book is extremely well researched, and the
authors and works cited in the footnotes form an extensive and useful 13-page bibliography of
philosophical thinking about the Holocaust in itself. Eaglestone is a British academic, writer, and
professor of contemporary literature and thought at Royal Holloway, University of London, in
the Department of English. His writings all tend to cluster around critical issues of contemporary
literature and literary theory, contemporary philosophy, Holocaust and genocide studies and the
legacy of the Holocaust and the Second World War.
Eaglestone is known for his provocative ideations on contemporary fiction and ethics. He is
well credentialed to write “The Broken Voice,” and says that his research explores how literature
“thinks,” especially in the way this functions in relation to issues of ethics. By this he means a
concern with ethical relationships to the past, centrally the Holocaust, and to other genocides and
atrocities as well. In this book he draws on memory studies and trauma studies, as well as on the
controversial ideas of original thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, Raymond Williams and Phillipe
Lacoue-Labarthe.
Eaglestone’s book was written with a deep awareness of the fact that we live in an age of
historical revisionism, and he is concerned with the fact that false representations of memory serve
to create a fertile climate for right-wing extremists to assault the basic facts of history itself. Given
this disturbing situation, Eaglestone discusses the purpose of literature is a means not only to
recall what actually happened in the Holocaust, but to help us learn that not all of history can be
explained by fact patterns and logic.
It is critical, he argues, to think deeply about events and join the past, present and future
together in a way that has meaning. It is only through the constant effort of sifting and shifting our
understanding of how the facts fit together with the vagaries of human thought and emotion that
we can being to grasp and repair the “broken voice.”
Eaglestone deftly takes us through the process one step at a time. In the first chapter, entitled
The Public Secret, he helps us gain a subjective understanding of some of the most highly debated
themes of the war crimes committed by the Nazis. He does this by asking us to consider how much
ordinary Germans knew about the events of the Holocaust. Were they aware of the concentration
camps? Did they know about the atrocities that led to the so-called Final Solution? Maintaining
that it is beyond the ability of historians to determine the extent of individual knowledge, the
author uses examples from novels to examine the structure and extent of complicity and how this
functions to efficiently degrade communities.
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Chapter two focuses on evil and raises the issue of how it is to be understood. Here the author
uses material by and about the perpetrators of the Holocaust and then turns to contemporary
fiction to search for definition and meaning. Hannah Arendt’s ideas once again illuminate the
discussion. This is the longest chapter in the book, and the one in which the author seeks to define
the essential nature of evil, maintaining that much of the evil in the Holocaust was perpetrated not
by monsters, as a great number of historians would have us believe, but by ordinary people.
Next the author turns to methods of working through the past to try to come to grips with its
influence on today. This is the most complex chapter, and once again he analyses novels to see
why and how individuals can come to understand complex events of the past—or fail to do so—
stressing how memory and meaning invariably meet and shape one another.
Chapters four and five consider the colonial past and post-colonial present and their
relationship to the Holocaust and genocide, examining racist ideologies by focusing on African
trauma literature. In the final chapter, Eaglestone turns to art and culture to consider whether
artistic representations of the Holocaust give it justice or if the act of creating the art cheapens
the subject and turns it into something designed to shock, rather than to commemorate or offer
meaning. He suggests that the Holocaust is simply too complex to be captured effectively in many
art forms.
Ultimately, Eaglestone argues that literature and art must be pondered deeply, discussed
among the populace and then recreated and retold in new ways. He says, “The Jewish philosopher
and survivor Emmanuel Levinas wrote that the cries of the victims of the Holocaust ‘are
inextinguishable: they echo and re-echo across eternity. What we must do is listen to the thoughts
that they contain.’” This, he concludes, provides our best chance of fixing the “broken voice.”
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On May 20th, 1960, Adolf Eichmann was abducted by civilians and members of the Israeli
Mossad secret service agents, from his house in the suburb of San Fernando, Province of Buenos
Aires. The former lieutenant colonel was secretly living in Argentina, were he had entered ten years
ago, with a fake passport issued by an Italian delegation of the International Committee of the Red
Cross. Five days after the abduction he was in Israel, were he was prosecuted and charged under
crimes against humanity, and later on May 31st, 1962, he was hanged.
El vecino alemán is a film about the life of Adolf Eichmann during the time he was hidden in
Argentina, right after the Holocaust and Second War World II years. There are several references
right from the start about the trial he faced in Israel at Jerusalem´s courts, where he was convicted
and executed for his criminal participation during the Nazi regime, on grounds that as a high
command he was actively involved as a supervisor of the mass deportation of Jews to extermination
camps in Nazi occupied eastern Europe during the war.
The trial itself shows different behaviors of Eichmann during it, who right from the beginning,
keeps justifying every killing command and pictures himself as a humble server who was not able
to change any single detail of the orders he was supposed to follow right from his superiors. There
is no remorse in him, according to his own words, an absence of feelings, probably funded on the
sense of loyalty that impregnated SS staff of the Nazi regime. The scenes on the trial, however, full
of survivors testimonies, are a constant reminder of the harm Eichmann caused to entire civilian
populations as a perpetrator, and a way to show the personal harm inflicted in each victim due to
decisions he made and orders he gave.
The plot: back in Argentina, the film starts with actress Antonella Saldicco in the role of Renate
Liebeskind, acting as a young Jewish translator, researcher and interviewer during the entire
documentary. She starts her job with the interview of a grandson of four survivors from the Warsaw
Ghetto, whom one of his grandmothers was also involved as a member of the Partisan resistance,
and he explains the fight inside his mind on ways for acceptance of the suffering inheritance he
received, and how to shape the family history to fit in his own life. There is some reference to a
trip he had to do to Poland in order to deal with the historical facts that were presented to him by
his grandparents. The need of a descendant to come to terms with sufferings he did not personally
live but still the same will always be haunting his mind. There is also a group of young local
people discussing about the fact that only perpetrators got punished while ordinary people who
got involved, or where just by-standers got away with crime, they also mention the fact that Israel
held Eichmann as a trophy, in exchange of the enormous amount of killed Jews.
References to Hannah Arendt will be present during the entire film, regarding the fact of her
active involvement during Eichmann´s trial, and her written essay about “Eichmann in Jerusalem”.
According to Arendt, evil does not originate out of hatred or perverse pleasure in inflicting pain or
suffering. Evil is essentially banal, as it emerges out of the absence of the imaginative capacities that
make the human and moral dimensions of our activities tangible.
Interviews on the film will continue with a testimony from a Jewish Argentine witness who
attended the trial in Israel, and then an interview to Alvaro Abós, a lawyer who was stunned to
learn that among Eichmann´s last words there was an specific reference about his gratitude for
Argentina, which triggered a research and later book called “Eichmann in Argentina”.
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Since the perpetrator lived in different places in Argentina, Jewish translator Renate Liebeskind
also visited the Province of Tucumán in order to get first hand testimonies of neighbors who knew
him. They described them rather as a regular citizen or as a former boss, and also a very ordinary,
educated, polite and serious person, who hardly spoke Spanish, and lived alone. Local researchers
find out more witnesses who knew Eichmann as “Ricardo Klement” and worked at the “Capri”
company. In Buenos Aires, he lived in the suburbs, in San Fernando, where testimonies of female
neighbors recall the Israeli secret agents kidnapping Eichmann, who by the time was only known
by the name “Ricardo Klement”, and after the abduction they recalled the agents keeping him
in his own house first, and later taking him to a plane dressed as a flight pilot, and drunk. One
of them also remembers having followed the trial on tv streaming. Other female witness was an
acquaintance of Eichmann´s wife, and she remembers him as a good person, a polite customer
who used to buy groceries at her store after his work day ended. There are huge contradictions
between his life as a simple civilian in Buenos Aires and his former role during the Third Reich,
where he neither prevented nor did he mind the tragic fate of hundreds of thousands, since by his
own statement there was nothing he could do to avoid the deportation and killings procedure.
Moreover, he denied the fact that deportees died inside the wagons during the trips to the KLs, but
also did not take responsibility on these issues since they were not among his duties.
Paola Delbosco, a doctor in philosophy from La Sapienza University, explained the
dehumanization process, not only for the perpetrators to find helpers in performing their tasks, but
also installed among the victims, and the fact that this process also includes an active aggressive
element, which makes the camp inmates do wrong to each other, after a period of mandatory
starvation, dirtiness, and sleep deprivation. The loyalty element is also brought to the Eichmann
trial, as a tool to comply with any orders given by the superiors. Doctor Delbosco also refers to
Primo Levi´s If This Is a Man Holocaust memoirs, to explain the dehumanization processes and
how empathy is lost due to them.
Doctor Rafecas, an Argentine judge, presented documental testimonies were Eichmann´s wife,
denounced to a local judge his disappearance right after he was abducted by Israeli secret forces,
and the reply from an Israeli Judge only confirmed the fact that there was nothing to be done in the
case, so the judiciary requests from Argentina would not be able to bring him back to the country.
More neighbors from San Fernando, Buenos Aires were interviewed to find out that also Adolf
Eichmann´s sons did not speak about their father, nor his grandsons would say much, and the
former house where he used to live was demolished because many people used to visit the place.
He was still seen as a good neighbor who helped for improvements for the benefit of all neighbors...
Title of the Film: El vecino alemán (The German Neighbor); Directors: Rosario Cervio, Martín Liji;
Producer: Martin Liji; Screenplay: Rosario Cervio, Martin Liji; Cinematography: Lucas Gaynor;
Film Editor: Rosario Cervio; Sound Designer: Julian Caparros; Cast: Antonella Saldicco; Country:
Argentina; Language: Spanish, German, Hebrew; Year of Production: 2016; Year of Release: 2018;
Production Company: Nana Cine; Duration: 93 minutes.
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